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Abstract
This thesis describes how transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic in the United
States varied geographically, with emphasis on population distribution and age structure.
This is made possible by the availability of medical claims records maintained in the private
sector that capture the weekly incidence of influenza-like illness in 834 US cities. First, a
probabilistic method is developed to infer each city’s outbreak onset time. This reveals a clear
wave-like pattern of transmission originating in the south-eastern US. Then, a mechanistic
mathematical model is constructed to describe the between-city transmission of the epidemic.
A model selection procedure reveals that transmission to a city is modulated by its population
size, surrounding population density, and possibly by students mixing in schools. Geographic
variation in transmissibility is explored further by nesting a latent Gaussian process within
the mechanistic transmission model, revealing a possible region of elevated transmissibility
in the south-eastern US.
Then, using the mechanistic model and a probabilistic back-tracing procedure, the
geographic introduction sites (the ‘transmission hubs’) of the outbreak are identified. The
transmission hubs of the 2009 pandemic were generally mid-sized cities, contrasting with the
conventional perspective that major outbreaks should start in large population centres with
high international connectivity. Transmission is traced forward from these hubs to identify
‘basins of infection’, or regions where outbreaks can be attributed with high probability to a
particular hub.
The city-level influenza data is also separated into 12 age categories. Techniques adapted
from signal processing reveal that school-aged children may have been key drivers of the
epidemic.
Finally, to provide a point of comparison, the procedures described above are applied to
the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks. Since the 2007-08 outbreak featured
three antigenically distinct strains of influenza, it is possible to identify which antigenic
strains may have been responsible for infecting each transmission hub. These strains are
identified using a probabilistic model that is joined with the geographic transmission model,
providing a link between population dynamics and molecular surveillance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The epidemiology of influenza escapes easy classification. At first glance, the transmission
of influenza is predictable: outbreaks strike temperate regions of the world each winter
without fail, and the influenza virus usually evolves so steadily that vaccines for the coming
season can be produced months in advance. But upon closer inspection, this regularity
gives way to inconstancy. Complex interactions between evolutionary selective pressure,
changes in interpersonal contact rates, and shifts in weather patterns may cause the timing
and severity of influenza outbreaks to shift unpredictably [151]. Sometimes, a novel genetic
variant of the influenza virus emerges, triggering a pandemic. Pandemic outbreaks can cause
infection well outside the months when seasonal outbreaks are normally observed, and can
cause severe disease in age groups that are normally resilient to seasonal influenza [254].
Variation between pandemics is great as well, ranging from the 1918 pandemic, which in
terms of mortality was among the worst natural disasters in human history, to the 2009
pandemic which, despite being caused by the same viral subtype as the 1918 pandemic,
featured morbidity and mortality rates that were hardly worse than for normal seasonal flu
[61, 232]. Apparent inconsistencies arise even at the level of individual outbreaks. The 2009
influenza pandemic spread globally far more rapidly than any previous influenza pandemic,
but its transmission at the country scale, at least within the United States, proceeded in a
slow, cohesive wave [91, 254].
Clearly, much uncertainty still surrounds the transmission dynamics of influenza. There is
a particular need to study the spread of pandemic influenza, since pandemic influenza is often
regarded as one of the foremost natural threats to human health and safety [28]. The 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic offers a valuable opportunity to study the transmission of
pandemic influenza in a contemporary setting.
2 Introduction
This thesis makes use of a dataset of unprecedented detail that captures the incidence of
weekly influenza-like illness in over 800 US cities between 2001 and 2010. A mathematical
modelling analysis identifies key predictors of the between-city spread of the major autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US, pinpoints the geographic
locations where the outbreak first became established, and determines which age groups
were most responsible for sustaining its transmission. Comparisons are drawn with two other
seasonal influenza outbreaks. The transmission patterns of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic challenge conventional wisdom at every turn, suggesting that extreme care must
be taken when developing strategies to mitigate the spread of future pandemics.
1.1 Biology and epidemiology of influenza
There are three types of influenza virus capable of infecting humans, labelled types A, B, and
C [44]. All three are thought to share a common ancestor, but have evolutionarily diverged
to the point that genetic material may be shared within a type, but likely not between types
[25]. Influenza virus types A and B cause periodic outbreaks in humans, while type C is
generally not capable of sustained human-to-human transmission [44]. Type A influenza may
be further classified into subtypes that specify the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase
(NA) antigenic proteins that are expressed on the virus’ surface. There are currently 18
known variants of HA and 11 variants of NA, each of which is assigned a number in order of
its first observation [46]. Influenza virus classifications begin with the type, and then, for
type A viruses, are followed by the HA and NA specification. Of the influenza A subtypes,
only subtypes A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 currently cause sustained human-to-human transmission
[46]. The strain responsible for the 2009 influenza pandemic is commonly labelled as type
A/H1N1pdm09 or simply A/H1N1pdm, to distinguish it from other A/H1N1 subtypes.
To replicate, the influenza virus binds to a cell’s surface, enters, and releases its genetic
material. Copies of the virus’ genome are made in the cell’s nucleus, and these copies are
packaged into new viral particles. Finally, the newly-formed virus particles exit the cell [25].
The genetic replication step is imperfect, so the influenza genome gradually accumulates
mutations. This leads to a process called antigenic drift, by which the antigenic proteins
expressed on the virus’ surface change. Over time, this can allow the virus to escape detection
by an immune system that has been challenged by an earlier form of the virus. Antigenic
drift is thought to be a primary reason why human immunity to influenza wanes over time,
making recurrent annual outbreaks possible [25].
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The influenza A virus also evolves according to a second, more punctuated process,
made possible by the fact that its genome is separated into segments. Sometimes, a single
cell becomes infected by different influenza A virus subtypes. During replication, genome
segments from these different strains may become packaged into a single new viral particle.
This can give rise to an antigenic shift, in which a virus is produced with a novel combination
of HA and NA surface proteins [25, 118]. If the new virus is capable of transmitting between
humans, a pandemic outbreak can occur, since underlying immunity to the new strain is
likely to be low [25]. Such recombination events are thought to have triggered the 1918
influenza pandemic and to have been important precursors to the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic [25, 118].
Influenza may be transmitted between humans through airborne droplets from coughs
and sneezes at a range of up to about six feet [42, 139]. The influenza virus can also survive
on surfaces, and may be transmitted via fomites [139]. Influenza infection presents clinically
in humans as an upper respiratory disease, normally associated with fever, chills, and a
cough [41]. Up to a third of influenza infections may remain asymptomatic [30]. Sometimes,
though, influenza infection is severe enough to cause major illness and even death, often
through secondary complications [41]. In the United States, influenza is thought to cause
over 30,000 deaths annually, with over 90% of these in the elderly population [52]. Pandemic
influenza outbreaks may feature shifts in the age groups that suffer the highest morbidity and
mortality, with children and young adults often disproportionately affected [254].
At the city level, the timing of influenza outbreaks may be modulated by population size
and/or surrounding population density [49, 50, 91]. A disproportionate amount of influenza
transmission likely occurs in schools [33, 199, 116]. School-aged children are thought
to bear the highest burden of infection during normal influenza seasons [252] and likely
helped to sustain and amplify transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in
communities around the world [117, 180]. The geographic transmission patterns of influenza
at the country and continent scales remain an area of open investigation [241]. A few studies
suggest that influenza may spread in relatively coherent geographic waves at this scale
[48, 91, 184].
Internationally, air travel likely contributes to the transmission of influenza [59, 96]. The
rise in air travel in the late 20th century may explain the rapid international spread of the
A/H1N1pdm pandemic in the spring of 2009, in comparison to the relatively slower global
spread of earlier pandemics [40]. Many of the earliest observed cases of 2009 A/H1N1pdm
infection were in countries with strong air traffic links with Mexico, where the disease was
first reported [132].
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The drivers of the strong wintertime rhythm of seasonal influenza outbreaks in temperate
regions are still not fully understood [151]. Fluctuations in temperature and absolute humidity
may play a role [62, 209], as might increased indoor crowding in the winter months, and
decreases in vitamin D associated with less exposure to sunlight, which may dampen the
immune system [151]. Dynamic resonance theory suggests that even small shifts in these
factors may be enough to sustain a seasonal pattern of influenza outbreaks, which could
explain why it remains so difficult to unpick the factors that drive the seasonality of outbreaks
[74]. Pandemic influenza outbreaks, however, may strike at any time of year, and often
feature multiple waves of infection in quick succession [40, 183, 254].
1.2 Chronicle of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic
in the United States
In February of 2009, the town of La Gloria Mexico suffered an outbreak of an influenza-like
respiratory pathogen [81]. At least one individual from La Gloria was later confirmed to
have been infected by a novel strain of type A/H1N1 influenza [81]. In April 2009, two
California children were found to have been infected by the same virus, confirming that the
virus had begun to spread internationally [40]. Within nine weeks of the first observed cases,
the virus had spread around the world, significantly more rapidly than any previous influenza
pandemic [254]. On 11 June 2009, the WHO officially declared the outbreak a pandemic
[40].
After an initial spike in influenza activity, incidence in the United States waned in July
and August, marking the end of the first spring wave of infection [40]. Some evidence
suggests that significant transmission of this first wave may have been limited to cities
in the northeastern US, despite the earliest cases being detected in California and Texas
[91]. Influenza activity increased again in late August, roughly coinciding with the start of
the autumn school term [40, 91]. This second wave caused significant levels of infection
across the US [122]. In the eastern US, the outbreak appears to have spread as a cohesive
geographic wave with an epicentre in Alabama or Georgia [91]. A third, less geographically
extensive wave followed in early 2010 in the southeastern US [209]. Overall, the 2009
A/H1N1pdm pandemic disproportionately affected children and young adults, both in the US
and worldwide, with abnormally high rates of hospitalisation and death among those under
the age of 60 [40, 254, 122].
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A number of intervention strategies were implemented to mitigate the spread of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US. On 27 April 2009, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) issued a recommendation that all US citizens avoid non-essential
travel to Mexico [40]. Local school closures were also reported throughout the pandemic
[40]. Many individuals voluntarily adopted personal prevention measures, including washing
hands more frequently, staying at home when feeling ill, and avoiding exposure to people
with flu-like symptoms [225]. The CDC began developing a vaccine for the new A/H1N1pdm
strain in April 2009, just six days after the first case was identified in the US [40]. The
vaccine was not approved until October, however, and was initially only administered to
groups deemed at high risk of infection [40]. Vaccine availability was not high enough for
mass vaccination until the end of December [40]. So, while vaccination may have reduced
the overall burden of infection during the pandemic, it did not have a major impact on the
transmission of the spring or autumn waves of infection.
1.3 Key concepts in mathematical epidemiology
1.3.1 Early contributions to mathematical epidemiology
In 1766, Daniel Bernoulli published an essay on the increase in life expectancy that universal
smallpox variolation might provide [19]. The document provides one of the earliest examples
of a mathematical model used to characterise the transmission of an infectious disease [68].
The following 150 years saw significant mathematical contributions to the mitigation of
disease, including Florence Nightingale’s use of statistics to successfully argue for sanitary
reform in Crimea [54], John Snow’s famous map revealing London’s Broad Street water
pump as the source of a massive cholera outbreak [220], and Sir Ronald Ross’s treatise on
the prevention of malaria [203]. However, it is William Kermack and Anderson McKendrick
who may be recognised as the founders of modern mathematical epidemiology. Their 1927
article “A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics” presents what are now often
regarded as fundamental equations of the field [131].
1.3.2 Geography and age in epidemiological models
The equations developed by Kermack and McKendrick rely on strict assumptions: they
require that all individuals in a population be equally susceptible to infection, that all equally
contribute to onward transmission, that interpersonal contact rates be uniform, and that
the infection be totally immunising [131]. Many of the developments in mathematical
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epidemiology over the past ninety years may be characterised as efforts to relax these
assumptions. Two key extensions to Kermack and McKendrick’s original theory are the
inclusion of geographic structure and age structure in epidemic models.
The importance of geography to the transmission of disease was clearly recognised even
before Kermack and McKendrick’s seminal article; indeed, John Snow’s mapping of the 1854
cholera outbreak, sixty years prior, is seen as a foundational moment in medical geography
[144]. Incorporating spatial structure into epidemic models is an obvious way to increase
their relevance, since infectious diseases may only be transmitted when a susceptible host
comes into physical proximity with a source of infection. However, as Lawson notes, major
developments in medical geography and spatial statistics did not occur until the second half
of the 20th century [144]. In 1969, Levins made a key contribution through his introduction
of the concept of a metapopulation, or a population of populations [148]. Levins was not the
first biologist to consider spatially-distributed populations, but he provides the first elements
of a robust mathematical framework for describing their dynamics [106]. Metapopulation
theory is attractive because it allows for some consideration of spatial heterogeneity, while
allowing sub-populations, or ‘patches’, to obey the stricter assumptions that underlie the
older epidemiological theory. Though one of the theory’s earliest applications was to study
animal species in physically separated settings like island systems, it was soon also used to
describe the spread of disease, where a pathogen spreads through a population of “island-like”
hosts, who themselves may also comprise a spatially structured population [98]. Hanski and
collaborators have made important contributions to metapopulation theory [103–105], and
Sattenspiel et al. (1995) [207] provide a theoretical treatment of Kermack-McKendrick-type
models on metapopulations. Metapopulation models are sometimes criticised for ignoring
important aspects of the physical environment, since few populations actually obey the
strict spatial clustering that the theory assumes [8]. However, since epidemiological data
are usually aggregated by geographic location, metapopulation models are often the best,
or only, viable option for describing the geographic transmission of disease. Furthermore,
interventions are normally implemented within well-defined geographic areas (e.g. cities),
making metapopulation models a natural framework for testing the potential impact of policy
decisions. Metapopulation models have successfully yielded insight into the transmission
of a range of diseases, suggesting that the trade-off of realism for tractability is warranted
[56, 75, 91, 100, 164, 256].
Individual-based models (IBMs) provide a second framework by which geographic space
may be considered in epidemic models. Rather than considering homogeneous patches of
spatially-separated individuals, IBMs account for an additional level of detail by keeping
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track of the movements and infectious statuses of all individuals in a population. IBMs
can provide insight into how individual-level variation affects disease transmission across
multiple scales, though the high level of detail incorporated into such models can sometimes
be falsely mistaken for fidelity to real-world processes [200]. Keeling et al. (2010) [128]
provide a useful comparison of epidemic dynamics on metapopulation models and on two
common types of individual-based models, the commuter model and the random movement
model. A version of the commuter model will be considered in §4.4.
For both metapopulation models and IBMs, the spatial range over which infection may
spread may be characterised in terms of a ‘kernel’. Kernels are functional forms, often only
defined up to a constant of proportionality, that describe how infectivity decays with distance.
For IBMs, the kernel may be more concretely interpreted as a description of the movement
tendencies of individuals in the population [128]. The shape of a kernel may be inferred from
pairwise movement data [127, 201], or, in the absence of such data, a parametric form for
the kernel may be specified a priori, and parameters may be chosen so that the kernel best
accounts for the observed spatial spread of a disease [48, 91, 239, 256]. Gravity and radiation
kernels are the two most common parametric kernel forms used to model the geographic
spread of infectious disease in humans [200, 215, 250]. These are discussed further in the
introduction to Chapter 3.
In contrast to the metapopulation and IBM approaches, which partition populations into
countable units, it is also possible to consider disease transmission as a continuous spatial
process. This is especially common in the study of animal and plant diseases, where, for
example, the spread of rabies among foxes [172] and the dispersal of pollen [181] may be
seen as or approximated by diffusion processes in continuous space. There is also a rich set of
statistical tools for inferring patterns from epidemic processes observed in continuous space.
These include point process analysis to detect abnormal clusters of infection [70, 84] and
Gaussian process regression to characterise wavefronts of infection [11, 93, 196]. Gaussian
process regression is considered further in Chapter 3.
Age-structured models constitute a second key extension to Kermack and McKendrick’s
original theory. Host age can have a profound impact on disease transmission, both because
immunity to disease may vary by age [216], and because a person’s age largely dictates with
whom she/he spends the most time [170]. Due to the similarities between the mathematical
theories of epidemiology and demography (see [111]), age structure can sometimes be
incorporated into epidemiological models in an elegant and analytically tractable way. Key
contributions in this area include Dietz and Schenzle’s introduction of a general model for
the transmission potential of a disease in an age-structured population [69], Andreasen’s
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analysis of how fatal infectious diseases can regulate host population size and age structure
[5], Diekmann, Heesterbeek, Roberts’ development of next-generation matrix theory [66],
and Klepac and Caswell’s general treatment of stage-structured epidemic models [134].
Inaba (2017) [120] provides a useful overview of demographic and epidemiological models
with age structure. Further background on age-structured models, especially in the context of
influenza, may be found in the introduction to Chapter 5.
1.3.3 Turning points in the theory of infectious disease
Amidst the gradual development of increasingly realistic epidemiological models over the
last century, two key ideas emerged that mark particularly important leaps in the theory
of infectious diseases. These are a notion of the basic reproduction number, R0, and the
development of phylodynamics.
Thresholds have played a central role in the mathematical theory of infectious diseases
for much of the field’s history. Ross’s ‘mosquito theorem’, for example, states that malaria
control is possible by reducing the prevalence of mosquitoes below some threshold, and
Kermack and McKendrick proved that epidemics may only occur when population density
surpasses a baseline value [131, 203]. It was not recognised until later, however, that a central
idea, the basic reproduction number, binds these diverse threshold results together. First
explicitly formulated by Dietz in 1975 [67], the basic reproduction number
“represents the number of secondary cases that one case can produce if intro-
duced to a susceptible population.” [67, 111]
The basic reproduction number provides a simple criterion for whether or not it is possible
for a disease to spread: if R0 > 1, an epidemic may occur, while if R0 < 1, the infection will
fade out of the population. Importantly, it also provides an estimate of how difficult it may be
to control the spread of a disease, since the target of any vaccination strategy may be roughly
summarised as an attempt to reduce R0 below 1. A generalisation of the basic reproduction
number, the next generation matrix (NGM), provides a natural way of characterising how a
disease’s infectiousness varies with different strata of the population, such as across different
age groups [66]. Knowing the structure of the NGM can help develop targeted intervention
strategies that reduce transmission in sectors of the population that tend to cause the most
onward transmission. In Chapter 2, the basic reproduction number is roughly estimated for
the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm epidemic in the United States, and in Chapter 5 the NGM
plays a central role in the development of a method to infer the relative strengths of disease
transmission between different age groups.
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The second major theoretical advance came in the early 2000s with the formal incorpora-
tion of genetic theory with epidemiology, termed ‘phylodynamics’ [99]. The central idea
is that a pathogen’s genome does not simply dictate how a disease will spread, but rather
that epidemiological and evolutionary processes interact. This consideration is especially
important for influenza, which features complex evolution patterns that are influenced by the
human immune response and by the virus’ ability to infect a diverse range of host species.
Since the introduction of phylodynamics, a significant body of literature has developed that
considers epidemiological and genetic data in tandem [20, 82, 110, 241]. Interest in phylo-
dynamics has been spurred by the simultaneous development of computational frameworks
like BEAST that make it easier to extract information from genome sequences [73, 72] with
the ever-diminishing cost of pathogen sequencing. The development of robust methods to
incorporate epidemiological and genetic data remains a central priority in infectious disease
research [95], and is a primary motivation for the theory developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
1.4 Mathematical contributions to the study of influenza
At certain scales, Kermack and McKendrick’s original theory provides an adequate de-
scription of influenza’s transmission dynamics, as Spicer et al. (1979, 1984) demonstrate
in England and Wales and in central London [221, 222]. Using sophisticated inference
techniques but few adjustments to the underlying theory, Yang et al. (2015) [257] use a
Kermack-McKendrick-type compartmental model to estimate key transmission parameters
for ten recent influenza outbreaks in the US. However, the transmission dynamics of influenza
do vary across geographic space and with host age, which has spurred the development of a
a range of models that account for these and other sources of heterogeneity.
Geographic mathematical models for the transmission of influenza have existed since at
least the late 1960s, when Rvachev and colleagues used travel statistics from the then-USSR
to describe the between-city transmission of influenza [53, 205, 221]. More recently, efforts
undertaken by Viboud et al. (2006) [239] describe how commuting patterns affect the spread
of seasonal influenza in the United States across 30 years. A model developed by Eggo et al.
(2011) [75] for the between-city transmission of the 1918 influenza pandemic in the US and
the UK laid the foundation for work by Gog et al. (2014) [91] and Charu et al. (2017) [48]
who describe the between-city transmission of influenza in the United States between 2001
and 2010. City-level transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic in Peru and Mexico is
considered by Chowell et al. (2011a, 2011b) [49, 50] who, like Gog et al. (2014) [91] and
Charu et al. (2017) [48], find that a city’s population size and surrounding population density
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may predict its outbreak timing. Geographic models for the transmission of influenza in
Europe have been developed by Smieszek et al. (2011) [218] for Switzerland, and by Paget
et al. (2007) [184] for the continent as a whole. Prior to the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic, a few studies attempted to predict the likely geographic transmission patterns of a
novel influenza-like respiratory pathogen at the country scale [76, 77, 87]. These predictions
generally featured hierarchical transmission, with infection reaching major cities first and
then diffusing into surrounding areas. While this paradigm appears to match the transmission
of some diseases such as measles [256], work by Gog et al. (2014) [91] suggests that the
2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US did not follow this sort of hierarchical
spread.
At the international scale, an early model that considers the spread of influenza via air
routes is also contributed by Rvachev et al. (1985) [206]. Prior to the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic, a number of models were developed that sought to characterise the likely
international transmission dynamics of a novel pandemic influenza virus via global airline
networks [55, 59, 29, 114]. These generally found that, while air travel would be a key driver
of the outbreak’s spread, travel restrictions would do little more than delay the pandemic’s
inevitable progress. Retrospective studies on the role of air travel in the global dissemination
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic support their findings; indeed, the pandemic
did spread internationally largely along air traffic routes, and countries that imposed travel
restrictions saw little delay in outbreak timing [10, 132].
Age structure is also a key component in many mathematical models of influenza trans-
mission. An important early work by Longini et al. (1978) [156] evaluates possible control
strategies for influenza outbreaks in an age-structured population. Castillo-Chavez et al.
(1989) [31] introduce a model for influenza transmission that accounts for host age and
cross-immunity from different strains of influenza, and demonstrate that an interplay be-
tween this cross-immunity and age-specific mortality may explain the recurrence of waves of
influenza infection. Kucharski and Gog (2012a, 2012b) [135, 136] follow in this tradition to
describe possible mechanisms for the development of age-varying immunity to influenza, and
to describe how this variation affects the population-level transmission of influenza. Other
recent approaches to incorporate age structure into mathematical models of influenza trans-
mission centre around inferring the next-generation matrices that describe the transmission
of influenza by age group, as in Nishiura et al. (2010) [180] and Glass et al. (2011) [90].
These approaches are described in greater detail in the introduction to Chapter 5. Keeling
and White (2011) consider age structure and geography jointly in a mathematical analysis of
1.5 Summary of thesis 11
optimal vaccination campaigns, partly inspired by the outbreak of 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic
influenza [130].
Recently, phylogenetic analyses have led to remarkable insights into the transmission
of influenza. Phylogeography, which refers to the use of phylogenetic techniques to char-
acterise the spatial spread of a species, has played an especially prominent important role
in elucidating the transmission patterns of influenza at the international and country scales
[123, 160, 177]. Russell et al. (2008) [204] show that international H3N2 influenza outbreaks
are normally seeded from southeast Asia, while Bedford et al. (2015) [18] demonstrate that
other strains may circulate at low levels in other parts of the world throughout the year.
Nelson et al. (2011) demonstrate that the spring wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic in the US may have featured multiple different strains, while the autumn wave was
likely dominated by a single strain [177]. As it becomes more commonplace to sequence
influenza virus genomes, phylogeographic approaches hold great promise for refining our
understanding of how influenza spreads.
1.5 Summary of thesis
This thesis gives a detailed account of the transmission of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm
pandemic influenza outbreak in the United States, highlighting how geography and age
affected the outbreak’s trajectory, often in unexpected ways. Chapter 2 presents the data
on which the subsequent chapters rely. Special attention is given to a dataset derived from
medical insurance claims records that captures the weekly incidence of influenza-like illness
in over 800 US cities between 2001 and 2010. An outbreak onset detection algorithm is
developed and used to infer city-level outbreak onset times from these ILI data for the
autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm epidemic in the US. An exploratory analysis of these onset times
reveals a coherent geographic transmission wave that radiated across the country from a few
distinct epicentres, with city-level onset times normally first detectable in children. These
observations form the basis for the investigations in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
In Chapter 3, a geographic transmission model for the between-city transmission of
influenza in the United States is developed, following the groundwork laid by Eggo et al.
(2011) [75] and Gog et al. (2014) [91]. This model is used to identify key factors that affected
a city’s risk of infection during the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic. A non-parametric
extension to the model reveals how the disease’s transmissibility may have varied over time
and by geographic location. In particular, a region of especially high transmissibility is
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identified in the southeastern US, which has already been identified as an important region
for the spread of both seasonal and 2009 pandemic influenza in the US [48, 91, 209].
Then, in Chapter 4, the geographic transmission model is reverse-engineered to identify
the establishment sites, or ’hubs’, of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US. The
most important of these lie in the southeastern US and in the central valley of California.
Mapping the spread of infection onward from these hubs reveals a set of overlapping sub-
outbreaks, which provide a testable hypothesis for where distinct viral strains may have
circulated.
Chapter 5 considers how the transmission strength of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic in the US differed by age group. A general information-theoretic measure is
adapted to identify the drivers of disease transmission from age-stratified incidence time
series. Applying the measure to ILI data from the autumn of 2009 in the US reveals that
school-aged children likely contributed most to sustaining transmission during the pandemic.
Age-stratified ILI time series are also incorporated into the geographic transmission model
from Chapter 3, revealing a slightly different picture of which age groups may have been
most responsible for first sparking outbreaks in neighbouring ZIPs.
To provide a point of comparison, the above methods are applied in Chapter 6 to ILI
data from the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks. Special emphasis is placed
on the geographic transmission kernels for the three outbreaks, which succinctly capture key
differences in the speed and wave-like character of transmission during those seasons. For the
2007-08 outbreak, a brief statistical analysis of available geo-tagged antigenic data provides
a first guess of which antigenic strains may have triggered the outbreaks in each of the
transmission hubs in that season. This points a way forward for combining epidemiological
and genetic data to make more robust geographic inferences of how influenza spreads at the
country scale.
Chapter 2
Data
This chapter presents the epidemiological, geographic, demographic, and antigenic datasets
that underpin this thesis’ findings. Of primary importance is a dataset that measures weekly
influenza-like illness (ILI) incidence for twelve age groups in 884 cities across the US in 2009,
covering 61.5% of all physician practices in the country. These data are presented in §2.2.
An outbreak onset detection algorithm, based on the breakpoint method introduced by Charu
et al. (2017) [48], is presented in §2.3 to help visualise the spatiotemporal patterns present in
these data, and to lay essential groundwork for the transmission model developed in Chapter
3. The transmission model in Chapter 3 also relies on the population sizes, coordinates, and
school term start dates for the 884 cities where ILI data are available. Datasets that provide
these pieces of information are presented in sections 2.5-2.6. Finally, Chapter 6 relies in
part on knowing the prevalences of distinct antigenic subtypes of influenza across the US.
A dataset that captures weekly counts of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases by antigenic
subtype in 10 US regions is presented in §2.7.
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.6 are adapted from “Geographic Transmission Hubs of the 2009
Influenza Pandemic in the United States” (Kissler et al. 2017 [133]), submitted to Epidemics.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 A brief history of influenza surveillance
Records of an influenza-like illness may be found as far back as the 5th century BCE in
the writings of Hippocrates, who described a winter-time outbreak of an upper respiratory
tract illness in the sixth book of Epidemics [186]. Though humans have likely suffered from
periodic influenza outbreaks for many centuries, reliable records are sparse until circa 1650,
14 Data
when some of the earliest confirmed references to influenza were written [195]. The first
detailed records of the pathophysiology of pandemic influenza were made and shared among
learned societies during the 1761-62 pandemic [230]. By the onset of the 1918 influenza
pandemic, many cities had developed robust surveillance systems that made it possible to
closely monitor and respond to the outbreak’s spread [3]. The detailed records made during
that outbreak paved the way for quantitative analysis of influenza transmission; indeed,
efforts to model the transmission of the 1918 pandemic using original records continue to the
present day [6, 51, 75].
Since the early 20th century, influenza surveillance has become increasingly centralised.
In 1947, the World Health Organisation (WHO) launched the Global Influenza Programme
as a central platform for sharing surveillance information and coordinating outbreak response
[253]. Shortly thereafter, in 1952, the WHO launched the Global Influenza Surveillance
Network (now the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, or GISRS) for
virologic surveillance, just two decades after the influenza virus was first isolated in the
laboratory [195, 253]. Currently, formal influenza surveillance is coordinated by individual
countries, often according to standards specified by the WHO [248]. The rise of computer
technology has supplemented these formal surveillance tracks with data from social media
[141], search engines [89, 194], and electronic medical records [240, 260].
2.1.2 Modern influenza surveillance in the United States
Formal influenza surveillance in the United States is coordinated nationally by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and locally by state and city public health services
[43]. The CDC collects clinical influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance data from a network
of over 2,800 outpatient healthcare providers, and reports these data aggregated weekly for
10 geographic regions [43]. The CDC defines ILI as “fever (temperature of 100°F [37.8°C]
or greater) and a cough and/or a sore throat without a known cause other than influenza” [43].
Since many non-influenza respiratory illnesses trigger ILI symptoms, the CDC also collects
virologic data from approximately 100 public health and 300 clinical laboratories across
the US [43]. This provides a lower-volume but more specific estimate of weekly influenza
incidence than the ILI network offers, and gives information about which viral strains are
circulating during a given influenza season.
The surveillance data gathered by the CDC are often used as benchmarks of accuracy
[89, 214, 240]. However, the data are normally only available 1–2 weeks after the reported
cases have occurred, and do not provide information about influenza activity at the state or
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city levels [89]. To obtain data with better timeliness and resolution, efforts were made in
the late 2000s to estimate influenza activity using Yahoo and Google search terms [89, 194].
These platforms initially only provided data for the US, though Google Flu Trends (GFT)
later expanded to provide international estimates of influenza activity [94]. Despite early
success, GFT mis-calculated the timing and severity of a number of outbreaks between
2009 and 2013, and was discontinued in 2015 [94, 182]. Even so, internet-based epidemic
surveillance remains an active area of research [107, 211]. In addition to the above, dedicated
online platforms such as FluNearYou in the US and FluSurvey in the UK gather reports of ILI
symptoms from community volunteers [109, 155]. Though data from these platforms repre-
sent only a convenience sample of the population, they hold some promise for supplementing
traditional ILI data streams with high-volume, real-time data [2, 190, 219].
Electronic medical claims records offer an alternate source of high-volume ILI data in the
United States [240]. These records are routinely collected for insurance purposes during the
majority of outpatient visits in the US. A separate claim is made for each visit, containing the
physician’s syndromic classification of the patient’s illness [240]. Syndromes are normally
classified according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) scheme, which is
a widely-used list of possible causes of ill health and mortality [169]. Claims forms that
contain syndromic classifications of influenza or influenza-related symptoms can be extracted,
providing clinically-based ILI counts without requiring extra effort on the part of the clinician.
Viboud et al. (2014) [240] demonstrate that retrospective ILI estimates from medical claims
records can reliably estimate weekly influenza incidence and outbreak timing, even at fine
geographic scales, with greater success than GFT. Yih et al. (2014) [260] demonstrate that
medical claims records can provide reliable real-time influenza incidence estimates. Marsden-
Haug et al. (2007) [161] compare electronic ICD-9 ILI estimates with laboratory-confirmed
influenza incidence from US military treatment facilities, and find that ICD-9 ILI provides
reliable information about temporal trends in influenza incidence. Medical claims records
are not free from bias; a report by the WHO notes that “the interpretation of the data derived
from [electronic medical claims-based] systems will depend heavily on the local coding
practices, the external forces that influence coding decisions (such as reimbursement), and
clinician understanding of the coding system” [248]. That report, however, addresses the
international community; incentives and coding habits are unlikely to vary within the US
as much as they might between countries. In addition, aggregating records from multiple
physician practices can help to homogenise some of the variability introduced by particular
practices and clinicians. Overall, electronic medical claims records offer a promising and
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so-far underutilised source of fine-scale data on influenza incidence in the United States
[182, 240].
2.1.3 Geographic divisions in the United States
For this thesis, there are two important geographic partitions of the US population: the ZIP
code and the HHS region. ZIP (postal) codes are five-digit numbers assigned to groups of
mailboxes by the United States Postal Service (USPS) to facilitate mail delivery. The first
three digits of a ZIP code specify the processing facility through which its mail is sorted, and
so can be used as a slightly coarser level of aggregation than the 5-digit ZIP code [238]. The
ILI data to be considered in this thesis are tagged by the 3-digit ZIP codes of the outpatient
clinics from which they are collected.
ZIP codes do not necessarily correspond to well-defined geographic regions [234, 238].
To make it possible to link ZIP codes to geographic areas, the US Census Bureau publishes
ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs), which specify rough ZIP boundaries [234]. The US
Census Bureau also publishes sets of “Gazetteer Files”, which provide geographic and
demographic data for ZCTAs [233]. There are 884 3-digit ZIP codes in the 48 contiguous US
states for which Gazetteer data are available. Fig 2.1 depicts the population size distribution
of these 3-digit ZIPs, and Fig 2.8 depicts their geographic locations (see §2.5 for more detail
on how the 3-digit ZIP coordinates are obtained). The median 3-digit ZIP population size is
209,839 people.
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Fig. 2.1 Population size distribution for the 884 3-digit ZIPs in the US Census Bureau’s
Gazetteer dataset [233]. The largest 3-digit ZIP is Houston Main TX, and serves 2,983,395
people. The median 3-digit ZIP population size is 209,839 people.
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HHS regions are multi-state areas specified by the US Department of Health and Human
Services to act as an intermediary between state-level and national welfare-related governance
[237]. There are 10 HHS regions, roughly corresponding to (1) New England, (2) New
York/New Jersey, (3) the Mid Atlantic, (4) the Southeast, (5) the Great Lakes, (6) the South,
(7) the Midwest, (8) the Mountain West, (9) the Southwest, and (10) the Northwest. The
CDC reports much of its data, including its virologic influenza surveillance data (see §2.7),
at the level of HHS regions.
Three-digit ZIPs roughly correspond to towns and cities, and HHS regions generally
consist of climatically and demographically similar groups of states. However, neither of
these partitions is likely to be perfectly suited for epidemiological inference. Geographic
community detection is an active area of research that holds some promise for identifying
more relevant ways of separating populations into discrete clusters based on movement
patterns or interpersonal contacts [162, 176]. However, identifying which community struc-
tures are most relevant for the transmission of a particular disease is complicated, since
disease transmission often requires specific types of contact between individuals [170], and
since transmission dynamics may depend on complex interactions between interpersonal
contact patterns and exogenous factors, such as temperature and humidity [62, 209]. To
my knowledge, there are no suitably detailed studies on the geographic population clusters
most relevant for the transmission of respiratory illnesses in the United States, or indeed in
any country. The best approach appears to be to use the data at the level at which they are
available, and note that models should only be used to make inferences at the geographic
scale of the data with which they are parametrised.
2.1.4 Outbreak onset detection
Ecological invasion waves, such as those caused by a spreading pathogen, are often charac-
terised in terms of the times at which the invading species becomes established in distinct
geographic areas [92, 165, 256]. Doing so makes available a range of established modelling
techniques for describing the progress of the invading species [92, 103, 75]. For infectious
diseases, incidence time series are often routinely recorded as an outbreak unfolds. This
motivates a need for for methods that can infer outbreak onset time, or the time of pathogen
establishment, from a disease incidence time series.
There are many algorithms to identify the onset of an outbreak in real time from disease
incidence time series [1, 108, 242, 248, 251]. These are mainly used as aids for making
public health decisions during an outbreak. On the other hand, if the outbreak has already
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passed, it may be possible to make more accurate onset time estimates by retrospectively
considering the full incidence time series. There are indeed some strategies for retrospectively
inferring whether an outbreak has taken place and its rough timing [112, 189], but these are
not generally intended for identifying precise outbreak onset times.
At least two strategies exist for explicitly inferring outbreak onset times from retrospective
ILI incidence time series [48, 91]. The first strategy, the “threshold method” from Gog et al.
(2014) [91], defines city-level influenza outbreak onset times as the first of three consecutive
weeks in which ILI incidence in a given city surpasses a sinusoidal baseline fit to the ILI
incidence between flu seasons. This is similar in strategy to many of the real-time outbreak
detection methods cited above. Though conceptually straightforward, defining baselines
and thresholds can be difficult, and generally must be repeated for each new pathogen and
geographic scale [43, 213]. The second strategy, the “breakpoint method” introduced by
Charu et al. (2017) [48], takes a somewhat different approach. It estimates epidemic onset
time as the changepoint in the slope of a bi-linear trend fit to an ILI time series in the weeks
preceding the epidemic peak. This avoids the need to define a baseline and, as will be seen
in §2.3, provides a natural way of characterising uncertainty in the onset estimate. The
method can have difficulty identifying the onset times of outbreaks with multiple peaks,
though adjustments to the method described in §2.3.1 help address this problem somewhat.
Even so, it offers an alternative approach to identify epidemic onset times from noisy data
while making few assumptions about the epidemic process. An evaluation of the breakpoint
method and a comparison of its results with those obtained using a version of the threshold
method may be found in §2.3.2.
Outbreak onset detection algorithms are intended to identify the time of outbreak estab-
lishment, but not necessarily the prior time of pathogen introduction into the population.
Introduction does not guarantee establishment, especially for diseases with relatively low
R0, such as 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza [129]. If establishment does follow an introduction,
the time interval between the two events is stochastic. In general, geographic ecological
models tend to focus on establishment because establishment is easier to detect from routinely
collected data than sporadic introductions are, and because establishment is also a better indi-
cator of a location’s influence on its neighbours. Because of this, traditional metapopulation
theory generally assumes that a sub-population can only contribute to the onward spread of
an invading species after local establishment has occurred [103]. In the context of spatial
disease transmission, the time of outbreak establishment in a sub-population can be roughly
seen as the time at which that sub-population becomes infectious to its neighbours. It is
therefore epidemiologically convenient to characterise the progress of a disease in terms of
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its local establishment times, which can be done with the help of an onset detection algorithm.
Eventually, phylogenetic data might be useful for determining outbreak establishment times.
Infections in distinct small populations are likely to all have a common ancestor, and so
the time of arrival of that first successful ancestor could be taken as the time of outbreak
establishment. Genetic data for influenza does not currently exist at the geographic resolution
necessary to make such inferences, but this would be a valuable avenue for future work.
2.2 Description of the ILI dataset
2.2.1 Data source
The ILI data to be considered in this thesis come from a convenience sample of electronic
CMS-1500 medical health insurance claims forms [236] submitted by physician practices
across the US between 2003 and 2009. Syndromic classifications on the forms are coded
by physicians according to ICD-9 standards. Data from 354,402 practices are available for
2009, which represents approximately 61.5% of all physician practices in the US, and is
thought to capture over 50% of all outpatient physician visits in that year [240]. The health
records were first gathered and made available by SDI Health (now Quintiles IMS), a private
healthcare data analytics company [119]. Records are anonymised and aggregated by the
first three digits of the ZIP code of the practice from which they were collected, for a total of
884 locations. For the remainder of this thesis, these 3-digit ZIP codes will be referred to
simply as “ZIPs”. To my knowledge, this is the most geographically detailed ILI dataset ever
considered for the United States. Within each ZIP, records are available as weekly aggregates
across all age groups, as well as stratified into 12 age groups (<2, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19,
20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, 80+). Weekly ILI counts are inferred by extracting
all claims with a direct mention of influenza, or fever combined with a respiratory symptom,
or febrile viral illness (ICD-9 487-488 OR [780.6 and (462 or 786.2)] OR 079.99) [240].
Cases from individuals with lower socio-economic status may be under-reported; the nature
and impact of these biases are discussed further by Lee et al. (2017) [145].
Time series of ILI incidence are made by dividing the total number of ILI cases in each
week by the total number of claims made in that week, for each ZIP. This helps adjust for
variation in coverage and reporting rate by location and time. The same is done for each
age-stratified subset of the data. The result is a time series of overall ILI incidence covering
496 weeks for each of the 884 ZIPs, as well as twelve age-stratified time series of the same
length for each ZIP. These time series will be referred to as the IMS-ILI dataset, following
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Viboud et al. (2014) [240]. The IMS-ILI data, aggregated across all age groups and locations,
are depicted in Fig 2.2.
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Fig. 2.2 Weekly ILI incidence in the United States, aggregated across all age groups and ZIPs,
from the IMS-ILI dataset. The ILI ratio is calculated by dividing the number of recorded ILI
cases by the total number medical claims submitted in each week. The blue shaded band
highlights the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic, which is the major focus
of this thesis. The 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal outbreaks, which will be considered in
Chapter 6, are marked by the grey bands.
2.2.2 Data validation
The correspondence between the IMS-ILI data and reference influenza surveillance data
from the CDC is described in depth in Viboud et al. (2014) [240]. In brief, the weekly
incidence and peak timing of outbreaks in the IMS-ILI dataset both correlate highly with
the weekly incidence and peak timing from CDC ILI and CDC virologic surveillance data
at the regional level. The correlations remain strong when the data are stratified into four
age groups. Correlations for the same metrics are also strong when the IMS-ILI data are
compared with city-level ILI data from New York State. City-level correlations outside New
York State could not be assessed, due to a lack of reference data. Taken together, this suggests
that the IMS-ILI data may provide reliable information about epidemic timing by geographic
region in the US, even when separated into age groups [240].
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2.3 Inferring outbreak onset times from the IMS-ILI data
To infer outbreak onset times from the IMS-ILI data, an improved version of the breakpoint
method developed in Charu et al. (2017) [48] is presented, and its performance is evaluated
using epidemic simulations.
2.3.1 Breakpoint onset detection method with peak adjustment
The breakpoint method defines outbreak onset time as the changepoint in the slope of a
piecewise-linear regression fit to an ILI time series in the n weeks prior to and including
the peak ILI incidence within some pre-specified time window. Specifically, the parameters
{β0,i,β1,i,β2,i, ti,σ2i } of the following linear model are estimated by maximum likelihood:
Yit = β0,i+β1,it+β2,i(t− ti)++ εit (2.1)
where Yit is the ILI ratio for location i at time t, and where the noise term εit follows a
N(0,σ2i ) distribution. The parameter β0,i gives the vertical-axis intercept of the first line in
the trend, the parameter β1,i gives the slope of the first line, and the sum β1,i+β2,i gives the
slope of the second line. The (t− ti)+ term takes the value t− ti if the difference is positive,
and zero otherwise. The time of epidemic onset in location i is given by the maximum
likelihood estimate of the breakpoint time ti, denoted tˆi. To interpolate to a slightly higher
degree of temporal resolution, epidemic onset times are rounded to the nearest half-week,
following Gog et al. (2014) [91] and Charu et al. (2017) [48]. Uncertainty in the onset time
is captured by the likelihood profile for tˆi. For 2009, fitting to n = 17 weeks prior to the peak
(inclusive) provides enough ILI data points to give a robust onset estimate, while avoiding the
tail end of the spring infection wave that affected a number of locations. Fig 2.3 illustrates
the procedure.
For locations with very uncertain onset times (i.e. the log likelihood profile does not drop
by at least 2 units), the procedure is repeated using alternative peaks, which are defined as
any points in the time series prior to the true peak whose two immediately neighbouring
points are lower. Whichever peak yields the narrowest onset confidence interval is chosen,
with its corresponding onset. This helps to determine accurate onset times for locations that
have multiple peaks. Fig 2.4 depicts the original and updated onset times for such a location
in 2009. Any locations for which the onset likelihood profile does not drop by at least 2
log-likelihood units, even after this adjustment, are omitted from further analysis.
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Fig. 2.3 Illustration of the breakpoint method for determining outbreak onset time from a
time series of ILI incidence. The time series (dotted lines) depict the weekly ILI ratios for
Chicago IL (ZIP 606) and the nearby Madison West WI (ZIP 538) in 2009. Chicago is one
of the largest ZIPs in the US, with a population of 2.8 million. Madison West is one of the
smallest, with a population of 58,000. A bi-linear trend is fit to the 17 weeks of the time series
prior to and including the week of peak incidence. The onset date is defined as the maximum
likelihood estimate of the breakpoint in the bi-linear trend, rounded to the nearest half-week.
The solid curve below the time series depicts the likelihood profile (analogous to a probability
density) for the breakpoint onset. Both likelihood profiles have been rescaled vertically
for ease of depiction, since only their distributions matter. For Chicago, the distribution is
narrow, indicating a high degree of certainty in the onset estimate. For Madison West, the
distribution is wider and bimodal, where each mode corresponds to a plausible estimate for
the city’s outbreak onset time.
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Fig. 2.4 ILI time series for Fresno CA in 2009 (black), with the original breakpoint likelihood
profile (blue, dashed) obtained using the overall peak incidence (dashed arrow), and the
adjusted breakpoint likelihood profile (blue, solid), obtained by using the earlier peak (solid
arrow). Both likelihood profiles have been rescaled for ease of depiction, since only their
distributions matter. The original likelihood profile is broad and double-peaked, and does not
drop sufficiently to give a reliable onset estimate. The adjusted likelihood profile is sharp,
indicating a confident onset estimate.
2.3.2 Evaluation of the breakpoint method
Using epidemic simulations, it is possible to check the breakpoint method’s ability to
accurately identify outbreak onset times. In this section, the breakpoint method is used to
estimate onset times for simulated outbreaks of varying strengths and with varying degrees of
autocorrelation between the incidence in consecutive weeks. Onsets are also calculated using
a version of the threshold method presented in Gog et al. (2014). The performance of both
onset detection methods improves with increasing epidemic strength. The performance of the
threshold method worsens with increasing autocorrelation, while the breakpoint method is
fairly robust to autocorrelation. In general, breakpoint onset estimates are both more accurate
(less biased) and more precise (have lower variance) than threshold onset estimates.
Simulated epidemic time series are generated using a two-component self-exciting Pois-
son process model inspired by Held et al. (2006) [112]. This framework permits flexible
modelling of stochastic epidemic processes without needing to make assumptions about the
number of susceptible individuals in a population, which is difficult to estimate for influenza
[257]. The incidence at discrete time t, Zt , is defined as the sum of an endemic process Xt
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and an epidemic process Yt :
Zt = Xt +Yt ,
Xt ∼ Poisson(νt)
Yt |Zt−1 ∼ Poisson(λtZt−1)
(2.2)
where νt is the mean value of the endemic process at time t, and λt is an excitation parameter.
If λt > 1, the epidemic will grow, and if λt < 1, it will decay. If the time step length
is approximately equal to the disease’s generation interval, then λt is analogous to the
reproduction number R.
A different approach for producing these epidemic simulations would model the endemic
and epidemic components Xt and Yt as independent processes. This second approach is
arguably more epidemiologically accurate for influenza than Eq 2.2, if Xt is interpreted as
non-influenza ILI and Yt is interpreted as true influenza infections. Non-influenza infections
clearly cannot directly cause influenza, but in Eq 2.2, the endemic process X contributes
directly to infections in the epidemic process Y through the history of Z. The primary reason
for using Eq 2.2 rather than a superposition of two independent processes is that it allows
the modeller to more easily specify the time of outbreak onset/establishment, as opposed to
the time of the first case introduction(s). If one were to model the endemic and epidemic
processes independently, one would have to seed the epidemic process with some number of
infected individuals at time tseed . If the number of initially infected individuals is small, there
is a high probability that the epidemic will fail. If the epidemic does become established, the
time of establishment will not generally fall on a consistent date. If one attempts to force
establishment on a particular date by introducing many infected individuals at once, this
leads to an artificial deterministic jump in the number of cases at time tseed , making it easy
for an onset detection algorithm to detect the onset time, but revealing very little about the
algorithm’s actual performance, since sudden introductions of many infected individuals into
a population are rare. A better approach seems to be to increase the infectiousness of the
disease, expressed as λt in Eq 2.2, at some time point tstart . This more reliably simulates a
scenario in which the pathogen has been circulating at low levels for some time, and then
suddenly becomes established in the population at a specified time.
In Held et al. (2006) [112], the endemic mean νt is allowed to vary in time, but does
not depend on previous values of the process itself. However, in the IMS-ILI time series,
there is evidence of autocorrelation in the ILI counts outside of the influenza season. This
can be demonstrated in the following way: Following Gog et al. (2014) [91], weeks with
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non-epidemic ILI are defined as those in the nationally-aggregated IMS-ILI time series (see
Fig 2.2) with ILI ratio below 0.06. A sinusoid is fit to these aggregated non-epidemic ILI
counts to estimate the sinusoidal phase D of the out-of-season ILI. Then, a quartic function
plus a new sinusoid with phase D is fit to each ZIP’s ILI incidence time series for the non-
epidemic weeks. This trend is subtracted from the time series, providing a de-trended set of
non-epidemic ILI ratios for each ZIP. A one-step autoregressive (AR1) process
Wt+1 = φWt + ε (2.3)
is fit to each of these de-trended non-epidemic time series, where Wt denotes the t th value of
the de-trended time series, φ describes the level of autocorrelation, and ε is an error term that
follows a N(0,σ2) distribution. Since the de-trended non-epidemic time series are roughly
stationary (i.e. not increasing or decaying over time), we should expect φ to be smaller than
1 in absolute value. Positive φ values provide evidence of positive autocorrelation, for which
subsequent series values tend to be similar to their predecessors. The model parameters φ
and σ2 are fit by maximum likelihood using Mathematica’s TimeSeriesModelFit function.
Fig 2.5 provides a histogram of the autocorrelation parameters φ estimated from each ZIP.
There is evidence of positive autoregression, with a median autoregression parameter of
φ = 0.35 and lower and upper quartiles of 0.24 and 0.49.
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Fig. 2.5 Histogram of the ZIP-level autocorrelation parameters φ for the de-trended out-of-
season ILI ratios. There is evidence of positive autocorrelation in the de-trended time series,
with a median AR parameter of φ = 0.35 and lower/upper quartiles of 0.24 and 0.49.
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To incorporate autocorrelation into the endemic process, set
νt = µX +φ(Xt−1−µX) (2.4)
where µX is the mean of the endemic process Xt , and φ is an autoregression parameter with
0 ≤ φ < 1. Specifying the parameters in this way ensures that the endemic process has a
stationary distribution with mean µX . The variance of the endemic process is µx/(1−φ2)
[101].
For the epidemic portion of the model, Yt , the excitation parameter λt is held fixed at
some constant value λmin < 1 from the start of the epidemic until a time tstart . At time tstart ,
λt jumps to λmax > 1. Then, λt decreases linearly until it returns to λmin at time tend . This
yields an acute outbreak of length tend− tstart .
Table 2.1 lists the outbreak simulation parameters, their interpretations, and the values
they take on for the epidemic simulations. A range of φ and λmax values are tested to simulate
varying levels of autoregression and epidemic strengths. Each simulation is run for a total
of 52 time steps, with epidemic onset at time tstart = 40 and an epidemic duration of eight
time steps. The endemic mean µX is set at 20. Simulations are seeded with 20 endemic-type
individuals (X0 = 20). For each combination of λmax and φ , 1000 epidemics are simulated.
Fig 2.6 depicts a representative simulation from each of these ensembles.
Table 2.1 Values and interpretations for the parameters of the epidemic simulation model Eq
2.2
Parameter Values Interpretation
λmin 0.5 Epidemic excitation parameter, lower bound
λmax {1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5} Epidemic excitation parameter, upper bound
φ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75} Endemic autoregression strength
µ 20 Endemic mean number of cases
X0 20 Initial number of endemic cases
Y0 0 Initial number of epidemic cases
tstart 40 Start time of the outbreak
tend 48 End time of the outbreak
For each simulated outbreak, the onset time is calculated using both a version of the
threshold method and the breakpoint method. For the threshold method, an optimal threshold
value is identified for each pair of φ and λmax. To do so, the mean µZ and standard devi-
ation σZ of the process Z outside the epidemic period are estimated by simulating 10,000
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Fig. 2.6 Example outbreak simulations from model Eq 2.2 for autocorrelation parameter φ ∈
{0,0.25,0.5,0.75} and epidemic strength λmax ∈ {1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5}. Autocorrelation
increases from left to right, and outbreak strength increases from top to bottom. The vertical
axes measure numbers of cases, and the horizontal axes measure time in units of weeks. The
true onset time tstart at 40 weeks is depicted by the black dashed vertical line. The estimated
threshold onset time is depicted in orange, and the breakpoint onset time is in blue. The
horizontal black bar depicts the optimal threshold used to calculate the threshold onsets (see
Table 2.2). For two of the simulated outbreaks, those with φ = 0.75 and λmax = 1 and with
φ = 0.5 and λmax = 1.1, the breakpoint method fails to detect a sufficiently certain onset
time.
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consecutive draws from the process Z with λt = λmin, and computing the empirical mean and
standard deviation of these draws. This gives a ‘baseline’ description of the process Z with
epidemic forcing λt is at its minimum value. Then, threshold onset times are calculated for
each of the 1,000 epidemic simulations in the ensemble using thirteen possible thresholds,
ranging from µZ to µZ +3σZ in steps of size σZ/4. The threshold onset time is defined as
the first of three consecutive weeks that lie above the specified threshold, following Gog et al.
(2014) [91]. The threshold that yields the greatest number of onsets within± one week of the
true onset, lagged by one week (the threshold method systematically estimates onsets with a
one-week lag, see Fig 2.7) is taken to be the optimal threshold for that particular combination
of λmax and φ . These threshold values are listed in Table 2.2 for each pair of φ and λmax. The
optimal thresholds lie between 1.5 and 2.5 standard deviations σZ above the process mean
µZ , with higher thresholds preferred for stronger outbreaks (higher λmax). Optimising the
threshold in this way clearly cannot be done in a real outbreak setting, since the true onset
time is not known; the intention of doing so here is to investigate which threshold values
generally perform best under different epidemic scenarios, and to compare the breakpoint
onset times against the best possible threshold onset times.
Table 2.2 Optimal thresholds for each combination of autoregression parameter φ and
epidemic strength λmax, expressed as the number of standard deviations σZ above the process
mean µZ
φ = 0 φ = 0.25 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.75
λmax = 1.0 1.5 1.75 1.5 1.5
λmax = 1.1 1.75 1.75 1.5 1.25
λmax = 1.2 1.75 2. 1.75 1.5
λmax = 1.3 2. 2. 2. 1.75
λmax = 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.25 2.
λmax = 1.5 2.5 2.25 2.25 1.75
Fig 2.7 provides violin plots of the distributions of onset times inferred using the threshold
and breakpoint methods for each ensemble of simulations. For all combinations of λmax and
φ , the most frequent threshold onset time is one week later than the true onset time, while
the most frequent breakpoint onset time coincides with the true onset time. The breakpoint
onset times also have lower variance than the threshold onset times in all but one scenario,
with φ = 0.75 and λmax = 1. This suggests that breakpoint onset times are generally more
precise than threshold onset times. In some cases, and particularly for low values of φ and
λmax, the lower variance of the breakpoint onset times may be due in part to the breakpoint
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method rejecting more onsets than the threshold method. Recall that the breakpoint method
rejects an onset whenever the log-likelihood profile for the onset time does not drop by
at least two units, and the threshold method rejects an onset whenever there are not three
consecutive weeks that lie above the threshold. Rejecting onsets should not necessarily be
seen as a failure of the method; indeed, for small values of λmax, the simulated outbreak is
often so small that it is practically indistinguishable from the background ILI noise (see Fig
2.6). In such cases, it is likely better to reject the onset than to make a very uncertain onset
estimate. As epidemic strength increases, the acceptance rates for both methods increase.
The threshold method rejects more onsets as the autoregression parameter φ increases. With
high autoregression (φ = 0.75), the threshold method both rejects more onsets and yields
onset times with higher variance than the breakpoint method. Overall, this suggests that the
breakpoint method is a viable alternative to the threshold method, and generally provides
more accurate onset time estimates than the threshold method, especially when background
incidence is autoregressive.
2.4 Breakpoint outbreak onset times for the autumn wave
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United
States
In this section, ZIP-level breakpoint outbreak onset times are calculated for the autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the United States. Regressions are performed
between the ZIP-level outbreak onset times and ZIP population size, latitude, longitude, and
distance from the apparent epicentre of the outbreak, to summarise the outbreak’s overall
geographic structure. Uncertainties in onset time are mapped and regressed against ZIP
population sizes, revealing no systematic relationship between population size and onset
time uncertainty. A bias is revealed for the breakpoint method to preferentially estimate
outbreak onset times on half-weeks. Outbreak onset times are compared with outbreak peak
times, and it is shown that onset times cannot be obtained by a simple shift of the peak
times. Age-stratified ZIP-level onset times are calculated for the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm
outbreak, revealing that 10-14 year-olds tend to have the earliest observable onset times. The
reproduction number R at the start of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak is
also roughly estimated.
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Fig. 2.7 Violin plots for the outbreak onset times estimated by the threshold (yellow) and
breakpoint (blue) methods from simulated epidemics. Each column corresponds to a different
epidemic strength (λmax), and each row corresponds to a different level of autocorrelation (φ )
between consecutive incidence values. Each cell summarises the onset estimates from 1,000
simulations from model Eq 2.2. The top number at the foot of each cell gives σˆ , the empirical
standard deviation of the onset time distribution, with threshold on the left and breakpoint on
the right. The bottom number, r, gives the number of onsets that were indeterminable using
the method. For the threshold method, an onset is indeterminable when there are not three
consecutive points in the simulation that surpass the optimal threshold. For the breakpoint
method, an onset is indeterminable when the log-likelihood profile does not drop by at least
two units. There is a systematic bias for the threshold to detect epidemic onset one week late.
In general, the breakpoint method yields onset time estimates with lower variance than the
threshold method.
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2.4.1 Estimation of onset times
Before calculating the ZIP-level outbreak onset times for the autumn of 2009, all ZIPs with
population size below 20,000 are omitted, due to the small numbers of observed ILI cases in
these locations. There are 21 of these. For the remaining 863 ZIPs, the maximum ILI ratio is
sought in the range between 5 July 2009 and 3 Jan 2010, depicted by the blue band in Fig 2.2.
The ILI time series values for the 17 weeks prior to and including these peaks are isolated.
After following the breakpoint procedure described in §2.3.1, onset estimates are obtained
for 834 ZIPs. These onset times are depicted geographically in Fig 2.8. Fig 2.9 depicts the
geographic locations of the 50 ZIPs that are rejected either due to their small size or to an
insufficient drop in the breakpoint log-likelihood profile, as well as the ZIPs that are retained
due to the alternate-peak-finding strategy.
Aug Sep Oct Nov
Fig. 2.8 ZIP-level outbreak onset times for 2009. Discs represent ZIPs, and disc area is
proportional to the ZIP’s population size. The earliest outbreaks are depicted in green/yellow,
and the latest in purple/blue. A major epidemic wave appears to spread from the southeast-
ern United States, with a possible second epidemic wave starting in the central valley of
California.
The ZIP-level onset times for 2009 reveal a radial pattern of transmission, emanating
from the south-eastern US. In the western half of the country, there is evidence of early
transmission in the central valley of California. The epidemic lasts for about 14 weeks, with
829 (99.4%) of the 834 onsets occurring within 14 weeks of the earliest onset, in Grenada
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MS. The difference between the earliest (Grenada MS) and latest (Portland ME) onset times
is 19.5 weeks.
Fig. 2.9 ZIPs rejected due to low population size or high onset time uncertainty (red discs), and
ZIPs retained in the analysis due to the peak-adjustment strategy (blue discs), by geographic
location. ZIPs retained in the analysis with no need for peak adjustment are depicted in
light grey. Disc area is proportional to the corresponding ZIP’s population size. Most of the
omitted ZIPs are small, and show little evidence of a geographic pattern. There are, however,
two small clusters of ZIPs omitted in New York state. The relatively mild autumn outbreaks
in these locations prevented a clear onset from being determined.
2.4.2 Investigation of the 2009 outbreak onset times and their uncer-
tainties
Fig 2.10 depicts linear regressions between the ZIP-level autumn 2009 outbreak onset times
and ZIP population size, latitude, longitude, and distance from Albany West, GA. Regressions
are performed for all ZIPs (black) and also for only the ZIPs in the eastern US (red), which
are here defined as the ZIPs lying in HHS regions 1-5, following Gog et al. (2014) [91].
Separating out the ZIPs in the eastern US helps isolate trends associated with the major
pandemic wave in the eastern half of the country.
For both the eastern US and for all US ZIPs, there is a significant negative correlation
(p< 10−4) between outbreak onset times and ZIP population size. That is, more populous
ZIPs tend to have earlier onsets. While this may suggest that influenza tends to arrive in large
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Fig. 2.10 Regressions between epidemic onset times and ZIP population size (top left),
latitude (top right), longitude (bottom left), and distance from Albany West GA (bottom
right). Red points correspond to ZIPs in the eastern US (HHS regions 1-5), and black points
correspond to ZIPs in the western US (HHS regions 6-10). Regressions are performed for the
full US (black lines) and for the eastern US (red lines). All correlations are significant (p<
10−4). There are negative correlations between onset time and population size, suggesting
that larger ZIPs tend to have earlier onsets. All other correlations are positive, indicating that
the outbreak spread in a general north-easterly path, and may have had an epicentre near
Albany West GA.
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cities first, the trend may also be explained by the fact that there are more large ZIPs in the
southern US than in the northern US. This can be demonstrated by dividing the US along
39.15 degrees of latitude, which splits the country into 418 northern ZIPs and 416 southern
ones. The southern half of the US has 112 ZIPs with more than 500,000 people vs. 74 in
the north, and has 34 ZIPs with more than 1,000,000 people vs. 23 in the north. Conversely,
there are just 60 ZIPs with fewer than 100,000 people in the southern half of the US, and
87 in the northern US. Since the major epidemic wave in the autumn of 2009 travelled from
south to north, larger ZIPs would tend to have earlier onsets simply because they lay earlier
in the epidemic’s path.
To demonstrate this idea more rigorously, the epidemic onset times may be regressed
simultaneously on latitude and population size. That is, the coefficients of the linear model
yi = β0+β1lati+β2 popi (2.5)
may be estimated using linear least squares. Here, yi represents ZIP i’s outbreak onset time,
lati is the ZIP’s latitude, and pop is the base-10 logarithm of the ZIP’s population size.
For both the eastern US and for all US ZIPs, the coefficients β0 and β1 (for the intercept
and latitude) are significant (p < 10−4), while the coefficient β2 (for population size) is
insignificant at confidence level α = 0.05 (p = 0.080 for the eastern US and p = 0.087 for
the full US). This indicates that, when accounting for latitude, ZIP population size offers
little additional explanation of the variation in outbreak onset time.
There are positive correlations between epidemic onset times and both latitude and
longitude, suggesting that the epidemic wave tended to travel in a north-easterly path. The
slopes of the onset vs. latitude regression lines are similar for the eastern and the full US,
suggesting a consistent pattern of south-to-north spread across the country. The slope of the
onset vs. longitude regression line for the eastern US is perceptibly steeper than the slope
for the full US, indicating that the west-to-east spread of the epidemic was strongest for the
major pandemic wave in the east. The onset vs. longitude scatter also shows that very few
locations in the central US had early onsets, possibly indicating that transmission started near
the coasts and spread inward.
Finally, there are positive correlations between both the eastern and full-US outbreak
onset times and distance from Albany West GA. Albany West is chosen as the possible
epicentre of the outbreak because the main epidemic wave appears to emanate from Alabama
or Georgia (see Fig 2.8), and Albany West has the earliest onset date in those states, on 26
July. The correlation is more significant for the eastern ZIPs than for the full US, again
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pointing to a strong radial transmission pattern in the eastern half of the US emanating from
the southeast. Epidemic epicentres for 2009 are considered more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
Next, we check for geographic patterns in onset uncertainty. Onset uncertainty is mea-
sured here as the width of the log-likelihood profile for the onset time t j (see Fig 2.3) at
1.92 log-likelihood units below the maximum value, which corresponds to a rough 95%
confidence interval. These widths are depicted geographically in Fig 2.11. There are patches
of high uncertainty in the vicinity of Los Angeles CA, San Francisco CA, and New York
City NY. There is also a vertical band of ZIPs with elevated onset uncertainty in the central
US and a patch in Kentucky. For the ZIPs in New York City, initial rises in ILI incidence
were generally less pronounced than in the rest of the country, making onset detection more
difficult. The weaker New York outbreaks could be due to local immunity from an earlier
pandemic wave that struck the city in the spring of 2009 [91]. In California, many of the ILI
time series have multiple peaks, possibly due to multiple epidemic waves passing through
the state (see for example the time series for Fresno CA in Fig 2.4), which generally makes
detecting onset times more difficult. The locations with high onset uncertainty in the central
US lie along a boundary where population density drops sharply. Different epidemiological
dynamics on the western vs. the eastern side of this boundary may have exposed these cities
to multiple transmission waves, making onset estimates less precise. It is unclear what may
have caused the wide onset uncertainties in Kentucky, though it appears that Kentucky lies in
a region where the major epidemic wave in the eastern US slowed briefly (see §3.2.2). If
outbreaks in that region were for some reason comparatively less severe than in the rest of
the country, this would account for both the slowing and the elevated onset uncertainty.
Fig 2.12 provides a scatter of onset uncertainty vs. ZIP population size. There is no
significant correlation (p = 0.16). The total range of uncertainties is high, at just over 10
weeks. However, 95% of ZIPS have uncertainties below 4 weeks and 79% of ZIPs have
uncertainties below 2 weeks, so most onset estimates are fairly confident.
When interpolating onset times to the nearest half-week, the breakpoint method tends to
place outbreak onset times on half weeks rather than full weeks. Fig 2.13 depicts the number
of city-level outbreak outbreak onset times in each half week during the autumn of 2009. The
line is jagged, with locally more onsets on half weeks than on full weeks. Interestingly, the
threshold method has a similar bias in the other direction; though somewhat less consistent,
there is a tendency for the threshold method presented by Gog et al. (2014) [91] to place
onset times in 2009 on full weeks rather than on half-weeks (see Fig 2.14). One way to
circumvent this bias would be to simply ignore the step of rounding to half-weeks, but the
additional detail provided by interpolation arguably justifies introducing the bias. It may be
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Fig. 2.11 Epidemic onset uncertainty by geographic location. Disc area is proportional to the
onset uncertainty in the corresponding ZIP. Onset uncertainty is measured as the width of the
breakpoint log likelihood profile (see Fig 2.3) at 1.92 log-likelihood units below the peak
(same as the widths depicted in Fig 2.12). Onset uncertainty is largest in Los Angeles CA,
San Francisco CA, New York City NY, in Kentucky, and along a vertical band through the
central US.
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Fig. 2.12 Scatter of onset uncertainty vs. ZIP population size. Onset uncertainty is defined as
the width of the breakpoint log-likelihood profile (see Fig 2.3) at 1.92 log-likelihood units
below the maximum. This gives an approximate 95% confidence interval for the onset. There
is no correlation (p = 0.16).
2.4 Breakpoint outbreak onset times for the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic in the United States 37
possible to adjust the breakpoint method to reduce this bias, perhaps by performing some
sort of smoothing on the ILI time series before fitting the breakpoint regression, but for now
I leave this for future work, and proceed using the breakpoint method as developed above in
§2.3.1. This bias reveals itself again in Chapter 3 when we estimate temporal variation in
the transmissibility of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave. The implications of the bias will be
discussed further there.
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Fig. 2.13 Number of ZIP-level outbreak onsets per half-week in the autumn of 2009, as
estimated by the breakpoint method. The vertical dashed lines mark full weeks. There is a
bias for the breakpoint method to put epidemic onset times on half-weeks.
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Fig. 2.14 Number of ZIP-level outbreak onsets per half-week in the autumn of 2009, as
estimated by the threshold method presented by Gog et al. (2014) [91]. The vertical dashed
lines mark full weeks. There is a moderate bias for the threshold method to put epidemic
onset times on full weeks, though there are some exceptions to this, as in the large half-week
spike in late August.
Finally, we compare outbreak onset times with outbreak peak times, to check whether
there is a simple relationship between the two. Fig 2.15 depicts the difference between
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the maximum-likelihood outbreak onset time and the outbreak peak time in each ZIP. The
onset-to-peak time varies geographically, with ZIPs in a band separating the southeastern and
northeastern US, as well as in coastal California and in New York City, tending to have longer
intervals between onset and peak times. The long onset-to-peak intervals in the horizontal
band across the eastern US roughly matches with a region where the major epidemic wave in
the eastern US slowed briefly (see §3.2.2). The long onset-to-peak intervals in New York
may be due to underlying immunity from the spring wave of infection in that city. The
long onset-to-peak intervals in California may be due to multiple epidemic waves affecting
that state, which could cause especially long intervals between the onset of the first wave
and the peak of the most severe wave. Fig 2.16 depicts the distribution of times between
outbreak onset and peak. In most cases, the peak time follows the onset time by 3-4 weeks.
The distribution is wide however, ranging from 0.5 to 12 weeks, suggesting that onset times
cannot be obtained from a simple time shift of the peak times. In Fig 2.17, the difference
between peak time and onset time is regressed against ZIP population size. There is a slight
but significant positive trend (p < 0.01), suggesting that larger ZIPs tend to have longer
spans of time between outbreak onset and peak. Overall, this suggests that peak time tends to
roughly follow a few weeks behind outbreak onset time, with a longer time interval for larger
ZIPs. However, there does not appear to be a reliable way to infer epidemic onset times from
peak times.
2.4.3 A rough calculation of R at the start of the autumn 2009 pan-
demic wave
Using the IMS-ILI data, it is possible to make a rough estimate of the reproduction number
R at the start of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic in the US. Following
Wallinga and Lipsitch (2007) [243], the value of R at the start of an outbreak may be estimated
from the initial exponential rate of increase in incidence r and the disease’s mean generation
interval Tc. If the disease is assumed to follow traditional SIR dynamics described by a system
of ordinary differential equations, then the generation interval must follow an exponential
distribution [243], and an estimate for R is given by
Rexp = 1+ rTc. (2.6)
On the other hand, an upper bound estimate for R may be obtained by assuming that all
secondary infections occur exactly Tc time units after the onset of the infection that caused
them. In this case, the generation interval distribution is a delta function centred at Tc [243].
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Fig. 2.15 Difference between epidemic peak time and epidemic onset time by geographic
location. Disc area is proportional to the size of the difference. The largest time intervals
between onset and peak are found in California and in the mid-Atlantic states.
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Fig. 2.16 Histogram of the difference between epidemic peak time and epidemic onset time
in 2009. The distribution is wide, suggesting that epidemic peak times cannot be used as a
simple proxy for epidemic onset times.
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Fig. 2.17 Scatter of the difference between epidemic peak and epidemic onset time vs. ZIP
population size. There is a significant trend (p < 0.01), with larger ZIPs tending to have
longer intervals between onset and peak.
An estimate for this upper bound is given by
Rmax = erTc . (2.7)
To estimate R at the start of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic wave, a linear regression
is fit to the logarithm of each ZIP’s ILI time series from the onset week to either four weeks
past the onset, or the epidemic peak, whichever comes first. The slope of this line provides
an estimate of r for each ZIP. There are many estimates of the generation interval for 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza, 17 of which are listed in a review by Boelle et al. (2011) [23]. Six
of these estimates are made using data from the US. Table 2.3 provides the median Rexp
and Rmax across all ZIPs calculated using these six generation interval estimates and the
initial rates of increase r. All lie near Yang et al.’s (2015) [258] estimate of R = 1.24 at the
beginning of the autumn wave of the 2009 pandemic in the US. There is no clear geographic
pattern in the R estimates.
2.4.4 Age-stratified autumn 2009 onset times
Outbreak onset times can also be calculated by age group in 2009. To do so, epidemic
peaks are sought in the age-stratified IMS-ILI data within the same timespan as for the
age-aggregated case, from 5 July 2009 – 3 Jan 2010, and the ILI ratios for the 17 weeks
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Table 2.3 Median Rexp and Rmax (Eq 2.6 and 2.7) across all ZIPs using five different estimates
of the mean generation interval Tc for 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza in the US
Tc Source of Tc estimate Rexp (IQR) Rmax (IQR)
2.6 Cauchemez et al. [32], White et al. [247] 1.17 (1.13, 1.22) 1.18 (1.14, 1.24)
2.7 Lessler et al. [147] 1.18 (1.14, 1.23) 1.19 (1.15, 1.25)
3.0 France et al. [80] 1.20 (1.15, 1.25) 1.22 (1.16, 1.28)
3.4 Morgan et al. [167] 1.22 (1.17, 1.28) 1.25 (1.19, 1.33)
4.4 Yang et al. [259] 1.29 (1.22, 1.37) 1.33 (1.25, 1.44)
prior to and including the peak are isolated. Onset times are estimated using the breakpoint
method. Fig 2.18 depicts these outbreak onset times by age group. The radial transmission
pattern observed in the age-aggregated onsets (Fig 2.8) is apparent in the age-stratified onsets
as well, though it becomes more difficult to detect in the oldest two age groups, which tend
to have very noisy ILI time series and therefore many undetectable outbreak onset times.
Previous studies suggest that school-aged children tend to suffer the highest burden
of influenza infection during outbreaks [81, 179, 245, 252, 259]. This may lead to earlier
detectable onsets on those age groups as well. Fig 2.19 depicts the the number of ZIPs for
which each age group has the earliest onset. If two age groups have tied outbreak onset times,
both are counted as having the earliest onset in that ZIP. The 10-14 year-old age group tends
to have the earliest detectable outbreak onset times. More generally, infants and school-aged
children (ages 0-19) tend to have earlier onset times than adults and the elderly (ages 20+).
Chapter 5 presents a more thorough analysis of the relative roles of age groups during the
spread of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US.
2.5 Geographic data
The US Census Bureau’s Gazetteer files provide coordinates and population sizes for ZCTAs,
which roughly correspond to five-digit ZIP codes [233]. Since the US census is only
conducted every ten years, the 2009 population sizes included in the Gazetteer files are
intercensal estimates made by the US Census Bureau that account for estimated births,
deaths, and migrations [235]. To identify coordinates for the 3-digit ZIP codes, the population-
weighted centre of mass is calculated for all 5-digit ZIPs within a 3-digit ZIP code. The
distribution of 3-digit ZIP population sizes is depicted in Fig 2.1, and the coordinates and
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Fig. 2.18 ZIP-level outbreak onset times for the autumn 2009 pandemic wave, stratified by
age group. Disc area is proportional to the ZIP’s population size. ZIPs are only depicted
where where a reliable onset estimate could be obtained for the age group. The radial pattern
is visible in all age groups, though the time series for the two oldest age groups are too noisy
to obtain many reliable onset estimates.
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Fig. 2.19 Frequency with which each age group has the earliest onset in a given ZIP. If two
age groups have a simultaneous onset in a ZIP, the frequency count is increased by 1 for
both. Children (0-19) tend to have the earliest onsets. The 10-14 year-old age group has the
earliest onset time most frequently, in 163 of the 884 ZIPs.
populations sizes are depicted geographically in Fig 2.8, with the autumn 2009 ZIP-level
outbreak onset times.
2.6 Schools data
Data on school start dates in the autumn of 2009 are available at the state level from Chao
et al. (2010) [47]. In Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the five
states near the apparent epicentre of the autumn 2009 outbreak in the eastern US, school
start dates are available at the finer district level, also from [47]. Most ZIPs contain multiple
school districts, so ZIP-level school start dates are defined to be the median of all district
start dates within that ZIP. The model fits in later chapters do not change appreciably when
the mean start date or earliest start date are used instead.
Fig 2.20 depicts ZIP-level median school start dates in 2009 by geographic location.
Schools open earliest in the southeastern US and latest in the northeastern US, roughly
anticipating the trajectory of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave. However, the pandemic wave
proceeded much more slowly than the opening of schools; all schools were open within a
span of about six weeks, while the epidemic wave took over 14 weeks to spread from the
southern US through Maine. Fig 2.21 depicts a linear regression of epidemic onset times on
school start dates. The trend is positive and significant, indicating an association between
school start dates and epidemic onset times. However, again, an increasing lag between
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school start dates and outbreak onset times is apparent from the regression, suggesting that
outbreak onsets cannot be explained simply by the opening of schools.
Aug Sep Oct Nov
Fig. 2.20 Median school start date by geographic location. Discs represent ZIPs, and disc
area is proportional to population size. The colour scale matches the one in Fig 2.8, to allow
comparison between school start dates and outbreak onset times in 2009. Schools tend to
open earliest in the southeast and latest in the northeast, in a radial pattern that roughly
anticipates the spread of the 2009 pandemic. However, the pandemic wave spread much
more slowly than the opening of schools; in Maine, there is roughly a two-month lag between
the school start date and the state-averaged outbreak onset time. A cluster of six ZIPs in
southern Georgia (boxed) had the country’s earliest school start dates in 2009, on or before 6
Aug 2009.
2.7 Antigenic data
The CDC publishes weekly virologic data for circulating influenza strains through its FluView
portal, with records going back to 1997 [45]. These data consist of the weekly number of
laboratory-confirmed observations of four antigenic subtypes of influenza (A/H1N1pdm,
A/H1, A/H3, and B) for each HHS region. The data are collected from approximately
100 public health laboratories and 300 clinical laboratories across the US [43]. Clinical
laboratories are generally only equipped to identify the type of influenza virus (A or B), but
not the subtype, so some of the CDC virologic samples are tagged as ‘A/Unsubtyped’ [43].
The number of laboratory-observed observations of each subtype by week and HHS region
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Fig. 2.21 Scatter of outbreak onset times vs. school start dates. Red points correspond to ZIPs
in the eastern US (HHS regions 1-5), and black points correspond to ZIPs in the western US
(HHS regions 6-10). The black regression line is fit to all points, and the red regression line
is fit just to those points corresponding to ZIPs in HHS regions 1-5. There is a significant
positive correlation between outbreak onset times and school start dates (p < 10−4) both
for the full US and for the eastern ZIPs. However, the difference between onset times and
school start dates increases as the epidemic progresses. The dashed line depicts equivalence
between outbreak onset times and school start dates. Early in the outbreak, the regression
trend lines lie close to this equivalence line, suggesting that outbreak onsets and school start
dates were closely associated at the start of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave. As the outbreak
progressed, however, the discrepancy between onset times and school start dates increased.
46 Data
from 2001-2010 are depicted in Fig 2.22. In 2009, transmission was dominated by subtype
A/H1N1pdm09. Because the outbreak was dominated by a single antigenic subtype, there
are no detectable geographic patterns in antigenic prevalence in 2009. Virologically-based
geographic analyses of 2009 pandemic influenza transmission therefore must generally rely
on more detailed genetic information [160, 177]. Investigation of influenza genomic data lies
beyond the scope of this thesis, but remains an important area for future research [241]. For
other influenza seasons, such as the 2007-08 seasonal outbreak, multiple antigenic subtypes
co-circulated, making geographic inferences possible using antigenic data. This will be
considered further in Chapter 6.
2.8 Discussion
This chapter’s primary focus is on a dataset that captures weekly influenza-like illness (ILI)
incidence for 12 age groups in 884 locations across the US between 2001 and 2009. The data
are available from medical claims records maintained in the private sector. To my knowledge,
they provide the finest geographic resolution of ILI data ever considered for studying the
spatial spread of influenza in the United States. Viboud et al. (2014) [240], Gog et al. (2014)
[91], and Charu et al. (2017) [48] use the same ILI data aggregated to a coarser geographic
resolution, with the number of geographic locations ranging between 200 and 400. The only
other study of which I am aware that considers a comparable number of locations in the US
is provided by Yang et al. (2015) [258], who estimate epidemiological parameters for 10
influenza seasons using ILI data from 115 US cities. A number of surprising epidemiological
characteristics of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States have already
been pointed out in other studies, including the unusually early timing of the autumn wave
[122], unusually high rates of morbidity and mortality among young adults [122, 198], and
an unusually slow and coherent geographic wave of transmission that seems to have been
seeded, unexpectedly, in the southeastern US [91]. The fine-scale data considered in this
thesis provide an opportunity to study this unconventional outbreak in close detail.
A number of other studies characterise the spread of influenza at the country scale using
spatially-resolved ILI data. In addition to the studies just mentioned by Gog et al. (2014)
[91], Charu et al. (2017) [48], and Yang et al. (2015) [258], Chowell et al. (2011a) [50] study
the geographic transmission of influenza in Peru across 134 provinces using a combination
of ILI and laboratory-confirmed data. Chowell et al. (2011b) [49] use a combination of
ILI and mortality data to describe the geographic transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
pandemic in Mexico. Smieszek et al. [218] use sentinel ILI data from Switzerland to model
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Fig. 2.22 Weekly number of laboratory-confirmed cases of each antigenic subtype collected
by the CDC between 2001 and 2010. The blue shaded region corresponds to the autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic, and the grey shaded areas correspond
to the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal outbreaks, to be discussed in Chapter 6. The autumn
wave of the 2009 pandemic was dominated by the A/H1N1pdm strain.
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the geographic transmission of the 2003-04 influenza outbreak in that country. Paget et al.
(2007) [184] use sentinel ILI data and virological data aggregated to the country level to
describe the transmission of eight seasonal influenza outbreaks across Europe. All of these
find significant differences in outbreak timing by geographic location, motivating the study
of the geographic transmission of influenza outbreaks using ILI data.
Electronic medical claims records offer a promising source of disease surveillance data,
especially in the context of influenza [240, 260]. In particular, they appear to provide more
finely-resolved information about the geography and age structure of influenza outbreaks
than traditional surveillance methods can, while improving upon the accuracy of social
media- and search query-based ILI estimates [182, 240]. However, the electronic medical
record data stream still carries a number of limitations. As mentioned in §2.1.2, differing
local incentives and coding practices can reduce the reliability of medical claims data [248].
Conflicting incentives can be problematic at the overall health-system level, too; in the United
States, the ownership of health-related data in the private sector can drive up the cost of
access, making electronic medical records, while easy to collect in theory, sometimes very
difficult to obtain. In addition, privacy concerns rightly place a limit on the resolution with
which medical claims data can be reported, so that some degree of aggregation will always
be necessary. Not all aggregation strategies are the same, however, and more research is
required to understand how to achieve aggregation with a proper balance between privacy,
ease of coding, epidemiological relevance, and pertinence for intervention strategies.
Aside from the particular difficulties associated with electronic medical claims data,
ILI itself is an imperfect measurement of influenza incidence. ILI incidence is normally
reported as a proportion of physician visits due to influenza-like illnesses, which may not
correspond to the per capita incidence of ILI [258]. This makes it difficult to estimate
population-level influenza intensity from ILI data. Indeed, Viboud et al. (2014) [240] find
that, while outbreak timing in the IMS-ILI data correlates highly with outbreak timing in
the CDC’s ILI and virologic data, correlations in outbreak intensity between the datasets,
measured as total additional ILI after subtracting out a sinusoidal baseline, are significantly
lower. This provides a rationale for focusing on outbreak timing when considering the
IMS-ILI data, and motivates this chapter’s focus on developing a robust algorithm to detect
epidemic onset times from ILI incidence time series.
The breakpoint method, originally introduced by Charu et al. (2017) [48] and presented
in updated form here, appears to offer a robust means of identifying outbreak onset times
from noisy, potentially autocorrelated time series of ILI incidence. A major advantage of
the breakpoint method is that it avoids a need to define baseline and threshold levels of ILI
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activity, which generally must be done in an ad hoc way [248]. The adjustments to the
breakpoint method introduced in this chapter include (1) fitting the breakpoint regression to
a fixed number of time series points for all locations, to ensure that onset uncertainties are
comparable between locations, (2) introducing a strategy to measure onset uncertainty using
the likelihood profile of the breakpoint estimate, (3) using that onset uncertainty estimate as
a criterion for accepting or rejecting a time series from analysis, rather than simply rejecting
the 20% of locations with the smallest differences between maximum and minimum ILI
intensity, and (4) introducing a strategy for identifying accurate onset times from time series
with multiple incidence peaks. This chapter also presents the first systematic evaluation of
the breakpoint method’s performance. According to this analysis, the breakpoint method
performs best when the ILI time series has a clear, sudden rise in incidence at the outbreak
onset time, though its performance is still good in noisier settings. Most ZIPs in the US
have a sharp increase in ILI activity at the beginning of the autumn wave of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm pandemic, so the breakpoint method should give fairly accurate onset estimates
for that epidemic. The breakpoint method can also generally detect epidemic onset times
with higher precision and accuracy than an optimised threshold method, especially when
autocorrelation between subsequent incidence values is high. Interpolating the breakpoint
onset time estimates to the nearest half-week introduces a bias, with relatively more onsets
estimated to occur on half weeks than on whole weeks. However, the overall trajectory of
the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic that becomes visible when
mapping the breakpoint onsets (Fig 2.8) matches well with the patterns observed by Gog et
al. (2014) [91] and Charu et al. (2017) [48], the only other studies of which I am aware that
provide detailed pictures of the geographic transmission of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave
in the US.
The breakpoint method was not tested for its ability to detect outbreak onset times in real
time for an ongoing outbreak. Since the breakpoint method relies on the full epidemic time
series prior to and including the peak, it is possible that when presented with less data, such
as before the epidemic has peaked, a threshold-based method might perform equally well
or better. The breakpoint method might be prone to detecting frequent spurious onsets due
to stochastic rises in ILI that yield ‘false’ peaks. Also, to use the breakpoint method in real
time, one would have to decide upon an acceptable width for the onset likelihood profile,
below which an onset would be identified. This seems to simply push the task of defining a
threshold to a higher level of abstraction, which may not ultimately be helpful. It is therefore
unlikely that the breakpoint method will contribute to real-time outbreak onset detection, but
further work might still be warranted in this area.
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Statistical analysis of the breakpoint outbreak onset times offers insight into the ge-
ographic transmission of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic wave in the
US. In general, and in agreement with findings from Gog et al. (2014) [91] and Charu et
al. (2017) [48], the outbreak featured a major geographic transmission wave that spread
from the southeastern US. Wave-like geographic transmission patterns for influenza at the
continent and country scales have been reported in a few of other studies as well: Paget et
al. (2007) [184], for example, find evidence of west-to-east and south-to-north spread of
influenza across Europe in four seasons between 1999 and 2007, and Smieszek et al. (2011)
[218] report a north-easterly spread of influenza across Switzerland in 2003. As may be
expected by the relatively high incidence of influenza in children [81, 179, 245], outbreak
onset times from the autumn of 2009 in the US are generally first detectable in school-aged
children, with 10-19 year-olds leading the estimated outbreak onset times in more ZIPs than
any other age group. At the full US scale, it appears that the overall geographic transmission
pattern of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave was fairly consistent between age groups, with
all age groups showing evidence of a transmission wave spreading from the southeastern
US. The geography and timing of the start of the pandemic wave may be associated with
the relatively early start of the school term in the southeastern US. This would agree with a
number of previous studies that have identified schools as key sites of transmission during
influenza outbreaks [117, 199, 255]. However, the opening of schools cannot fully explain
the onward spread of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave, since the transmission wave lagged
well behind the start of the school term in many ZIPs, especially in the northern US. The
themes uncovered by these statistical analyses constitute major areas of focus for the rest
of this thesis: Chapter 3 examines potential contributors to the geographic transmission of
the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US, including the role of schools; Chapter 4
considers the geographic establishment sites of the outbreak; and Chapter 5 takes a closer
look at how different age groups may have contributed to both sparking and sustaining
transmission.
2.9 Summary
This chapter presents the key datasets that underpin this thesis’ findings. Special focus
is placed on a set of geo-tagged influenza-like illness (ILI) data obtained from electronic
medical claims records. This dataset captures weekly ILI incidence in 884 3-digit ZIP
(postal) codes across the US between 2001 and 2009. An onset detection algorithm is
presented, and its performance is evaluated using epidemic simulations. Epidemic onset
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times are calculated for the autumn 2009 pandemic wave in the US, revealing a radial pattern
of geographic transmission from a likely epicentre in the southeastern US. This overall
geographic transmission pattern remains visible when the ILI data are stratified into 12 age
groups. An estimate of the reproduction number R at the start of the autumn wave of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm pandemic aligns closely previous estimates. Additional datasets are introduced
that provide the coordinates, population sizes, and school start dates for the 884 3-digit ZIPs
covered by the ILI dataset. While the start of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
outbreak in the US roughly coincided with the opening of schools in the southeast, the
discrepancy between school start dates and local epidemic onset times increased as the
epidemic spread, suggesting that schools alone cannot explain the geographic transmission
of the outbreak.

Chapter 3
A geographic model of between-city
influenza transmission
In this chapter, a mechanistic mathematical model is presented to describe the between-city
geographic transmission of influenza in the United States. The model is fit to city-level
outbreak onset times from the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza outbreak in
the US. Analysis of the best-fit model reveals that a given city’s outbreak onset time was
likely influenced by its population size, the surrounding population density, its geographic
distance from infected locations, and possibly the mixing of children in schools within
the city. To flexibly account for additional unobserved factors that may have influenced
transmission, the model’s transmissibility parameter is allowed to vary in time and space
according to a Gaussian process. The optimal Gaussian process fits reveal a probable region
of increased transmissibility in the southeastern United States at the beginning of the autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 The gravity model
Metapopulation models provide a useful framework for describing the transmission of disease
between discrete geographic sub-populations (see §1.3.2). Modelling disease dynamics on
metapopulations requires specifying how members of the host species move between sub-
populations, or patches. A key challenge therefore consists in modelling how an individual
migrating from a given patch chooses a destination. Ideally, this is done with empirical
mobility data. For humans, this information can sometimes be obtained from survey-based
54 A geographic model of between-city influenza transmission
commuting data or mobile phone geo-tags [239, 246]. In many cases, however, such data are
unavailable or lacks sufficient detail. In the United States, privacy laws prohibit telecommu-
nications companies from sharing mobile phone locations with third parties. Commuting
data, which are available from the US Census Bureau, could be used instead. But, if the bulk
of transmission occurs between unemployed individuals, such as children, the relevance of
commuting data may be limited [91, 239].
The gravity model provides a simple and well-tested alternative for describing the move-
ments of individuals between metapopulation patches. Introduced by Zipf in 1946 [261], the
model states that the frequency of trips between two sub-populations is related to the product
of the sub-populations’ sizes and to the distance between them. In one common form, the
gravity model describes the amount of movement m between two sub-populations i and j as
mi, j = cNαi N
β
j κ(di, j) (3.1)
where Ni and N j are the population sizes of locations i and j, κ is a decaying function of the
distance di, j between the two locations (power and exponential curves are common choices),
α and β modulate the relative importances of the “donor” and “recipient” population sizes
respectively, and c is a scaling factor. When α = β = 1 and κ(di, j) = 1/d2i, j, the equation
has the same form as Newton’s law of gravitation, giving the model its name.
Zipf originally developed the model, naming it the “P1 P2 / D hypothesis”, as a heuristic
description of the between-city movement of individuals in the United States [261]. Later,
the model was set on sounder theoretical footing, most notably by Wilson (1970) [250] and
Batty and Sikdar (1982) [14–17]. Both theoretical treatments use an entropy maximization
approach to derive the model. The model in its basic form (Eq 3.1) has some clear incon-
sistencies: it is possible for the flux between a very small and a very large population to
exceed the size of the small population, and doubling the sizes of two populations quadruples
the movement between them, eventually turning all (or more than all) of the inhabitants of
the cities into commuters. To circumvent these problems, Wilson’s and Batty and Sikdar’s
formulations introduce unique balancing coefficients for each city. In practice, however, the
simpler version of the gravity model is normally used. As long as the model is parametrised
for the same metapopulation on which it is used, and the sub-populations do not grow or
shrink significantly, the apparent inconsistencies can be safely ignored. Some recent exam-
ples that use the gravity model to describe the geographic transmission of disease in humans
are given in [91, 164, 231, 239, 256].
3.1 Background 55
There is at least one important alternative to the gravity model. The radiation model,
introduced by Simini et al. (2012) [215], is intended to describe how workers commute
between cities. The model is founded on two basic assumptions: that the number of jobs
available in a city is related to the city’s population size, and that an individual will always
choose the closest job to her/his home that offers higher benefits than the best job available
in her/his own city. The model can be formulated in terms of the equations that describe
particle radiation and absorption. The model is parameter-free, which may be seen as both
an advantage and a disadvantage: in the complete absence of data, the model can still be
used, but when data are available, the model cannot adapt even if the fit is poor. A radiation
model was tested as an alternative to the gravity model kernel discussed below. However,
simulations from that model were incapable of reproducing the wave-like structure observed
during the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic wave in the US, due to too-frequent long-
distance jumps of infection between major population centres. All attempts to reproduce the
qualitative behaviour of the geographic spread of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic
wave using the radiation model were unsuccessful.
3.1.2 Survival analysis
Colonisation and extinction are the two key processes that underlie ecological dynamics
on metapopulations [106]. In traditional metapopulation theory, they are discrete binary
events: a given patch is either extinct or is colonised, and the switch from one state to another
happens instantaneously. A common assumption states that patches may only transition once,
from colonised to extinct or vice-versa. This assumption roughly holds true when modelling
non-recurrent ecological invasion waves, as are often observed for acute infectious diseases,
for which colonisation corresponds to infection. Survival analysis, which is the statistical
theory that describes the expected waiting time for sudden, permanent events to occur, offers
a natural mathematical framework for studying such systems.
In survival analysis, the time at which an irreversible event occurs is a random variable
with distribution uniquely specified by a hazard function h. The hazard function expresses
the time-varying rate at which the event occurs, conditional upon the event not occurring
prior to that time. Normally, time is taken to be a continuous variable. For epidemiological
modelling, however, observations are often binned into regular time intervals, making it more
natural to treat time as a discrete variable. To make the standard survival-analytic framework
amenable to epidemiological data, then, it is necessary to discretise time. In particular, we
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seek an expression for the probability of onset occurrence at a given discrete time t j, in terms
of some underlying continuous process. The following derivation is adapted from [202]:
Consider a continuous random variable T , which describes the occurrence time of an
irreversible event. Its probability density is given by f (t), and it has cumulative density
function
F(t) = Pr(T < t) =
∫ t
0
f (x)dx. (3.2)
Define the survival function
S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t) = 1−F(t) =
∫ ∞
t
f (x)dx (3.3)
as the probability that the event does not occur before time t.
The hazard function
h(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ T < t+dt|T ≥ t)
dt
=
f (t)
S(t)
(3.4)
is the instantaneous occurrence rate of the event, conditional on the event not occurring
before time t. This is the central object of study in survival analysis. From Eq 3.3, it can be
seen that S′(t) =− f (t), and so
h(t) =− d
dt
logS(t). (3.5)
Integrating gives an expression for the survival function S, and thus the overall distribution
of the event’s occurrence time, in terms of the hazard function:
S(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
h(x)dx
]
. (3.6)
Next, consider a set of time intervals t1, t2, . . . , where ti is the time interval [τi−1,τi).
Define the discrete random variable Tˆ , which describes the (discrete) occurrence time of an
event. Its probability mass is given by
fˆ j = Pr(Tˆ = t j). (3.7)
The discrete hazard function is defined as
hˆ j = Pr(Tˆ = t j|Tˆ ≥ t j). (3.8)
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Note that
hˆ j = 1−Pr(Tˆ > t j|Tˆ > t j−1) (3.9)
= 1− exp
[
−
∫ τ j
τ j−1
h(t)dt
]
(3.10)
which follows from Eq 3.6, where τ j−1 is allowed to take the lower bound of the survival
function integral since survival has been guaranteed up to time τ j−1. Now, define the “force
function” 1
λ j =
∫ τ j
τ j−1
h(t)dt. (3.11)
A high cumulative continuous hazard h over a given time interval translates into a high
value for the force function, so that λ j may be interpreted the amount of “force” driving the
occurrence of the event in time step t j.
To conclude, the hazard of occurrence of an irreversible event at discrete time t j may be
expressed in terms of the force function λ j:
hˆ j = Pr(Tˆ = t j|Tˆ ≥ t j) = 1− e−λ j , (3.12)
where λ j is the integrated continuous hazard function h over the bounds of the time interval
t j (Eq 3.11). This provides a way of expressing the discrete-time probability distribution of
event occurrence in terms of the continuous-time hazard function h. Specifying either h or λ
is sufficient to specify the discrete hazard function hˆ. Eggo et al. (2011) [75] and Gog et al.
(2014) [91] define expressions for the force of infection λ on cities during the the 1918 and
2009 influenza pandemics, and use relation 3.12 to construct the probability of observing
some full set of outbreak onset times across multiple cities. A derivation of this probability
expression may be found in §3.2.2.
3.1.3 Gaussian processes
Parametric models, which characterise data using functions of finite collections of param-
eters, are useful when an underlying mechanism for the process that generated the data
is hypothesised or known. When the mechanism is unclear, non-parametric models, for
which the number of parameters grows indefinitely with the amount of available data, can
1In traditional survival analysis texts, the hazard is denoted λ , rather than h. In epidemiological literature,
however, the symbol λ often corresponds to the force of infection, which is why λ has been reserved for the
force function here.
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help to identify meaningful patterns in the data. Rasmussen and Williams (2006) [196],
p.166, provide a helpful discussion of parametric and non-parametric models. A useful
type of non-parametric model is the Gaussian process. A Gaussian process is a flexible
random surface that can be regressed onto data. Gaussian processes are infinite-dimensional
generalisations of multivariate normal distributions, and have many of the advantages of
analytic tractability that accompany normal distributions.
Formally, a Gaussian process is defined as a collection of random variables, any finite
number of which follow a multivariate normal distribution [196]. Following [196], a Gaussian
process is fully specified by its mean function m(x) and covariance function k(x,x′), and is
denoted
f (x)∼ GP(m(x),k(x,x′)). (3.13)
The Gaussian process at any finite collection of points x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) follows the multi-
variate normal distribution
MV N((m(x1),m(x2), . . . ,m(xn))T ,

k(x1,x1) k(x1,x2) . . . k(x1,xn)
k(x2,x1) k(x2,x2) . . . k(x2,xn)
... . . .
...
k(xn,x1) k(xn,x2) . . . k(xn,xn)
).
The covariance function k must be positive semidefinite and symmetric in its arguments,
analogous to the constraints on the covariance matrix of a multivariate normal distribution
[196]. Different choices of covariance function yield processes that differ in smoothness and
how rapidly they vary with distance. The squared exponential (SE) covariance function is a
simple yet versatile example of covariance function. It is defined as
kSE(d) = exp
(
− d
2
2l2
)
(3.14)
where d is the distance |x− x′| between any two input points x and x′, and l defines the
characteristic length scale of the process, which is roughly the distance that must be travelled
for the function value to change ‘significantly’. Gaussian processes with a SE covariance
function are smooth, with mean-square derivatives of all orders [196]. This may be contrasted
with the exponential covariance function, which has form
kE(d) = exp
(
−d
l
)
. (3.15)
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The exponential covariance function is jagged (see Fig 3.1), without guaranteed mean-square
differentiability of any order.
The SE covariance function is a special case of both the rational quadratic (RQ) and the
Matérn covariance functions. The RQ covariance function has form
kRQ(d) =
(
1+
d2
2αl2
)−α
(3.16)
which approaches the SE covariance function as α → ∞. The RQ covariance function may
be interpreted as an infinite sum of SE covariance functions with different length scales,
and also has mean-squared differentiability of all orders, regardless of α [196]. The Matérn
covariance function has form
kMatérn(d) =
21−ν
Γ(ν)
(√2νd
l
)ν
Kν
(√2νd
l
)
(3.17)
with ν and l both positive and Kν a modified Bessel function. The argument ν is a smoothness
parameter, such that processes with the Matérn covariance function are ⌊ν⌋-times mean-
square differentiable [196]. The SE covariance function is obtained when ν → ∞. The
exponential covariance function is obtained when ν = 1/2. Figure 3.1 depicts draws from
Gaussian processes with the squared exponential, exponential, and RQ covariance functions.
When developing a Gaussian process model, a covariance function is normally chosen a
priori by the modeller to match the anticipated ‘character’ of the underlying process to be
described, such as its smoothness and rough rate of variation.
Gaussian process regression
In practice, one often wishes to fit a Gaussian process f (·) with covariance function k(·, ·)
to n observed data points y taken at locations x. For example, one might wish to model
how temperature varies across a geographic region, given readings y from a set of n weather
stations at coordinates x. One way to approach this problem is to model the observations as a
Gaussian process f (x) with additional noise:
y = f (x)+ ε (3.18)
where ε is a vector of the measurement errors at each site. If the measurement errors are
assumed to follow independent and identically distributed draws from a normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2n , the joint distribution of the observations y and a set of m
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Fig. 3.1 Five draws each from Gaussian processes with the squared exponential (SE) covari-
ance function (Eq 3.14; top left plot), exponential covariance function (Eq 3.15; top right
plot), and rational quadratic (RQ) covariance function (Eq 3.16; bottom plot) with α = 12 .
The length scale l is fixed at 1 for all three processes, and the process mean m(x) (see Eq
3.13) is fixed at 0. The processes differ primarily in smoothness: the squared exponential and
RQ covariance functions yield smooth processes with mean-square differentiability of all
orders, while the exponential covariance function yields a jagged process without guaranteed
mean-square differentiability of any order. Choice of covariance function is normally made a
priori by the modeller, depending on the anticipated qualitative behaviour of the underlying
process to be described.
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unobserved temperatures f∗ at locations x∗ is[
y
f∗
]
∼MV N(0,
[
K(X ,X)+σ2n I K(X ,X∗)
K(X∗,X) K(X∗,X∗)
]
) (3.19)
where K(X ,X) is the n×n covariance matrix obtained by evaluating the covariance function
for each pair of observation points x, K(X ,X∗) is the n×m matrix of covariances between the
observation points x and the prediction points x∗, K(X∗,X∗) is the m×m covariance matrix
of the prediction points x∗ with themselves, and K(X∗,X) = K(X ,X∗)T .
The posterior distribution of f∗, conditional on the observed data points y, is given in
[196]:
f∗|X ,y,X∗ ∼MV N(f¯∗,cov(f∗)) where (3.20)
f¯∗ = K(X∗,X)[K(X ,X)+σ2n I]
−1y, (3.21)
cov(f∗) = K(X∗,X∗)−K(X∗,X)[K(X ,X)+σ2n I]−1K(X ,X∗). (3.22)
So, the posterior mean and variance of the process can be evaluated at any set of points x∗
from just the covariance function and the observed data. This is the simplest case of Gaussian
process regression.
Often, however, the training data y are not observed directly. Instead, some process that
depends on y is observed, and the posterior process f∗ must be inferred indirectly. This may
be accomplished using a link function Φ that connects some set of direct observations t with
the process f (·). In one common case, the link function defines the probability with which a
particular event t is observed:
P(T = t) =Φ(Ω,y, t) where (3.23)
y = f (x)+ ε and (3.24)
f (x)∼ GP(0,k(x,x′)). (3.25)
Here, T is a random variable that describes the observation process, and Ω is a finite list of
additional model parameters. In this formulation, Φ is a semiparametric model, which means
that it is composed of both parametric (Ω) and nonparametric (y) elements. To estimate y
and Ω, one can consider the likelihood function
L(y,Ω|t) =Φ(Ω,y, t). (3.26)
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If it is sufficiently easy to evaluate Φ, posterior estimates of both y and Ω may be obtained
using a Metropolis Hastings algorithm. First, a prior distribution for the parameter Ω must
be specified. The prior for y is given by the Gaussian process, Eq 3.13. Proposals for y and
Ω are drawn from their respective prior distributions, and the likelihood (3.26) is evaluated.
The proposals are accepted or rejected with probability proportional to the likelihood ratio
between the current and most recently accepted proposals, eventually yielding a good estimate
of the posterior densities of y and Ω.
In addition to the detailed background on Gaussian processes and Gaussian process
regression provided by Rasmussen and Williams in [196], Gelfand et al. (2003) [85] introduce
a theoretical framework for fitting generalised linear models with coefficients that vary
spatially or temporally according to a Gaussian process. Building upon the related work of
Banerjee et al. (2003) and Banerjee and Gelfand (2006) [11], Goldstein et al. (2015) [93]
identify local trends in the speed and direction of the spread of an invasion wave of the gypsy
moth Lymantria dispar in the north-eastern United States.
3.2 Model definition
To describe the geographic transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the United
States, two related models are presented. They differ only in the parameter that describes the
transmissibility of the disease: in the first, transmissibility is constant across locations and
time, while in the second, it is allowed to vary by location and time according to a Gaussian
process.
3.2.1 Motivating the model structure
A metapopulation model is a natural choice for describing the geographic transmission of
a human disease at the continent scale. Humans tend to cluster into relatively well-defined
communities, such as cities and towns, and epidemiological data is often collected at the
same scale. For this analysis, data are available for 834 3-digit ZIP (postal) codes in the
United States (see Chapter 2), each of which roughly corresponds to a city. These ZIPs are
treated as the sub-populations of the metapopulation model.
The model is constructed to explain the time of epidemic onset in each ZIP as a function
of relevant predictors. Following Gog et al. (2014) [91], the model tests for effects from
population size and density, the onset of the autumn school term, and proximity to infected
ZIPs. It is assumed that each ZIP transitions exactly once from uninfected to infected, since
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the model only seeks to explain the initial invasion of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave.
Survival analysis offers a mathematically natural way of addressing this problem. From
this perspective, specifying the transmission model consists in defining a force function (see
§3.1.2) in terms of relevant predictors, which in turn specifies the probability distribution of
each city’s outbreak onset time via the discrete hazard function, Eq 3.12.
In both of the transmission models presented in this chapter, the force of infection λ
consists of two summed parts. The first part captures the baseline risk of importing infection
from far away (either from abroad or from some distant location within the country), while
the second describes the risk of importing infection from close neighbours. This form
is chosen in an attempt to reproduce the outbreak dynamics of the autumn wave of the
2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US, described in §2.4, consisting of a few long-distance
introductions followed by short-distance wave-like spread.
3.2.2 The fundamental transmission model
The force of infection on location i is given by the equation
λi(t) = β0+(βd + Iaβds)N
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt n
θ
j,tN
ν
j κ(di, j)
[∑ j ̸=i Nνj κ(di, j)]ε
(3.27)
where λi(t) is the force of infection on location i at (discrete) time t. This force of infection
may be interpreted as the cumulative continuous hazard of infection over half-week i (see
Eq 3.11). The input Ia is an indicator function that is 1 if the school term in location i
begins in week t+a, and 0 otherwise. Possible lags a ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5,2} are considered, to
test for heightened transmission due to increased social mixing between children up to two
weeks before the start of the school term. The summation index Λt is the set of all locations
with epidemic onset prior to time t. The input n j,t is the observed ILI ratio (see §2.2) in
location j at time t, normalised by the mean ILI ratio in location j from June 2009 through
June 2010, and fixed at 0 for all t prior to location j’s epidemic onset time. Models that
incorporated the ILI ratio into n j,t prior to location j’s onset time were also tested, but these
generally performed worse in terms of AIC than those that fixed n j,t at 0 prior to the onset
in location j. This jump in ILI essentially characterises outbreak establishment as a sudden
event, rather than a gradual process. This perspective is defensible in the context of a highly
infectious pathogen, for which the sudden presence of even a small amount of infection
in a neighbouring city leads to a large increase in the force of infection. The ILI ratio on
half-week values is taken to be the geometric mean of the ILI ratios on the full weeks just
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before and just after the half-week, following Gog et al. (2014) [91]. Inputs Ni and N j are
the population sizes of the recipient and donor populations i and j, respectively, normalised
by the mean ZIP population size. The parameter β0 is the background force of infection
due to long-distance seeding of infection, assumed constant for all locations, following [91];
βd is the transmissive strength of the disease; βds is a boost in transmissive strength due to
schools being in session in location i; µ and ν are gravity model exponents on the population
sizes of recipient location i and donor location j, respectively; θ modulates the importance
of the epidemic time series; ε modulates population density dependence; and κ(di, j) is a
decreasing function that describes how epidemiological connectivity between cities decays
with great-circle distance di, j. The model is based on the most parsimonious model from
Gog et al. (2014) [91], though the donor population size N j is re-incorporated, the epidemic
time series term nθj,t is introduced, and a more general distance kernel is used (see Eq 3.28).
Table 3.1 summarises the parameters’ interpretations and gives their possible ranges.
The distance kernel has form
κ(di, j) =
(
1+
di, j
ργ
)−γ
(3.28)
where di, j is the distance between locations i and j, ρ is the kernel’s distance scale, and γ is
the kernel’s rate of decay. Note that
lim
γ→∞κ(di, j) = e
−di, j/ρ ,
following a definition of the exponential function. In other words, the parameter ρ defines
the exponential curve that the kernel κ(di, j) approaches as γ → ∞ (see Fig 3.2). This way,
the kernel incorporates both power-law decay and exponential decay, the two most common
kernels for gravity models. Roughly speaking, ρ adjusts the kernel’s rate of decay at short
distances, and γ adjusts the kernel’s rate of decay at long distances. This is apparent by
examining the curves depicted in Fig 3.2.
The interpretations of ρ and γ become clearer when the kernel is seen as a custom
function designed to feature a set of desired properties. The first such property might be that
the kernel should describe power-law decay in the force of infection with distance, since
human movements are so often cited to follow power laws. So, one might propose
κ(di, j) = d
−γ
i, j .
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This kernel has a singularity at di, j = 0, however. To avoid this, one might propose the kernel
κ(di, j) = (1+di, j)−γ
which shifts the kernel horizontally so that it intersects the vertical axis at κ(0) = 1. Next, it
might be desirable to scale the distance di, j by some value σ to provide greater flexibility in
the rate of decay. Such a kernel would have form
κ(di, j) =
(
1+
di, j
σ
)−γ
.
The parameters σ and γ interact: increasing γ increases the steepness of the curve, while
increasing σ makes the curve more shallow. These adjustments are different in character,
however. Changes in σ squeeze or stretch the curve horizontally, which affects the shape
of the kernel most at shorter distances. On the other hand, γ specifies the rate at which the
kernel decays, which affects the kernel’s shape most significantly at larger distances. If both
γ and σ increase together, the parameters roughly offset each other, but the kernel changes
subtly in form: it approaches an exponential. This limiting exponential function has a decay
rate that depends on how quickly γ increases compared to σ . To untangle this relationship,
σ may be factored into ργ , where ρ captures this difference in the rate of increase in σ vs
γ . So, ρ explicitly gives the decay rate of the limiting exponential function as γ → ∞. This
yields Eq 3.28.
Parameter estimation
Parameter values for the fundamental transmission model, Eq 3.27, may be estimated using
a maximum likelihood scheme. To accomplish this, we here derive an expression for the
probability of observing some full set of outbreak onset times T = {T1, . . . ,Tn}, where Ti is
the outbreak onset time for city i, in terms of Θ= {β0,βd,βds,µ,ν ,ρ,γ,ε}, the set of model
parameters.
Consider a time step t for which the set of all previously infected locations, Λt , is known.
Recall from §3.1.2 that 1− exp(−λi(t)) is the probability that location i becomes infected at
time t, given that it has not been infected prior to time t, where λi(t) is the force of infection
on location i at time t. It follows that exp(−λi(t)) is the probability that an uninfected
location i remains uninfected at discrete time t. Let Ψt be the (random) set of locations
that become infected at time t, so that Λt+1 =Ψt ∪Λt , with Ψt ∩Λt = /0. Also let Λ¯t be the
complement of Λt , or the set of locations that remain uninfected at time t− 1. Then, the
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Fig. 3.2 Plots of the distance kernel κ(di, j) for ρ = 2 (top pane) and ρ = 1 (bottom pane),
with γ = {0.5,1,2,4,8,16} (grey curves). The solid black curves represent the case γ → ∞,
for which the kernel decays exponentially. As γ increases, the kernel approaches this limiting
exponential form. The kernel with ρ = 1 decays twice as fast as the kernel with ρ = 2; in
both plots, the point where κ(di, j) = 0.5 is marked, which occurs for ρ = 1 at exactly half the
distance it takes for the ρ = 2 kernel to decay by the same amount. The plots on the right-hand
side depict the logged kernels for the same ρ and γ values. These demonstrate that at long
distances, the kernel with finite γ will always decay more slowly than its exponential (γ→∞)
counterpart: the logged power kernel (finite γ) remains always convex, while the logged
exponential kernel (infinite γ) is linear. This is why the power kernel is often characterised as
having ‘thick tails’ compared to its exponential counterpart.
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Table 3.1 Geographic transmission model parameters, possible ranges, and interpretations
Parameter Range Interpretation
β0 [0,∞)
Force from external seeding
(importations from abroad or distant within-country)
βd [0,∞)
Transmissibility
βds [0,∞)
Boost in transmissibility from schools
µ [0,1] Importance of recipient population size
ν [0,1] Importance of donor population size
ρ (0,∞) Characteristic transmission distance
γ (0,∞) Transmission kernel decay rate
ε [0,1] Population density dependence (at high values, the fraction of
neighbours infected matters more than total neighbours infected)
θ [0,1] Importance of true neighbouring number infected
(i.e. importance of neighbouring epidemic time series)
probability that the set Ψt of locations becomes infected at time t is
P(Ψt |Λt ,Θ) = ∏
i∈Ψt
(1− e−λi(t)) ∏
i∈Λ¯t+1
e−λi(t)∏
i∈Λt
1 (3.29)
= ∏
i∈Ψt
(1− e−λi(t)) ∏
i∈Λ¯t+1
e−λi(t) (3.30)
which may be interpreted as a product of the probabilities that the locations in Ψt become
infected at time t, multiplied by a product of the probabilities that all locations not in Ψt
that were previously uninfected remain uninfected at time t, multiplied by a product of the
probabilities that each location that has already been infected prior to time t remains infected
at time t (which is 1 for this model, since locations can never become uninfected after having
been infected). Then, the probability of observing some full set of epidemic onset times T is
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a product of Eq 3.30 over each time step in the epidemic; that is,
P(T |Θ) =
max(T )
∏
t=1
P(Ψt |Λt) (3.31)
=
max(T )
∏
t=1
[
∏
i:Ti=t
(1− e−λi(t)) ∏
i:Ti>t
e−λi(t)
]
(3.32)
=
(max(T )
∏
t=1
∏
i:Ti=t
(1− e−λi(t))
)(max(T )
∏
t=1
∏
i:Ti>t
e−λi(t)
)
(3.33)
=
( n
∏
i=1
(1− e−λi(t))
)( n
∏
i=1
∏
t<Ti
e−λi(t)
)
(3.34)
=
n
∏
i=1
[
(1− e−λi(Ti))
Ti−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)
]
(3.35)
where (3.32) follows from substituting Eq 3.30, (3.33) follows from regrouping terms, (3.34)
follows from rearranging the products, and (3.35) follows from recombining the terms. The
initial set of infected locations, Λ1, is the empty set. The upper product limit n in Eqs 3.34
and 3.35 is the total number of locations.
Eq 3.35 may be interpreted as the likelihood of the model parametersΘ given the observed
outbreak onset times. Taking the logarithm gives the log-likelihood:
ℓ(Θ;T ) =
n
∑
i=1
(
log(1− e−λi(Ti))−
Ti−1
∑
t=1
λi(t)
)
. (3.36)
The parameter values Θ that maximise (3.36), given outbreak onset times T estimated by the
breakpoint method (see §2.3), are calculated using the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm, as
implemented in MATLAB’s fminsearch() function.
Model selection
Holding certain parameters in Eq 3.27 at null values (see Table 3.2) yields a set of simpler
nested models. These models can be compared against one another in terms of their goodness
of fit and complexity using an information criterion such as the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) [4]. The AIC is defined as
AIC = 2k−2log(L)
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where k is the number of parameters in the model and L is the model’s likelihood. Smaller
AIC values correspond to better models. To identify the “best” model, maximum likelihood
parameter values are estimated for the full model (Eq 3.27) and for all possible nested
models, yielding 480 fits in total. An AIC value is calculated for each model, and the model
with the best (lowest) AIC is identified. Table 3.3 provides the AIC values for a set of 20
representative nested models. While including donor population size Nνj in the model never
yields an improvement in AIC, including an effect from schools (βds) is preferred for some
classes of nested models. Specifically, for models in which the explicit ILI time series is not
included (θ = 0), models that include βds with one-week-advanced school start dates (a = 1)
are preferred by AIC. So, even though the best overall model does not include an influence
from schools, there is some evidence that mixing among schoolchildren – perhaps up to a
week before the start of the school term – may have influenced transmission of the outbreak.
Table 3.2 Null values of geographic transmission model parameters and interpretations
Parameter Null value Interpretation
βds 0 No effect from schools opening
µ 0 No effect from recipient population size
ν 0 No effect from donor population size
γ ∞ Distance kernel is exponential
ε 0 No population density dependence
1 Full population density dependence
θ 0 No effect from neighbouring number infected
*Null values for β0, βd , and ρ are not considered. Without β0, there is no
seeding, so the outbreak can never begin. Without βd , all parameters except
β0 are also practically removed. Setting ρ = 0 makes local transmission
impossible, while ρ → ∞ makes trips to all locations equally probable,
making the model no longer a geographic one.
The best model in terms of AIC has form
λi(t) = β0+βdN
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt n
θ
j,tκ(di, j)
∑ j ̸=iκ(di, j)
. (3.37)
That is, the optimal model includes effects from all parameters except school onsets (βds)
and donor population size (ν). The population density parameter ε estimated as identically 1.
The maximum-likelihood parameter values for this model are listed in Table 3.4, and their
profile likelihoods are depicted in Fig 3.3.
The absence of a parameter that captures the effect of the autumn school term in Eq
3.37 contrasts with the findings of Gog et al. (2014) [91]. Incorporating the neighbouring
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Table 3.3 AIC values and significant parameters for 20 of the “best” nested models
I-curve param Kernel param a Best ∆AIC β0 βd βds µ ν ρ ε
θ = 0
γ → ∞
0 28.5 • • • • •
0.5 28.5 • • • • •
1 25.5 • • • • • •
1.5 26.8 • • • • • •
2 28.5 • • • • •
γ free
0 23.4 • • • • •
.5 23.4 • • • • •
1 21.0 • • • • • •
1.5 21.6 • • • • • •
2 23.4 • • • • •
θ free
γ → ∞
0 2.8 • • • • •
.5 2.8 • • • • •
1 2.8 • • • • •
1.5 2.8 • • • • •
2 2.8 • • • • •
γ free
0 0 • • • • •
.5 0 • • • • •
1 0 • • • • •
1.5 0 • • • • •
2 0 • • • • •
To generate this table, all 480 models generated by setting all possible combinations
of the parameters to null values, and considering all possible school onset lags up to
two weeks, were fit to data. The AIC values reported here are for all combinations
of θ (fixed at 0 or free), γ (fixed at ∞ or free), and a ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5,2}. For each of
these combinations, the best model in terms of AIC was identified. The bullets in the
columns on the right-hand side of the table indicate which parameters are included in
those best models. The parameter ν is never included (it is always fit to effectively
0), and the parameter βds is only included for the θ = 0 models, at a = 1 and a = 1.5.
Note that lower AIC values correspond to “better” models. The raw AIC score for the
best model is 4275.6.
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outbreak ILI intensity, n j,t , which was not done in Gog et al. (2014) [91], can account for this
difference. Specifically, the neighbouring outbreak intensity n j,t seems to capture most of the
relevant information encoded in the school opening term Ia, rendering βds redundant. Indeed,
in a subset of ZIPs – especially those in the southeast – a rise in ILI intensity is associated
with the start of the autumn school term. Fig 3.4 depicts the ZIPs with outbreak onset time
within one week of the start of the autumn school term. While school term start dates are
closely linked with outbreak onset times in the southeast, the lag between school start dates
and outbreak onset times increases over the course of the epidemic, with some outbreaks in
the northeast trailing the start of the school term by two months or more (see Fig 2.21). The
ILI intensity term nθj,t may therefore capture much of the relevant school-term information at
the start of the outbreak, and, unlike the school term, remain a relevant predictor of onset
times as the epidemic unfolds, leading to an ultimate rejection of the parameter βds in the
most parsimonious model, Eq 3.37.
Table 3.4 Maximum likelihood parameter values for the best transmission model, Eq 3.37
(see also Fig 3.3)
Parameter Estimated value (95% CI) Units
β0 0.00043 (0.00015, 0.00087) (∆t)−1
βd 0.61 (0.53, 0.70) (∆t)−1(km)1−ε
µ 0.32 (0.24, 0.40) none
ρ 66 (48, 96) km
γ 8.9 (5.5, 74) none
ε 1.0 (fixed) none
θ 0.56 (0.35, 0.77) none
Global parameter sensitivities to onset uncertainty
The parameters of the transmission model, Eq 3.27, are fit using two stages of maximum
likelihood inference. The first stage specifies the outbreak onset times (see §2.3). The second
stage fits the model parameters to these estimated onsets, as described in this chapter. The
95% confidence intervals given in Table 3.4 report uncertainty from the second stage of
maximum likelihood only. However, uncertainty from the first stage (the onset calculations)
also propagates to the parameters.
It is possible to compare the uncertainties introduced by each stage of inference. Fig
3.5 depicts the MLE parameter values for the best transmission model, Eq 3.37, as pairwise
scatters (small black points) for 1,000 sets of re-sampled onset times. The new onset times are
calculated by independently drawing a new onset time from each location’s onset likelihood
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Fig. 3.3 Profile likelihood curves for the six free parameters of the best transmission model,
Eq 3.37. The parameter values in Table 3.4 correspond to the maximum values of these
curves, and the confidence intervals are specified by the intersection points between the
curves and the horizontal line at 1.92 log-likelihood units below the maximum log-likelihood.
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Fig. 3.4 Map depicting ZIPs where the median start date of the autumn school term is within
one week of the outbreak onset time (black discs). Grey discs represent ZIPs where the
discrepancy between outbreak onset time and school start date is greater than one week.
Outbreak onset times are closely associated with the start of the autumn school term in the
southeastern US.
74 A geographic model of between-city influenza transmission
distribution (see §2.3). To provide a point of comparison, the larger red points depict the
maximum likelihood model parameters estimated using the maximum likelihood onsets.
These are the same parameter values that are listed in Table 3.4. The red ellipses depict the
95% confidence regions for the MLE parameters using MLE onsets. These are analogous to
the confidence intervals reported in Table 3.4. These ellipses mark the intersection of the
log-likelihood surface for the two parameters depicted, maximizing over the other parameters,
with the plane at 1.92 log-likelihood units below the maximum log-likelihood. Note that
the ellipses are calculated without using any input from the re-sampled onsets. Even so, the
scatters generated by re-sampling onsets generally lie acceptably within the ellipses. This
suggests that the “stage-2” (model) uncertainty reported in Table 3.4 already captures much
of the additional uncertainty introduced through onset uncertainty. This is just a rough test
of the relationship between onset uncertainty and model uncertainty; one should note in
particular that each small black point plotted in Fig 3.5 would have its own 95% confidence
interval. However, this test does provide some evidence that ignoring onset uncertainty does
not lead us to egregiously under-estimate the model parameter uncertainties. With this in
mind, we proceed using the transmission model parameters estimated using the maximum
likelihood onset times, listed in Table 3.4.
Simulations
To verify that the transmission model can reproduce the wave-like geographic transmission
pattern observed during the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US,
epidemics may be simulated from the transmission model. Two such simulations are depicted
in Fig 3.6. The epidemics are seeded in Albany West GA, Augusta Northeast SC, Grenada
MS, and Stockton North CA, the four locations with outbreak onset times in the first week of
the true epidemic. It is assumed that no further seeding takes place, so β0 is fixed at 0 for the
rest of each simulation. The best transmission model with θ = 0 is used for these simulations,
since simulating from a model with θ > 0 would require specifying an underlying model to
generate the within-ZIP ILI incidence time series. The parameter values for the simulation
model are listed in the caption to Fig 3.6. They lie within the confidence intervals of the
overall best model’s parameter values (see Table 3.4), suggesting that the simulations from
this simpler model should still give valuable insight into the optimal model’s behaviour.
The simulations broadly capture the wave-like spread of the true outbreak, and last for a
similar duration (∼14 weeks). Systematic differences between the simulated epidemics and
the true one are discussed and addressed further in the following subsection.
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Fig. 3.5 Scatters of MLE parameter values of the most parsimonious transmission model, Eq
3.37, using re-sampled epidemic onset times (black points). The red points mark the MLE
parameter values using the MLE onset times. The red ellipses represent the intersection of
the log-likelihood surface of the most parsimonious transmission model’s parameters with
the plane at 1.92 log-likelihood units below the model’s maximum log-likelihood, giving an
approximate 95% confidence region for the parameters. These ellipses are analogous to the
confidence intervals reported in Table 3.4. The ellipses are calculated with no input from
the scatters of black points. Even so, the scatters lie largely within the ellipses, indicating
that the uncertainty in epidemic onset times is already captured acceptably by the confidence
intervals reported in Table 3.4.
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Fig. 3.6 Two simulations from the most parsimonious transmission model with θ = 0, seeded
in the four locations with epidemic onset in the first week of the true epidemic (boxed).
Comparing with the onsets of the true epidemic (Fig 2.8), the simulated epidemics have
similar radial spread patterns and overall durations. Parameters for these simulations are
βd = 0.57, µ = 0.25, ν = 0, ρ = 62, γ = 7.8, ε = 1, θ = 0.
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Outbreak onset time residuals
In addition to checking output from simulations, the model’s quality can be checked by
examining the differences between the observed epidemic onset times and the onset times
predicted by the model. For a given location i, the expected onset time is
E[Ti] =
∞
∑
k=1
k ·P(Ti = k) (3.38)
=
∞
∑
k=1
k(1− e−λi(k))
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t) (3.39)
=
0
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)−
1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)+2
1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)−2
2
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)+3
2
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)− . . . (3.40)
Since P(Ti = τ) = (1−e−λi(τ))∏τ−1t=1 e−λi(t) and P(Ti = 1) = (1−e−λi(1)), it makes sense to
define ∏0t=1 e−λi(t) = 1. Substituting this into (3.40) and simplifying gives
E[Ti] =
∞
∑
k=1
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t). (3.41)
Now, let t f denote the onset time of the outbreak with the latest onset. By noting that λi(t)
remains constant for all t > t f , the infinite sum can be evaluated exactly:
E[Ti] =
[ t f
∑
k=1
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)
]
+
[ ∞
∑
k=t f+1
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)
]
(3.42)
=
[ t f
∑
k=1
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)
]
+
[
(
t f
∏
t=1
e−λi(t))(1+ e−λi(t f+1)+(e−λi(t f+1))2+ . . .)
]
(3.43)
=
[ t f
∑
k=1
k−1
∏
t=1
e−λi(t)
]
+
[
(
t f
∏
t=1
e−λi(t))
1
1− e−λi(t f+1)
]
. (3.44)
Fig 3.7 depicts the difference between the observed and expected epidemic onset time in
each ZIP. There is a clear band in Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia where the true outbreaks
begin significantly later than the model expects. A discrepancy is also visible when plotting
the true vs. expected cumulative number of outbreaks (Fig 3.8). The true epidemic gets off
to a faster start than expected, but progresses at a slower rate, before increasing in rate in
late September, after which the true and expected cumulative number of outbreaks match
relatively well. These observations suggest that there is some variation in transmissibility in
space and/or time for which the model does not yet fully account.
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Fig. 3.7 Difference in weeks between the observed and expected outbreak onset time in each
ZIP. The area of each disc is proportional to the magnitude of the difference. Blue/purple
discs correspond to ZIPs where the true epidemic onset time is later than the expected onset
time, and green/red discs correspond to ZIPs where the opposite is true. There is a band of
locations in Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia, and another patch near San Francisco CA,
where the model consistently predicts earlier epidemic onset times than actually occurred.
The model compensates by predicting slightly later-than-accurate epidemic onset times in
much of the rest of the country.
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Fig. 3.8 Expected (black) and observed (blue) cumulative number of locations infected over
time. The expected onsets are calculated from Eq 3.44. The true epidemic starts more quickly
than expected by the transmission model, and has an increase in rate in late September that is
not reflected in the expected onsets.
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3.2.3 The transmissibility surface transmission model
The basic transmission model Eq 3.27 accounts for short-range predictors of transmission,
and treats long-distance jumps as a stochastic process with constant rate across all locations.
However, it overlooks mid-scale variation in transmission strength. To adjust for this variation,
one can allow the transmissibility βd to depend on time and geographic location. However,
fitting an independent value for the transmissibility at each time and location would require
fitting far more parameters than there are available data points and, even if it were possible,
would yield an over-fit model from which underlying patterns would be difficult to identify.
These issues may be avoided by imposing a correlation structure on the transmissibility
values. In particular, a time-specific adjustment ξ Tt and a space-specific adjustment ξ Si are
incorporated into the model’s transmissibility term, yielding a new model of form
λi(t) = β0+βd Exp[ξ Tt +ξ
S
i ]N
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt n
θ
j,tκ(di, j)
∑ j ̸=iκ(di, j)
(3.45)
where
ξ T = f T (t)+ ε T , ξ S = f S(x)+ ε S
and
f T ∼ GP(µT (·),kT (·, ·)), f S ∼ GP(µS(·),kS(·, ·)).
That is, the temporal and spatial adjustments to transmissibility, ξ T = (ξ T1 , . . . ,ξ
T
tmax) and
ξ S = (ξ S1 , . . . ,ξ
S
n ), are described by the Gaussian processes f
T and f S. Here, t is an array of
the time intervals during which the epidemic occurs, and x is an array of the ZIP coordinates.
The vectors ε T and ε S are additive noise terms, where each element εTt and εSi follows an
independent, identically distributed Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2T and
σ2S , respectively; that is,
εTt ∼ N(0,σ2T ) and (3.46)
εSi ∼ N(0,σ2S ) (3.47)
for all t and i. The Gaussian processes f T and f S are defined by the temporal and spatial
mean functions µT and µS and the temporal and spatial covariance functions kT and kS. The
transmissibility terms ξ Tt and ξ Si enter the transmission model via an exponential function to
ensure that the full transmissibility term remains positive.
Specifying the model in this way allows the modeller to impose a correlation relationship
between the temporal and spatial transmissibility values respectively, preventing the problems
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associated with overfitting. The new terms may be interpreted as a “global” transmissibility
adjustment ξ T that varies over time equally across all locations, plus a “local” transmissibility
adjustment ξ S that accounts for additional spatial variation. Fixing µT (t) = µS(x)≡ 0 and
kT (t, t ′) = kS(x,x′)≡ 1 for all t,x, t ′,x′ yields the original best transmission model, Eq 3.37.
In this case, the adjustments ξ T and ξ S are identically equal to zero.
Other choices of covariance function allow for more flexible transmissibility surfaces.
The task of choosing a prior form for the covariance function can be simplified by considering
what sort of predictor the Gaussian process might be replacing. Broad-scale weather changes
and geographic and temporal differences in human behaviour might all explain the additional
variation in transmissibility. It is reasonable to assume that these predictors might vary
somewhat smoothly in space and time. A squared-exponential kernel, then, for its smoothness
and analytical simplicity, might be a natural choice. One might seek a temporal process with
length scale of approximately one month (eight half-weeks), since a shorter length scale
would risk reintroducing the problem of overfitting, while a larger one might not be flexible
enough to detect important structure. For the spatial process, a length scale of approximately
3ρ is reasonable. At this distance, the distance kernel κ has dropped by 95%, so the Gaussian
process would capture mid-scale variability, picking up where the distance kernel leaves off.
According to the MLE parameter values from Table 3.4, a distance of 3ρ is approximately
200 km.
For the following model fits, ξ T is assumed to follow a Gaussian process prior with
mean function µT = 0 and SE covariance function kT with length scale l = 8 half-weeks.
The spatial transmissibility adjustment ξ S is assumed to follow a Gaussian process prior
with mean function µS = 0 and squared-exponential covariance function kS with length scale
l = 200 km. Spatial length scales of l = 100 km and l = 500 km were also tested, as well as
a rational quadratic covariance function with length scale l = 200 km.
Parameter estimation
Posterior distributions for ξ T and ξ S are estimated using a Metropolis Hastings algorithm.
In each iteration of the algorithm, proposed values for a random subset of ξ T are drawn from
a multivariate normal distribution specified by Eq 3.20-3.22, where x∗ are the proposal time
points and the x are the other time points, with values y. The model’s likelihood is evaluated
with these new proposed values. The proposal is accepted with probability proportional to the
ratio of the new likelihood to the most recently accepted likelihood (or, for the first iteration,
the original model’s likelihood, with no ξ T or ξ S). This is repeated for mutually exclusive
random subsets of ξ T until a new value has been proposed and either accepted or rejected
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for each element of ξ T . The same procedure is applied to update ξ S. This constitutes a
single iteration of the algorithm. The algorithm is run four times for 10,000 iterations each.
Following Gelman et al. (2013) [86], the first 5,000 iterations of each run are discarded to
avoid effects from the burn-in period. To assess convergence, the Gelman-Rubin statistic is
calculated for each location and each half-week [86]. The Gelman-Rubin statistic is a ratio of
the between-chain to the within-chain variance that approaches 1 from above as the number
of iterations approaches infinity. The above procedure yields a Gelman-Rubin statistic of
below 2 for all chains, and below 1.1 for all ξ S chains and 37 of the 40 ξ T chains. This
suggests that the chains have converged. The ordered Gelman-Rubin statistics for the ξ S and
ξ T chains are depicted in Fig 3.9.
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Fig. 3.9 Gelman-Rubin statistics for the spatial (ξ S) and temporal (ξ T ) transmissibility
surface Markov chains, produced using the Metropolis Hastings algorithm described in
§3.2.3. The Gelman-Rubin statistic for all spatial and temporal chains is below 2, and is
below 1.1 for all spatial chains and all but three of the temporal chains. This provides good
evidence that the chains have converged.
The last 5,000 iterations for each of the four runs are combined, yielding 20,000 posterior
estimate draws of ξ T and ξ S. Fig 3.10 depicts the mean exponentiated ξ T values with ±2
standard deviations. The exponentiated ξ T may be interpreted as a temporally-varying multi-
plicative factor for the transmissibility term βd . There is evidence of a drop in transmissibility
in August that rises again from September to mid-October, before dropping again to average
by the end of the outbreak. The curve is jagged, reflecting the breakpoint onset detection
method’s tendency to place epidemic onset times preferentially on half weeks (see §2.3.2);
there are local peaks in ξ T on half weeks and dips on whole weeks. Despite this small-
scale bias, there is still a clear trend in the large-scale structure. Fig 3.11 depicts the mean
exponentiated ξ S values geographically, which may be interpreted as a spatially-varying
multiplicative factor for βd . There is evidence of higher-than-average transmissibility in
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the southeast and lower-than-average transmissibility in the mid-Atlantic region where the
epidemic wave slowed.
● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ●
● ●
● ●
● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
0.5
1
2
4
E
xp
(ξ t)
Fig. 3.10 Mean exponentiated temporal transmissibility values, Exp[ξ T ] (black line), with
±2 standard deviations (grey band). Values above 1 indicate higher-than-average transmissi-
bility, and values lower than 1 indicate lower-than-average transmissibility. The temporal
transmissibility adjustment begins slightly above 1, before dipping in mid-August through
the beginning of September. It then rises until mid-October, and finally decreases again back
to 1 at the end of the epidemic. The locally jagged pattern is an artefact of the breakpoint
onset detection method’s preference to place epidemic onsets near half-week values (see
§2.3.2); this makes transmission appear to be stronger on half weeks vs. full weeks.
For comparison, the transmissibility adjustments ξ T and ξ S are re-estimated using (1) a
SE covariance function with spatial length scale of 100 km and temporal length scale of 8
half-weeks, (2) a SE covariance function with spatial length scale of 500 km and temporal
length scale of 8 half weeks, and (3) a RQ covariance function with spatial length scale
of 200 km and temporal length scale of 8 half weeks. The temporal length scales in all
scenarios is kept at 8 half-weeks since a shorter length scale risks over-fitting, while a longer
length scale would make the process too inflexible to show significant variation over the
14-week outbreak. The posterior estimates of Exp[ξ T ] under each scenario are depicted in
Fig 3.12, and the posterior estimates of Exp[ξ T ] under each scenario are depicted in Fig
3.13. The overall shape of Exp[ξ T ] under all three scenarios is similar to the shape obtained
using a SE covariance function with spatial length scale of 200 km and temporal length
scale of 8 half weeks (Fig 3.10). All have a dip in transmissibility in September and a rise
in transmissibility in late October. This is perhaps unsurprising, since the temporal length
scale for all three scenarios is the same, but it does show that inference of the temporal
process is fairly robust to changes in the spatial length scale and the covariance function. The
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Fig. 3.11 Map of the mean exponentiated geographic transmissibility values, Exp[ξ S]. Discs
represent ZIPs, and are coloured according to the ZIP’s estimated mean Exp[ξ Si ] value. Values
higher than 1 (red) indicate higher-than-average transmissibility, and values lower than 1
(blue) indicate lower-than-average transmissibility. The transmissibility adjustment is highest
in the southeast, while there is a clear band of low transmissibility in Missouri, Illinois, and
Kentucky, where the epidemic wave slowed. There is also evidence of higher-than-average
transmissibility in the central valley of California, where a second epidemic wave appears to
have been sparked.
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spatial transmissibility surfaces depicted in Fig 3.13 also reveal roughly similar patterns as
the transmissibility surface in Fig 3.11, with elevated transmissibility in the southeastern US.
Under the first scenario, with spatial length scale of 100 km, the transmissibility surface is
more locally variable than the surfaces produced using longer spatial length scales. This is to
be expected, since a length scale of 100 km yields a very flexible transmissibility surface.
The transmissibility surface produced under the second scenario, with spatial length scale
of 500 km, is less locally variable than the transmissibility surfaces produced using shorter
length scales. The overall range of transmissibility values is also smaller, with Exp[ξ T ]
ranging from 0.3 to 3.5, rather than from about 0.2 to over 6 for the SE scenarios with
shorter length scale. This reduced variability is due to the surface’s higher rigidity. The
transmissibility surface produced under the third scenario, with spatial length scale of 200
km and a RQ covariance function, is similar to the transmissibility surface produced using a
SE covariance function and the same spatial length scale (Fig 3.11). This suggests that the
estimated transmissibility surface is somewhat robust to the choice of covariance function,
though it should be noted that both covariance functions belong to the same general class,
yielding a surface with infinite mean-square differentiability everywhere (see §3.1.3).
We proceed using the mean posterior estimates for ξ T and ξ S obtained using a SE
covariance function with spatial length scale of 200 km and temporal length scale of 8 half
weeks. Fig 3.14 depicts the difference between the actual and expected outbreak onset times
by location using the new model, Eq 3.45, with these posterior mean estimates substituted in.
Comparing with Fig 3.7 indicates that including ξ T and ξ S resolves many of the systematic
discrepancies. Fig 3.15 depicts the expected and true cumulative number of locations infected
over time under the new model. The shapes of the curves now match closely. The gap between
the curves points to a remaining model mis-specification. In general, there are always a few
more true outbreaks than expected, likely due to mid-range jumps of infection that the model
cannot reliably predict. There appear to be about 50 such jumps at any given time; adding
50 to the expected cumulative onset curve makes the two curves match almost perfectly,
except at the very beginning and very end of the epidemic. The discrepancy may be due to a
mis-specification in the shape of the transmission kernel, and suggests that exploring more
flexible kernel forms may be warranted.
3.2.4 Further exploration of the Gaussian process fitting procedure
To check whether the above inferences of temporal and spatial variation in the transmissibility
of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak are reliable, epidemics can be simulated using the
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Fig. 3.12 Mean exponentiated temporal transmissibility values, Exp[ξ T ] (black lines), with
±2 standard deviations (grey bands), using a SE covariance function with spatial length
scale of l = 100 km and temporal length scale l = 8 half-weeks (upper left), a SE covariance
function with spatial length scale l = 500km and temporal length scale l = 8 half-weeks
(upper right), and a rational quadratic covariance function with spatial length scale l = 200
km and temporal length scale l = 8 half-weeks (bottom). The exponentiated transmissibility
adjustment Exp[ξ T ] may be interpreted as a multiplicative factor for the transmissibility
term βd (see Eq 3.45) that varies over time. Values above 1 indicate higher-than-average
transmissibility, and values lower than 1 indicate lower-than-average transmissibility. All
three plots resemble the temporal transmissibility surface fit using a SE kernel with spatial
length scale l = 200 km and temporal length scale l = 8 half-weeks (Fig 3.10).
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Fig. 3.13 Maps of the mean exponentiated geographic transmissibility values, Exp[ξ S], using
a SE covariance function with spatial length scale l = 100 km (top), l = 500 km (middle),
and a rational quadratic covariance function with length scale l = 200 km (bottom). In all
three scenarios, the temporal characteristic length scale is 8 half-weeks. The exponentiated
transmissibility adjustment Exp[ξ S] may be interpreted as a multiplicative factor for the
transmissibility term βd (see Eq 3.45) that varies across space. A SE covariance function with
characteristic distance of l = 100 km yields a patchy spatial transmissibility surface, though
there is still a high concentration of ZIPs in the southeast with elevated transmissibility. A SE
covariance function with characteristic distance of l = 500 km yields a surface with relatively
less variation than the shorter distance scales. A RQ covariance function with l = 200 yields
a spatial transmissibility surface that closely resembles the one estimated using the SE kernel
with the same length scale, depicted in Fig 3.11.
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Fig. 3.14 Difference in weeks between the observed and expected epidemic onset time in each
ZIP under the transmissibility-adjusted model, Eq 3.45. The area of each disc is proportional
to the magnitude of the difference. Blue/purple discs correspond to ZIPs where the true
epidemic onset time is later than the expected onset time, and green/red discs correspond to
ZIPs where the opposite is true. The band of locations in Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia
with later-than-expected onsets in Fig 3.7 is no longer as apparent.
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Fig. 3.15 Expected (black) and observed (blue) cumulative number of locations infected over
time under the transmissibility-adjusted model, Eq 3.45. The shapes of the two curves match
closely. The lag between the expected and observed cumulative number of onsets may be
due to mid-range jumps for which the transmission model still does not fully account. If
this is true, then there were approximately 50 of these mid-range outbreaks at any given
time during the outbreak; adding 50 to the expected cumulative number of outbreaks causes
the two curves to match almost perfectly, except at the very beginning and very end of the
epidemic.
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geographic transmission model Eq 3.37 with known transmissibility βd , and the transmis-
sibility surfaces can be estimated using the synthetic onsets. In this section, two scenarios
are considered. First, the transmissibility βd is held constant across all locations and for all
time, to ensure that the Gaussian process fits do not yield spurious patterns. Second, the
transmissibility βd is increased in the southeastern US (HHS regions 4 and 6) to check that
the Gaussian process fits can correctly identify authentic differences in transmissibility. In
both scenarios, βd is held constant across time.
Outbreaks are simulated from the best mechanistic transmission model Eq 3.37 with
βds, ν , and θ all equal to zero. As for the simulations presented in §3.2.2, θ is held at
zero to avoid having to simulate full epidemic curves in each ZIP. Other parameter values
are fixed at µ = 0.25, ρ = 62km, and γ = 7.8, equal to the values used to produce Fig 3.6.
Also following §3.2.2, epidemics are seeded in the four locations with onset in the first
week of the true outbreak, and β0 is fixed at 0, so that no additional seeding occurs. For
the constant-transmissibility scenario, βd is fixed at 0.61 for all locations throughout the
epidemic. For the spatially-varying transmissibility scenario, βd is fixed at 1.64 in the 244
ZIPs in HHS regions 4 and 6, and at 1.64/4 = 0.41 in the 590 ZIPs in the rest of the country.
This makes the mean βd across all locations equal to 0.61, and makes βd in the southeast
four times higher than it is in the rest of the country.
Three epidemics are simulated under each scenario. For each simulation, posterior
Gaussian process estimates of ξ T and ξ S are generated using the procedures described in
§3.2.3, using a SE covariance function with spatial length scale l = 200 km and temporal
length scale l = 8 half-weeks. Figs 3.16-3.17 depict the mean posterior ξ T and ξ S for the
constant βd scenario, and Fig 3.18-3.19 depict the mean ξ
T and ξ S for the scenario with
elevated βd in the southeast. The fits for the constant βd scenario in Figs 3.16-3.17 show
no substantial variation in transmissibility over time or space, as expected. For the second
scenario with elevated transmissibility in the southeast, the temporal transmissibility surfaces
ξ T are significantly elevated at the start of the outbreak, and decrease near the fourth week
of the simulation. This is because three of the four outbreak seeds are in the southeastern
US (see Fig 3.6), so the early epidemic is associated with high transmissibility in all three
cases. The spatial transmissibility surfaces in Fig 3.17 also reveal elevated transmissibility
in the southeastern US. Interestingly, the transmissibility surfaces here have smaller ranges
than the transmissibility surfaces obtained using the true onset times (see Figs 3.10 and 3.11).
Despite the true transmissibility in the southeast being four times higher than in the rest of
the country, the posterior mean estimates for Exp[ξ S] in that region are just over 1.25. This
underestimate of the true elevation in transmissibility may be due in part to rigidity in the
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posterior process imposed by the correlation structure, and may also be exacerbated by the
smooth process having difficulty fitting to the sharp, sudden increase in transmissibility in
the southeast. If it is true that the Gaussian process fits generally underestimate the overall
variation in transmissibility, then the true transmissibility elevation in the southeastern US
during the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic wave may have been very pronounced, in
order to produce posterior mean ξ S estimates well over 4.
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0 4 8 12 16
0.75
1.25
1
1.5
Week
E
xp
(ξ t)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ●
● ● ● ● ●
●
●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0 4 8 12 16
0.75
1.25
1
1.5
Week
E
xp
(ξ t)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0 4 8 12
0.75
1.25
1
1.5
Week
E
xp
(ξ t)
Fig. 3.16 Mean exponentiated temporal transmissibility values, Exp[ξ T ] (black lines), with
±2 standard deviations (grey bands), for three epidemic simulations using the transmission
model Eq 3.37 with parameter values β0 = 0, βd = 0.61, µ = 0.25, ρ = 62km, γ = 7.8, and
θ = 0. The outbreaks are seeded in the four locations with earliest onset in during the true
autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US (see Fig 3.6). The uncertainty
bands all overlap with the horizontal line at Exp[ξ T ] = 1, correctly identifying no substantial
variation in transmissibility over time.
3.3 Discussion
In this chapter, a mechanistic transmission model is presented that describes the outbreak
onset times in 834 3-digit ZIP codes in the United States during the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic. A model selection procedure indicates that the recipient ZIP’s population
size, its surrounding population density, the distance to neighbouring infected ZIPs, and
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Fig. 3.17 Maps of the mean exponentiated geographic transmissibility values, Exp[ξ S] for
three epidemic simulations using the transmission model Eq 3.37 with parameter values
β0 = 0, βd = 0.61, µ = 0.25, ρ = 62km, γ = 7.8, and θ = 0. The outbreaks are seeded in the
four locations with earliest onset in during the true autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
outbreak in the US (see Fig 3.6). Though the surfaces show some spatial variation, the
patches of high/low transmissibility are not consistent across the three simulations. The
range of posterior mean Exp[ξ S] estimates is small, between 0.8 and 1.2 in all three cases,
correctly identifying virtually no substantial spatial variation in transmissibility.
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Fig. 3.18 Mean exponentiated temporal transmissibility values, Exp[ξ T ] (black lines), with
±2 standard deviations (grey bands), for three epidemic simulations using the transmission
model Eq 3.37 with parameter values β0 = 0, µ = 0.25, ρ = 62km, γ = 7.8, and θ = 0. The
transmissibility parameter βd is four times higher in the southeast (HHS regions 4 and 6) than
in the rest of the country, at a value of 1.64 vs. 0.41. The mean βd across all locations is 0.61.
The outbreaks are seeded in the four locations with earliest onset in during the true autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US (see Fig 3.6). The posterior mean Exp[ξ T ]
is elevated at the start of the outbreak, reflecting the fact that the epidemics generally begin
in the southeast, where transmission strength is high. The transmissibility estimates decrease
below 1 after the epidemic has passed out of the southeast into areas with below-average
transmissibility, around week 4.
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Fig. 3.19 Maps of the mean exponentiated geographic transmissibility values, Exp[ξ S] for
three epidemic simulations using the transmission model Eq 3.37 with parameter values
β0 = 0, µ = 0.25, ρ = 62km, γ = 7.8, and θ = 0. The transmissibility parameter βd is four
times higher in the southeast (HHS regions 4 and 6) than in the rest of the country, at a value
of 1.64 vs. 0.41. The mean βd across all locations is 0.61. The outbreaks are seeded in the
four locations with earliest onset in during the true autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
outbreak in the US (see Fig 3.6). The posterior mean Exp[ξ S] is elevated in the southeast
in all three cases, correctly identifying the imposed geographic variation in transmissibility,
though underestimating the magnitude of the difference.
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the intensity of the outbreaks in those neighbouring ZIPs all predict a given ZIP’s outbreak
onset time. There is also some evidence that mixing between children a week before the
start of the autumn school term may have contributed to transmission, though this effect is
only identified in sub-models that ignore the intensity of the outbreaks in neighbouring ZIPs
(θ = 0).
The best transmission model’s rejection of an effect from the start of the autumn school
term deserves further commentary, since on the surface it seems to contradict a range of
other findings that schools act as catalysts for influenza transmission [91, 117, 199, 255].
Indeed, rises in ILI intensity corresponded closely with the start of the autumn school term
in ZIPs in the southeastern US, where the major transmission wave of the autumn 2009
epidemic originated. As the outbreak progressed, however, epidemic onset times lagged
increasingly behind the start date of the autumn school term, while infection in neighbouring
ZIPs remained a good predictor of epidemic onset time. This ultimately leads the best
transmission model to include an effect from the neighbouring ILI intensity and to reject an
effect from the start of the autumn school term. It is possible that heightened interpersonal
mixing between children in schools made cities receptive to epidemic “sparks”, but that other
factors were more important for specifying a city’s precise outbreak onset time. The relative
roles of different age groups in the transmission of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic
in the US is analysed in greater depth in Chapter 5.
In previous studies, power-law and exponential distance kernels have been used to
describe the geographic transmission range of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic in the
United States [48, 91, 133, 239]. The hybrid kernel considered here (Eq 3.28) is chosen to
help identify which type of kernel is preferred. The best transmission model in terms of AIC
uses a power-law kernel, with finite power-law decay γ , but the MLE estimate for γ is high,
so that the optimal kernel is in practice very nearly exponential. In general, power kernels
have thicker tails than exponential kernels, and so geographic epidemic processes that spread
according to power law kernels tend to have relatively more long-range jumps than ones that
spread according to exponential kernels. The high MLE value for γ identified here suggests
that long-range jumps of infection occurred during the 2009 outbreak in the US, but were
rare.
There are many other types of distance kernels that might be tested. An especially rich
set of kernels may be found in the literature on pollen dispersal [7]. It would be interesting to
see whether any of these kernels yield a better model fit, and in particular whether they clear
up the discrepancy between the predicted and true cumulative number of onsets over time
depicted in Fig 3.15. Alternatively, a more rigorous approach for choosing a kernel would
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involve tracking the movements of individuals over a period of time, as in Read et al. (2014)
[197], and either parametrising a functional form or fitting a non-parametric curve to the
distribution of trip distances. In the latter case, a cubic spline might be fit to the distribution
of trips between ZIPs, and vertical and horizontal stretch parameters would be estimated as
part of the transmission model. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, movement data from the
US with sufficient detail to make such inferences do not exist.
The parameter θ , which extends the transmission model presented in Gog et al. (2014)
[91], has a few possible interpretations. According to the MLE value for θ , the force
of infection in a given ZIP is approximately related to the square root (θ ≈ 0.5) of the
normalised number of infected individuals in the neighbouring ZIPs, n j,t . Setting θ < 1
vertically squashes the neighbouring ILI curve relative to the θ = 1 case, so that the peak
contributes relatively less and the trough contributes relatively more to the force of infection
(see Fig 3.20). This could be due in part to variable behaviour over the course of the outbreak;
for example, it is possible that healthcare providers are more vigilant for influenza-like illness
near the peak of an outbreak, and individuals are more likely to seek healthcare. This would
artificially inflate the number of observed cases near the peak of the outbreak. Setting θ < 1
could help offset this effect. Alternatively, it is possible that infected individuals may be less
likely to travel during the peak of an outbreak than when baseline influenza levels are low.
This would somewhat reduce the risk of infection to neighbouring cities during the peak.
The value of θ may also be influenced by the basic reproduction number, R0, of the
disease. Assuming the within-city infection process may be modelled as a Poisson branching
process, the risk of sparking an outbreak in a susceptible city with k independent introductions
of infection is
P(in f ect) = 1−
( 1
R0
)k
(3.48)
as shown in Keeling and Rohani (2011) [129]. Alternatively, according to the transmission
model presented in this chapter, the probability that a ZIP i becomes infected in a given time
step t may be expressed as
P(in f ect) = 1−Exp(−λi(t)). (3.49)
If we consider the force of infection from just one city j, and interpret the force of infection
λ as a function of θ (holding all other parameters constant), we may approximate the force
of infection on city i from city j as λi, j(t)≈ c1nθj,t , where c1 is a constant that captures all
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other parts of the transmission model besides n j,t . Eq 3.49 may then be re-written as
P(in f ect) = 1−Exp(−c1nθj,t). (3.50)
If we assume that the number of introductions of infection, k, to city i from city j is
proportional to the number of people who are infected in city j (that is, k ∝ n j,t), then we
may express Eq 3.50 as
P(in f ect) = 1−Exp(−c2kθ ) (3.51)
where the c2 is another scaling constant. Now we may compare Eq 3.48 and Eq 3.51, both
of which express the probability of infection as a function of the number of introductions
k of infection. The two equations have fundamentally different forms, but both describe
monotonically increasing functions that are equal to 0 when k = 0, and approach 1 as k
increases (see Fig 3.21). It is possible that the value of θ is chosen so that the graphical
form of Eq 3.51 matches the form of the ‘true’ probability of infection, modelled by 3.48, as
closely as possible. This suggests that θ may be linked to the basic reproduction number R0
of the disease.
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Fig. 3.20 Normalised ILI time series for ZIP 606 (Chicago IL) from the last 30 weeks of
2009, taken to various powers θ . Values of θ < 1 dampen the relative intensity of the peak
compared with the rest of the time series. The normalised time series approaches a flat line
as θ approaches 0 from above.
The parameters for the mechanistic transmission model are fit using a maximum like-
lihood strategy, as in [91]. Sensitivity of the model parameter values to uncertainty in
the outbreak onset times is assessed by re-drawing onset times and re-fitting the model
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Fig. 3.21 Probability of infection as a function of the number of introductions k of infection
into a susceptible population, as described by two different models. The blue line corresponds
to the assumption that the within-city transmission of disease follows a Poisson branching
process, yielding Eq 3.48. The black lines correspond to the assumption that the probability
of infection may be derived from the force of infection exerted by a neighbouring city,
leading to Eq 3.51. Both ways of describing the probability of infection give monotonically
increasing functional forms. The value of θ could be chosen so that the probability of
triggering an outbreak as described by the transmission model (black) most closely matches
the underlying ‘truth’ (blue), which is dictated by the basic reproduction number R0.
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parameters. Another option would be to define a full likelihood function for the model
parameters that takes into account the onset time uncertainties, and then to fit the mechanistic
transmission model parameters using a MCMC scheme, as in [75]. This would offer a more
unified approach for incorporating the onset time uncertainties into the full model, but is
also more computationally intensive, and so for now is left for future work. The parameter
estimates and the optimal model structures resulting from the maximum likelihood and the
MCMC schemes should be compared, to check that the model fitting procedure does not lead
to conflicting qualitative interpretations of the 2009 pandemic’s transmission.
Another potentially useful model extension would be to incorporate a full stochastic
SIR model into the mechanistic transmission model. In this scenario, the model parameters
would be fit to the entire ILI curve, rather than just the outbreak onset times. Due to the
high degree of noise and heterogeneity between the ILI curves for different ZIPs, it is likely
that an adaptive fitting algorithm, such as the particle filtering method employed by Yang
et al. (2015) [257], would be needed. However, this would involve not just a significant
increase in methodological complexity, but it would also require a fundamentally more
complex underlying model: for example, the model would have to account for geographic
differences in ILI reporting rates to fully explain the observed differences in ILI intensity
between locations. Furthermore, Viboud et al. (2014) [240] find that estimates of epidemic
intensity from the IMS-ILI data may not be fully reliable, so it may be difficult to defend
epidemiological conclusions based on an SIR model fit explicitly to the IMS-ILI curves.
Developing and fitting such a model remains a potentially fruitful area for future work, but
lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
Simulations verify that the fundamental geographic transmission model, Eq 3.37, can
reproduce the overall epidemic timing and wave-like trajectory observed during the autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the United States. However, the fundamental
model does not fully account for variation in the geographic structure of the outbreak at the
regional scale. Plotting the difference between the true ZIP-level outbreak onset times and
the outbreak onset times predicted by the fundamental transmission model reveals a clear hor-
izontal band in the eastern US where the epidemic wave appears to have slowed. To account
for this variation, a temporal and a spatial correction parameter, ξ T and ξ S, are introduced
into the model. These parameters are each constrained to follow a Gaussian process. Fitting
these parameters to the data reveals a dip in transmissibility in early September and a peak
between October and November, as well as elevated transmissibility in the southeast and
decreased transmissibility in the north, with an apparent dividing line in southern Missouri,
Illinois, and Kentucky. While it remains unclear what causes this variation, it is possible that
98 A geographic model of between-city influenza transmission
geographic differences in weather-related factors, such as temperature and humidity, may be
responsible [151, 209]. The temporal variation could also be attributed to changes in human
behaviour: the dip in transmissibility might reflect an abundance of caution in the initial
phases of the epidemic that subsided as people realised that the disease was not as severe as
initially feared. Poletti et al. (2011) [193] attribute a sudden increase in weekly incidence of
A/H1N1pdm influenza in mid-October of 2009 in Italy, similar to the one observed in the
United States, to changes in human behaviour associated with a reduced perception of risk.
An interesting area for future study would be to seek factors that co-vary with the posterior
ξ T and ξ S through regression studies and incorporate these into the transmission model, to
see if a better fit might be obtained.
The temporal and spatial posterior transmissibility surfaces ξ T and ξ S should not be
interpreted in isolation from one another. The second set of simulation studies in §3.2.4, with
elevated transmissibility in the southeast, demonstrate that spatial variation in transmissibility
can make it appear that there is also temporal variation in transmissibility. The ξ T and ξ S
are best interpreted as joint windows into the same underlying process. For the autumn
wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US, transmissibility appears to have been
high during the early transmission of the outbreak in the southeastern US, decreased in the
mid-autumn as the outbreak spread from that region, and then rose again to an average value
as the epidemic traversed the rest of the country in the late autumn. These differences may
be due to either spatial or temporal changes in transmissibility, or both. Further simulations
are warranted to determine the extent to which explicitly spatial or temporal differences in
transmissibility are distinguishable using the methods presented above. These might involve
simulating outbreaks spreading on a hypothetical metapopulation under various transmissibil-
ity scenarios, including fixed spatial/varying temporal transmissibility, fixed spatial/varying
temporal transmissibility, and varying spatial/varying temporal transmissibility. The posterior
transmissibility surfaces would be estimated from the simulated outbreak onset times using
the methods described in this chapter, and these would be compared with the true variation in
transmissibility used to generate the simulations. It is possible that the ability to distinguish
between spatial and temporal variation in transmissibility will increase with the number of
independent introduction sites, since, for example, a universal slowdown in all sub-outbreaks
would be best explained by temporal variation in transmissibility, while local slowdowns
would be best explained by spatial variation in transmissibility. Ideally, one would estimate
an independent transmissibility value for each location at each time point, rather than locking
the temporal variation in transmissibility across all locations, as is done in the methods
presented in this chapter. In such a scenario, one might assume that the transmissibility at
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each location is correlated with its neighbours and also with its own transmissibility at the
previous time step(s). While theoretically possible, this more general case requires vastly
more transmissibility values to be estimated, making the overall calculation computationally
prohibitive.
Simulating outbreak onset times from the geographic transmission model and re-fitting
the Gaussian process transmissibility surfaces helps to reveal the relationship between the
transmissibility surface fits and the true underlying epidemic dynamics. While the Gaussian
process fits correctly identify no spatiotemporal differences in transmissibility when βd
is held constant constant across time and space, the Gaussian process fits underestimate
the variation in transmissibility for the simulations with elevated βd in the southeast (Figs
3.18-3.19) by a factor of over 2. If this underestimation extends to the Gaussian process fits
on the true data, then it would appear that transmissibility in the southeastern US during
the spread of the autumn 2009 pandemic wave was comparatively explosive, up to eight
times higher than in many other parts of the country. However, there are a few reasons why
the true elevation in transmissibility in the southeast may not have been quite so severe.
First, the smooth Gaussian processes generated using SE and RQ covariance functions are
not well-suited to identify sudden jumps in an observed process, such as the sudden jump
in transmissibility built into the epidemic simulations [196]. This unrealistic ridge could
contribute to the underestimation observed in the simulation study. Second, it appears that
the temporal process artificially absorbs some of the spatial variation in transmissibility in
the simulations, reducing the observed spatial variance in the Gaussian process fits. Third,
the transmission model itself may provide an incomplete description of how local epidemic
establishment occurs. As it stands, the transmission model only accounts for outbreaks that
are caused by active seeding of infection from neighbours or from far-away reservoirs of
infection. Alternatively, the A/H1N1pdm influenza virus may have been circulating at low
levels in the late summer of 2009, and some combination of schools opening in the southeast,
favourable meteorological conditions, and/or changes in interpersonal contact behaviour
could have triggered many outbreaks in the southeast nearly simultaneously. This would lead
the transmission model to infer extremely high transmissibility, to account for the sudden
onset of many nearby outbreaks. More research is needed to better understand whether and
to what extent influenza virus circulates in populations between seasons, and also to identify
exogenous factors that may trigger the sudden establishment of infection in a population.
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3.4 Summary
A mechanistic geographic transmission model is developed to explain the epidemic onset
times in 834 3-digit ZIP codes across the United States during the autumn wave of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic. Population size, population density, the distance to neigh-
bouring ZIPs, and the epidemic intensity in those same ZIPs predict outbreak onset times.
There is some evidence that mixing among children a week before the start of the autumn
school term also facilitated transmission. To account for regional variation in transmissibility,
time- and location-specific adjustments are built into the model following Gaussian process
priors. Fitting these adjustment factors to data reveals that overall transmissibility dipped in
early September and rose again between October and November, that transmissibility in the
southeast was higher than average, and transmissibility in the north was lower than average.
Chapter 4
Transmission hubs of the autumn wave
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic in the United States
A central goal in epidemiology is to identify the geographic sites where an epidemic first
becomes established. These are normally places to which infection is introduced from
somewhere outside the population, sparking a chain of outbreaks within the population.
We refer to establishment sites of this type as ‘hubs’, since they are locations through
which infection passes from outside the population to within it. In this chapter, a general
mathematical strategy is presented to identify the transmission hubs of an outbreak that occurs
on a metapopulation. Using this strategy, the transmission hubs of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic in the United States are identified, and the total onward transmission
triggered by each hub is mapped. Most of the ZIP-level outbreaks in the US can be traced
back to three hubs, in Albany West GA, Grenada MS, and Stockton CA. Onward transmission
from these and an additional six hubs accounts for 90% of the observed ZIP-level outbreaks
in the autumn of 2009. Mapping the onward transmission triggered by each hub yields a
hypothesis of where distinct viral strains may have circulated.
Sections 4.2–4.5 are adapted from “Geographic Transmission Hubs of the 2009 Influenza
Pandemic in the United States” (Kissler et al. 2017 [133]), submitted to Epidemics.
102 Transmission hubs of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Terms for various epidemiological hotspots
Identifying ‘hotspots’ of disease transmission is a key part of describing the transmission
history of an epidemic. Hotspots come in a variety of forms: examples include individual
people who pass infection on to many neighbours, geographic locations responsible for
infecting large regions of a country, individuals or locations in which genetic recombination
frequently occurs yielding new viral strains, or locations where contact between humans and
animals leads to host species crossover. Each type of hotspot contributes to transmission in
a distinct way, but overlapping nomenclature can lead to confusion between the concepts.
Here, a variety of hotspots are named and described to distinguish them from the central
theme of this chapter, the transmission hub.
Superspreaders are either individuals or geographic locations that spread disease to
many immediate neighbours [188]. The term has existed since at least 1973, when it was
conjectured that individual superspreaders might contribute to the transmission of influenza
[79]. Lloyd-Smith et al. (2005) [154] provide a rigorous definition of “super-spreading
events”, and demonstrate that individual-level variability in disease transmission rates (i.e.
the presence of superspreaders) leads to more frequent epidemic extinction, but also to more
explosive outbreaks. Importantly, superspreaders need not be index cases of a disease. Rather,
a disease may be circulating at low levels within a population, reach a superspreader, and
then spread rapidly.
Sources, on the other hand, are locations in which novel genetic strains of a pathogen
emerge, or sometimes where animal-to-human transmission first occurs; often, these coincide
[60, 140, 204, 241]. This term is also, perhaps misleadingly, sometimes used to refer to
reservoirs of infection, like schools and workplaces [102].
In contrast, a hub is a location through which infection circulating outside a popula-
tion passes into the population. Hubs are sites that (1) receive a long-distance jump of
infection that (2) sparks significant onward transmission within the population. These too
are sometimes called ‘sources’ [258] – but we avoid that term here. Taken together, out-
breaks generally emerge from a source, enter into distinct populations via hubs, and spread
explosively once they reach superspreaders (see Fig 4.1).
Various strategies exist for identifying specific superspreaders [212, 226] and for testing
whether superspreaders may have significantly contributed to the transmission of an outbreak
[83, 154]. Similarly, there are techniques to identify epidemic sources, using both epidemi-
ological and genetic data [95, 140, 204, 241]. A few strategies have also been proposed to
4.1 Background 103
Source
Hub
Superspreader
Fig. 4.1 Schematic diagram depicting the relationship between a source, a superspreader,
and a hub. Circles could represent cities or individual people, the ellipse could represent a
country or a community of interest, and arrows represent disease transmission. In general, a
disease first emerges in a source, enters into a population of interest via a hub, and spreads
explosively through transmission by superspreaders.
identify transmission hubs. LeGrand et al. (2009) [146] develop a back-calculation method
to identify the probable location of an aerosol pathogen release, motivated by a hypothetical
bioterrorism event. The algorithm assumes diffusive spread of the pathogen, and can only
identify a single source of infection. Levy et al. (2011) [150] re-trace an outbreak of Chagas
disease in Peru, also using a diffusion-based transmission model. Their strategy allows for the
identification of multiple hubs, but the number of hubs must be specified before carrying out
the calculation. Yang et al. (2015) [258] identify transmission hubs of the 2014-2015 Ebola
virus outbreak in Sierra Leone using a gravity-based transmission model and an MCMC
Kalman filtering method. There remains a need for a mathematical strategy that identifies
multiple hubs automatically, using a mechanistic model, without relying on the convergence
of MCMC algorithms that can take large amounts of time and computing power when dealing
with big datasets.
In the particular case of influenza, it is generally accepted that many new viral strains
originate in East and Southeast Asia [204], and that superspreaders may contribute to the
transmission of disease [138, 191]. Charu et al. (2017) [48] propose an empirical hub-finding
technique for cities in the United States where outbreak onset times are available. Under that
method, the distance to the nearest previously-infected city is recorded for each city at its
outbreak onset time, and hubs are defined as the locations with distances in the top 1% of
this distribution. To my knowledge, no other study has attempted to identify the transmission
hubs for influenza at the country scale.
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4.1.2 Epidemiology and phylogeography
Phylogeography refers to the inference of an organism’s geographic spread using geo-tagged
genetic sequences and the statistical tools of genetic phylogeny [115]. Like traditional
epidemiology, the central aim of pathogen phylogeography is to reconstruct the transmission
history of an outbreak. Combining epidemiological and genetic data offers a powerful way
to improve inferences of an epidemic’s geographic transmission history. However, there
remains a need for robust theoretical frameworks that synthesise these two disparate data
sources [95].
One way to link epidemiological data with genetic data in a geographic setting is to use
phylogeographic methods to infer transmission chains, and then to refine these inferences
using epidemiological data [63, 64, 142, 166]. Since inferring phylogenies is computationally
intensive, these approaches have to my knowledge only been applied to relatively small
outbreaks, consisting of up to 150 simulated cases, or up to about 50 real cases. Alternatively,
it is possible take the reverse approach, and use epidemiological data to generate hypotheses
for the geographic patterns that should be visible in genetic data. This strategy is less
common, probably because epidemiological datasets with sufficient spatial resolution to
reconstruct detailed geographic transmission routes are rare. When such data are available,
however, it should in theory be possible to use a mathematical model to reconstruct how an
observed outbreak spread from a set of possible introduction sites. Using this reconstruction,
geographic regions could be delineated where infection was triggered predominately by
onward transmission from a particular introduction site. According to the ecological founder
effect, a high prevalence of genetically-related pathogens should be found within each
of these regions, due to the pathogens having a common ancestor, while between-region
genetic variance should be higher. The region structure can therefore be tested and refined
using genetic clustering analyses. This chapter lays a foundation for such an approach, by
presenting a method to infer introduction sites and the extent of onward transmission of an
outbreak using a metapopulation transmission model and known outbreak onset times in
each sub-population. The method is demonstrated using city-level outbreak onset times from
the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States.
4.2 Mathematical framework
Given a mathematical model that describes outbreak onset times in distinct metapopulation
patches as an additive force of infection from each previously-infected patch, a transmission
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network may be constructed that describes all possible routes of transmission. Reversing this
transmission network in a particular way yields a Markov chain that can be used to trace the
epidemic to its most likely sites of introduction. This section describes this strategy in detail.
4.2.1 Characterising the forward transmission network
Suppose an epidemic occurs on n metapopulation patches, or ‘locations’. Each location’s
outbreak onset time is observed. Without loss of generality, let the locations be assigned
indices i = 1, . . . ,n in order of their outbreak onset time, from earliest to latest. Consider a
function λi that characterises the force of infection on location i at its outbreak onset time as
the sum of the forces exerted by all previously-infected locations, plus some background risk
of seeding from outside the metapopulation. That is,
λi = β0+
i−1
∑
j=1
λi, j (4.1)
where β0 is the force from external seeding, and λi, j is the force exerted on location i by
location j. The first outbreak (i = 1) could only have been triggered by external seeding, so
define ∑0j=1λ1, j = 0.
The partial forces of infection λi, j can be visualized as a transmission network, as depicted
in the left-hand diagram in Fig 4.2. Locations are represented by nodes (circles), connected
with arrows that indicate possible transmission pathways. In addition, n ‘seeding states’
(clouds) are introduced, each of which exerts a force of β0 on a single location. Summing the
forces of all of the arrows going into a node i yields Eq 4.1.
4.2.2 Reversing the infection process
To identify epidemic hubs, transmission chains are traced probabilistically back to likely
points of introduction. This is done by reversing the direction of the transmission network
and noting that, with the proper normalisations, the resulting ‘reverse transmission network’
represents a Markov chain for which the probability of transitioning from state i to state j is
equivalent to the probability that location i was infected by ‘parent’ location j. The aim is to
trace each outbreak to a most probable parent, then to a most probable parent’s parent, and
so on, until the outbreak is ultimately traced back to a first ancestor, where the infection was
introduced into the system – that is, a hub.
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Fig. 4.2 Forward transmission network (left) and reverse transmission network (right) for
an idealised outbreak taking place on three locations. Circles represent real locations, and
clouds represent ‘seeding states’ – conceptual reservoirs of infection that contribute infective
force from outside the population. In reality, it is more natural to think of a single external
reservoir of infection that contributes a constant force β0 on all locations; however, artificially
separating the reservoirs is mathematically convenient. In this example, the outbreak begins
in location 1, then infects location 2, and finally infects location 3, in three subsequent time
steps. In the left-hand diagram, arrows denote possible transmission paths, and arrow labels
give the partial forces of infection. In the right-hand diagram, arrows point towards possible
‘parent’ outbreaks, and arrow labels give the probability that the location at the tip of the
arrow directly sparked the outbreak in the location at the tail of the arrow. Definitions of the
arrow weights are given in §4.2.2. In this simplified setting, location 1 would be a hub, since
the outbreaks in locations 2 and 3 can be traced back to the seeding state attached to location
1 with high probability.
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Mathematically, this back-stepping procedure is done by taking powers of the reverse
transmission network’s transition matrix. The i, jth entry of the transition matrix gives the
probability that the outbreak in location i was immediately triggered by location j (i.e.
that location j was a ‘parent’ to the outbreak in location i). The i, jth entry of the squared
transition matrix gives the probability that the outbreak in location i was triggered by location
j via any one intervening location (i.e., that location j was a ‘grandparent’ to the outbreak in
location i). As these powers approach infinity, each outbreak is traced back to a most likely
‘seeding state’. In the limit, the i, jth entry of the pth power of the transition matrix gives
the probability that the outbreak in location i was initially triggered by a seeding event in
location j.
To illustrate the procedure, refer again to the idealised outbreak depicted in Fig 4.2.
Reversing the arrows in the left-hand diagram gives the reverse transmission network (right-
hand diagram), where each arrow now points towards a possible contributor of infection. The
transition probabilities are denoted
τi j = P(transmission from j to i) =
λi j
λi
and
σi = P(external seeding in i) =
β0
λi
.
The τi j represent the probability that the outbreak in location i came from parent location j,
and the σi represent the probability that the outbreak in location i was due to a seeding event.
Define τ n×n to be the matrix whose i, jth entry is τi j. Note that τi j = 0 for all j ≥ i, so τ
is strictly lower triangular. Also define σ n×n to be the matrix with σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn along the
diagonal and with zeros elsewhere. The transition matrix M2n×2n that describes the reverse
transmission network can be written using these matrices:
M =
(
I 0
σ τ
)
.
The first n elements of the state space of M correspond to the seeding states (clouds in
Fig 4.2), and the remaining n elements correspond to the real locations. Entry Mi j is the
probability that ‘parent’ location j directly sparked location i’s outbreak (or, equivalently,
the probability that the reverse transmission process transitions from state i to state j). The
identity matrix in the upper left block indicates that the seeding states are ultimate sources of
infection; they can only transition to themselves. Similarly, the 0 matrix in the upper right
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block indicates that transmission cannot occur from a real location to a seeding state. The σ
matrix in the lower left block captures the probability of a seeding event in each real location.
The τ matrix in the lower right captures the transmission probabilities between real locations.
Note that, as required, the row sums of M all equal 1.
The pth power of M contains the probabilities of transitioning between any two nodes
via p−1 intermediate steps. Finding the ultimate ancestor of each location’s outbreak, then,
requires calculating limp→∞Mp ≡M∞. Since τ is strictly lower triangular (has zeros along
its diagonal), τm = 0 for m≥ n+1. Thus, Mm = M∞ for m≥ n+1, yielding
M∞ =
(
I 0
(I+ τ + τ 2+ . . .)σ 0
)
.
Element (M∞)i, j gives the probability that state j was the ultimate source of the outbreak
in location i. The identity matrix in the upper left block indicates that seeding states are
sources unto themselves; this is so by definition. Each real location’s ultimate source is a
seeding state, since the real→real transitions in the lower-right block of the matrix all go to
zero. The lower-left block of M∞ contains the values of greatest interest. Denote this block
Pn×n ≡ (I+ τ + τ 2 + . . .)σ . The entries Pi, j are the probabilities that external seeding in
location j ultimately led to an outbreak in location i. The row sums ∑ j Pi j equal 1 for all
j. The column sums of P, denoted C j = ∑i Pi j, can be interpreted as the expected number
of outbreaks triggered by seeding in location j. Hubs are locations with high σ and high C
values – that is, locations where external seeding probably triggered an outbreak, which then
led to significant onward spread.
This result may also be derived in a more compact, though perhaps less intuitively
satisfying, way. We seek a matrix P such that entry Pi, j is the probability that seeding in
location j caused the outbreak in location i, via any number of intermediate steps. It is
helpful to introduce notation for the following events:
j˚ ⇒ i : “Seeding in location j ultimately caused the outbreak in location i”
j → i : “The outbreak in location j immediately caused the outbreak in location i”
So, Pi j = Pr( j˚ ⇒ i). Note that Pr( j˚ ⇒ j) = σ j. For i ̸= j, the law of total probability states
that
Pr( j˚ ⇒ i) =∑
k
Pr( j˚ ⇒ k)Pr(k → i).
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The probabilities Pr(k → i) are the i,kth entries of the transition matrix τ . Taken together,
this implies that
P = σ + τP. (4.2)
Solving for P gives
P = (I− τ )−1σ = (I+ τ + τ 2+ . . .)σ . (4.3)
Since τ is strictly lower triangular, τ p = 0 for p> n, and so the infinite sum is guaranteed to
converge. Eq 4.3 matches the earlier result for P.
4.3 Hubs of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in
the United States
4.3.1 The transmission model revisited
The transmission model given in Eq 3.27 expresses the force of infection on a location i as
a sum of the forces exerted by all potential contributors. The methods developed in §4.2
may therefore be applied to identify transmission hubs of the autumn wave of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States. For the following, we define forces of
infection using the best transmissibility-adjusted transmission model developed in Chapter 3,
Eq 3.45. Results are the same when using the best model without transmissibility adjustments
(Eq 3.37), as well as the best exponential-kernel model (Eq 3.37 with γ→∞) with or without
an effect from 1-week-advanced school start dates.
In particular, define λi j, the force of infection on location i from location j at i’s time of
onset, as
λi, j =

βd Exp[ξ Tt +ξ Si ]N
µ
i
nθj,tκ(di, j)
∑
k ̸=i
κ(di,k)
if j < i
0 otherwise
where κ(di, j)
(
1+ di, jργ
)−γ
. Recall that under the most parsimonious transmission model,
βds = ν = 0 and ε = 1 (see Eq 3.27 and Table 3.3). The total force of infection on location i
at its time of onset can be written as the sum of these partial forces:
λi = β0+
n
∑
j=1
λi j.
110 Transmission hubs of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US
This is equivalent to the transmission model given in Eq 3.37, evaluated at location i’s
outbreak onset time.
4.3.2 Calculating hubs
Using these λi, j, the transition probabilities τ and σ of the reverse transmission network are
calculated, giving the transition matrix M. Taking powers of M until the lower-right block
becomes a zero matrix yields sub-matrix P, which gives the probability that seeding in any
one location triggered the outbreak in any other. We define hubs as locations with σ > 0.3
and C > 2 (recall that C j = ∑i Pi, j is the effective number of locations infected by seeding in
location j). That is, hubs are locations in which an outbreak was caused by external seeding
with at least 30% probability, and that went on to infect at least two other locations. These
cutoff values for σ and C correspond to natural gaps in the σ - and C-values estimated for
the ZIPs in 2009 (see Figs 4.3-4.6). The cutoff values are liberal, in the sense that they
err on the side of identifying locations that may have had near-negligible influence on the
onward geographic transmission of the outbreak, rather than risk excluding any possible
hubs. Indeed, a seeding event that triggered just C = 2 onward outbreaks would have had
very little practical effect on this set of over 800 cities. There is an even lower natural cutoff
for σ , around σ = 0.12 (see Fig 4.3), that could be used, but would arguably be too lax of a
criterion, admitting as hubs cities where an external seeding event was very unlikely.
Despite these fairly relaxed criteria for defining transmission hubs, just nine ZIPs surpass
both cutoffs. These are listed in Table 4.1. Reducing the σ cutoff to the lower value to
0.12 introduces just one additional transmission hub, in Frederick MD, with σ = 0.14 and
C = 11.2. Seeding in the three most influential hubs is expected to have triggered 617 of the
834 observed ZIP-level outbreaks. Overall, seeding in the nine hubs is estimated to account
for 90% (758.8) of the observed ZIP-level outbreaks in the US in the autumn of 2009 through
onward geographic transmission. To visualise the geographic influence of hub j, matrix
element Pi, j is translated into a colour intensity and mapped for all locations i. These ‘basins
of infection’ are depicted in Fig 4.7.
4.3.3 Accounting for onset uncertainty
Each ZIP’s outbreak onset time is associated with some uncertainty, which could affect the
placement of the hubs. Re-drawing outbreak onset times from the breakpoint likelihood
profiles (see §2.3) and re-calculating the transmission hubs generally yields a set of locations
either identical to or geographically close to the hubs listed in Table 4.1. So, the hubs
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Fig. 4.3 Seeding probability σ for all 834 ZIPs, ordered by magnitude of σ . Most locations
have σ -values below 0.1, which translates into a less than 10% estimated chance that external
seeding caused the location’s outbreak, according to the transmission model Eq 3.45. A few
locations, however, have much higher σ -values. A natural gap occurs around σ = 0.3 (solid
horizontal line), between the ninth- and tenth-highest σ -values. We adopt this as the σ cutoff
value for defining transmission hubs of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic.
Another cutoff arises around σ = 0.12 (dashed horizontal line), between the 12th- and 13th-
highest σ -values. The geographic locations of all ZIPs with σ > 0.12 are depicted in Fig 4.5.
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Fig. 4.4 Effective number of locations infected (C) for all ZIPs, ordered by magnitude of C.
The left-hand plot depicts the C values for all ZIPs, and the right-hand plot provides detail of
the section in the dashed box. A natural cutoff arises around C = 2, marked by the horizontal
black line in the left-hand plot, which 12 ZIPs surpass. The names and geographic locations
of these ZIPs are depicted in Fig 4.6.
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Grenada MS
Albany West GA
Owensboro KY
Omaha Main NE
Waco Main TX
Boulder CO
Show Low AZ
Stockton North CA
Yakima WA
(Frederick MD)
(Madison Main WI)
(Columbia City of Jefferson City MO)
Fig. 4.5 Map depicting the seeding probabilities σ by geographic location for all ZIPs with
σ > 0.12. Disc area is proportional to the magnitude of σ . ZIPs with σ > 0.3 are in black
and labelled without parentheses. ZIPs with 0.12< σ < 0.3 are in grey, and their names are
in parentheses. These potential sites of external seeding are scattered roughly evenly across
the country.
Table 4.1 Transmission hubs of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic
in the United States
Name ZIP Pop. size C σ Onset date
Grenada, MS 389 113,782 387.4 1.00 23 Jul
Albany West, GA 398 111,263 144.3 0.43 26 Jul
Stockton North, CA 952 508,759 85.6 1.00 26 Jul
Omaha Main, NE 681 573,828 43.4 0.96 2 Aug
Owensboro, KY 423 167,975 30.2 0.56 2 Aug
Boulder, CO 803 112,702 28.5 0.78 9 Aug
Show Low, AZ 859 77,189 16.4 0.92 2 Aug
Yakima, WA 989 275,599 13.0 0.81 23 Aug
Waco, TX 767 171,493 10.0 0.58 6 Aug
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Frederick MD
Augusta (GA) Northeast SC
Nashville (A-L) TN
Grenada MS
Albany West GA
Owensboro KY
Omaha Main NE
Waco Main TX
Boulder CO
Show Low AZ
Stockton North CA
Yakima WA
Worcester Main MA
Lexington North KY
Madison Main WI
Windom MN
Columbia City of Jefferson City MO
Russellville AR
Fig. 4.6 Map depicting the effective number of locations infected C by geographic location
for all ZIPs with C > 2. Disc area is proportional to the magnitude of C. Stockton North
CA, Grenada MS, and Albany West GA have the highest C-values, indicating that seeding
in these three ZIPs contributed significantly to the onward geographic transmission of the
2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza outbreak in the United States. Relatively smaller contributors
are scattered throughout the rest of the country.
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Grenada MS
Albany West GA
Owensboro KY
Omaha Main NE
Waco Main TX
Boulder CO
Show Low AZ
Stockton North CA
Yakima WA
Fig. 4.7 Basins of infection for the nine hubs listed in Table 4.1. Hubs are outlined with
boxes. Box area is proportional to the number of outbreaks that seeding in the hub triggered
through gravity-driven onward transmission. Each hub j is assigned a colour (the colour of
the surrounding box), and then all locations i are coloured with intensity proportional to the
probability Pi j that hub j sparked its outbreak (see §4.2). The prevailing black in California
indicates that outbreaks in that state can be chiefly attributed to the hub in Stockton CA. The
purple in the eastern US indicates mixing from Grenada MS (blue) and Albany West GA
(red).
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identified above may be interpreted as representatives of larger geographic regions in which
an introduction of infection likely took place, sparking onward chains of short-distance
transmission.
To determine the precise effect of this onset uncertainty on the hubs, 250 new sets
of outbreak onset times were drawn from the onset likelihood profiles, and hubs were re-
calculated. Fig 4.8 depicts the average C for each ZIP after the 250 onset re-samples, in
ascending order. There remains a cutoff around C = 12, which 16 ZIPs surpass. Fig 4.9
depicts the average C for each ZIP geographically. To identify ZIPs that triggered infections
in similar geographic areas, the columns of P¯, the element-wise average P across all 250
re-samples, are normalised to each sum to 1. Then, for each of the ZIPs that infected at
least 12 others on average, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is calculated between
the column corresponding to that ZIP and every other column. The columns of ZIPs that
infected similar geographic regions have low KL divergence. The grey lines in Fig 4.9 depict
these divergences, where thickness is proportional to the inverse of the divergence. There
tends to be a sharp break between divergences of less than 0.1 and divergences greater than
0.1. Lines connecting ZIPs with KL divergence less than 0.1 are given colours. This yields
seven connected clusters of ZIPs. These clusters are estimates of the larger regions that the
transmission hubs listed in Table 4.1 represent. There are two large connected components
in the southeast, surrounding Grenada MS and Albany West GA. Each of these consists of
9 and 22 ZIPs, respectively. Boulder CO has a connected component consisting of 3 ZIPs.
Yakima WA, Stockton North CA, and Show Low AZ have connected components consisting
of 2 ZIPs each. Omaha NE is isolated.
Only one of the seven connected components, the one surrounding New York City PO
Box/Unique (1), NY, does not include a hub listed in Table 4.1. This could be taken as
evidence that there was a possibly significant seeding event in New York City, breaking the
trend of hubs in small- to mid-sized cities. However, this ZIP has a relatively noisy ILI
time series and a correspondingly wide onset confidence interval. Because of this, the ZIP
is sometimes assigned a significantly earlier onset than its neighbours. The average C for
this ZIP across the 250 re-sampled sets of onset times is 21, indicating that seeding in this
ZIP may have triggered about 21 downstream outbreaks. There are exactly 21 ZIPs within a
50-km radius of this one, which suggests that whatever influence this hub may have had was
limited to a small geographic area, and hence did not significantly impact the geographic
transmission of the outbreak in the rest of the US.
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Fig. 4.8 Average effective number of locations infected (C¯) for all ZIPs under 250 sets of
re-sampled onsets, ordered by magnitude of C. The horizontal line depicts the cutoff at
C = 12, which 16 ZIPs surpass.
4.3.4 Re-calculating the transmission hubs with the true hubs missing
According to the methods developed above, the transmission hubs of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic in the United States were small- to mid-sized cities (see Table 4.1).
Though this conclusion runs against the conventional wisdom that outbreak epicentres ought
to be in large, well-connected cities, there are a few epidemiological arguments for why these
findings are plausible (see §4.5). However, one possible explanation for the counter-intuitive
distribution of hubs is that (1) there are far more small- to mid-sized ZIPs than there are large
ZIPs, and (2) smaller ZIPs tend to have noisier epidemic times series than larger ZIPs. As
a result, by chance, smaller ZIPs may sometimes appear to pre-empt the outbreak onsets
in their larger neighbours, even if the larger ZIP were the true hub. This would cause our
method to erroneously identify the smaller city as a hub.
One way to roughly test whether this is the case is to omit the transmission hubs identified
above, in §4.3.2, from the set of ZIPs and to re-calculate the hubs. If the true establishment
sites of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US were in fact in large cities, and
the small-city hub assignments are simply one-off errors, then this exercise should correctly
reveal the large cities as the transmission hubs. If, however, a set of nearby smaller cities are
again identified as hubs, then either the small-city observational noise is pronounced enough
to cause a second layer of mistaken hub assignments, or there is reason to believe that the
transmission hubs of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic wave in the US may truly
have been in small- to mid-sized cities.
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Fig. 4.9 Map of clusters of ZIPs that triggered outbreaks in similar geographic areas. The
upper map depicts the clusters for the entire US, and the lower map provides detail for the
souteastern US. Disc area is proportional to the ZIP’s average C across 250 re-sampled sets of
onsets. ZIPs that triggered more than 12 downstream outbreaks on average are labelled. ZIPs
responsible for infecting similar geographic areas are connected with grey lines, where the
thickness of the line is proportional to the number of shared downstream outbreaks. Similarity
is measured by normalising each column of matrix P¯ to sum to 1, and then calculating the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between those distributions. For each ZIP that triggered
more than 12 downstream outbreaks on average, coloured lines are drawn to all other ZIPs
where the calculated KL divergence is less than 0.1 (that is, to ZIPs that infected very similar
geographic areas). This forms seven connected components. These clusters are estimates
of the larger regions that the hubs listed in Table 4.1 represent, in which an introduction of
infection likely occurred, triggering significant onward short-distance transmission.
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Fig 4.10 depicts the seeding probabilities σ by geographic location, and Fig 4.11 depicts
C by geographic location, after omitting the nine hubs identified in §4.3. Nine more ZIPs
are identified with σ > 0.3 and C > 2; these are labelled in Fig 4.11. Once again, these new
hubs are all small- to mid-sized cities. Importantly, these new hubs lie geographically near
the hubs identified previously, which would not be expected if noise alone were responsible
for classifying a ZIP as a hub; if noise alone were responsible, the geographic placement of
the new hubs should have little correlation with the placement of the previous ones. There
remains a high concentration of new hubs in the southeast, providing further support that
the southeast was an important region for epidemic establishment in the US in the autumn
of 2009. Though only a rough test, this exercise indicates that a more nuanced explanation
than one-off observational noise is likely required to account for why the observed set of
hubs were not in major cities. A more thorough test of the hub-identification method using
individual-based epidemic simulations is presented in the next section, §4.4.
Augusta (GA) Northeast SCTuscaloosa AL
Dothan AL
Nashville (A-L) TN
Russellville AR
Denver North CO
Brighton West CO
Gallup NMBakersfield Vicinity CA
Fig. 4.10 Seeding probability σ by geographic location, with the transmission hubs identified
in §4.3.2 and listed in Table 4.1 removed from the set of ZIPs. Discs represent ZIPs, and disc
area is proportional to σ . Locations with σ > 0.3 are labelled. In general, the ZIPs with high
σ depicted here lie close to a previously-identified transmission hub, but are still not major
cities.
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Augusta (GA) Northeast SCTuscaloosa AL
Dothan AL
Nashville (A-L) TN
Russellville AR
Denver North CO
Brighton West CO
Gallup NMBakersfield Vicinity CA
Fig. 4.11 Effective number of outbreaks C triggered by geographic location, with the trans-
mission hubs identified in §4.3.2 and listed in Table 4.1 removed from the set of ZIPs. Discs
represent ZIPs, and disc area is proportional to C. Locations with C > 2 are labelled. These
happen to be the same cities labelled in Fig 4.10 with σ > 0.3. So, the labelled cities may
be interpreted as the new transmission hubs that are identified when the true transmission
hubs are removed from the analysis. Once again, probable epidemic establishment sites are
identified in the central valley of California, in Colorado, in Arizona/New Mexico, and in the
southeast, but not in major cities.
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4.4 Simulation-based validation of methods
To more thoroughly test the accuracy of the hub-identification method developed in this
chapter, we turn to individual-based epidemic simulations on metapopulations. Here, epi-
demics are seeded in a large city surrounded by smaller ones, allowed to propagate, and then
the transmission hubs are calculated. The introduction site is identified accurately around
80% of the time. It is therefore unlikely that, in the real autumn 2009 outbreak, many small
hubs would be identified if in fact the outbreak were triggered in large cities. This section
describes the epidemic simulation strategy in detail, and provides more information about
the hub detection method’s accuracy.
4.4.1 Overview of the epidemic simulation methods
The simulation model described here is a version of the commuter model presented in Keeling
et al. (2010) [128]. Epidemics are simulated on metapopulations consisting of either 16 or 25
cities with random coordinates. Using random coordinates allows for a general exploration
of how city placement affects the accuracy of hub identification; simulations using actual ZIP
population sizes and coordinates are considered in §4.4.6. City population sizes are chosen to
match the distribution of ZIP population sizes in the US. Within-city infection and recovery
are governed by SIR dynamics, and modelled using the Gillespie algorithm with additional
noise. Infection travels between cities via commuting individuals, who spend one-third of
their day in a ‘workplace’ city and two-thirds in a ‘residence’ city. Epidemic onset times
are calculated from the simulated time series using the breakpoint method (§2.3). Hubs are
identified using these epidemic onset times according to the methods developed in §4.2.
4.4.2 Specifying city coordinates and population sizes
Each simulation takes place onN = 16 or 25 cities, which just surpass the median number of
ZIPs (13 and 22) that surround the real hubs within a radius of 3ρ and 4ρ respectively, where
ρ = 66km is the maximum likelihood length scale of the distance kernel from the geographic
transmission model developed in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.4). Considering a radius of 3–4 times
the characteristic distance ρ from the true hub should be sufficient, since beyond a distance
of 4ρ cities are virtually epidemiologically uncoupled, according to the transmission model
developed in Chapter 3. At a distance of 3ρ , there is an approximately 95% drop in force of
infection, according to Eq 3.37. At a distance of 4ρ , the drop is over 98%. Early outbreaks
that occur at a distance of more than 3-4ρ from a true transmission hub are therefore likely
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to be identified as separate seeding events, rather than erroneously replacing the hub. Also,
simulations that incorporate more than about 25 cities quickly become computationally
infeasible.
Cities are uniform-randomly assigned coordinates within a square of width w. Population
sizes are assigned by randomly drawingN values from from the distribution of true ZIP
population sizes in the US. The populations of the simulated cities are divided by 500 before
simulating. This makes the noise of the simulated epidemics match or exceed the noise of
the true epidemics (see Fig 4.12), and ensures that the the population sizes are small enough
for stochasticity to matter. Introducing a division factor may be justified in part by noting
that the effective population size of a city should be smaller than the true population size,
since in reality individuals are not in constant contact with every other member in their city
(i.e. real populations are not well-mixed).
4.4.3 Commuting
The simulated disease spreads between cities via commuting individuals. A proportion fc of
each city’s inhabitants commutes to other cities each day. Workplaces for these commuters
are assigned according to the gravity model with an exponentially-decaying distance kernel.
For each city i, potential workplaces j are given relative weights
w j = N
µ
j e
−di j/ρ .
The commuters are assigned in proportion to these weights. For example, if city 1 has 100
commuters, and cities 2, 3, and 4 have relative weights of w j = 15, 30, and 5, respectively
(and there are no other cities in the simulation), 30 commuters would be assigned to city 1,
60 to city 2, and 10 to city 3.
Commuters are the only mobile individuals in the simulation, and they are only permitted
to travel to and from their workplace. Between the hours of 5pm and 9am (i.e. overnight),
the commuters reside in their home city. At 9am, the commuters instantaneously move to
their workplaces, and remain there until 5pm, when they instantaneously return home.
4.4.4 Model running
The disease is simulated according to the Gillespie algorithm, assuming that each city’s
population is well-mixed, and that each individual’s times of infection and recovery are
random variables that follow exponential distributions.
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At the start of the simulation, one city is chosen as the epidemic introduction site. An
outbreak is seeded in that city by randomly choosing ten individuals and updating their status
to ‘infected’. The outbreak begins at midnight. Transition rates between susceptible (S),
infected (I), and recovered (R) classes for individuals within a city are specified by the SIR
model:
Transition Rate
S→ I β SIN
I → R γI
In the rate definitions, N is the city’s population size, which between 5pm and 9am is the
city’s total number of residents, and between 9am and 5pm is the number of non-commuting
residents plus the total number of commuters to the city. S and I are the numbers of
susceptible and infected individuals in the city, respectively. The parameter β specifies the
infectiousness of the pathogen, and γ is the recovery rate.
4.4.5 Binning and noise
In conventional disease incidence data, the precise times of infection and recovery for
individuals are not recorded. Instead, new infections are aggregated over fixed units of time.
To represent this, the simulated model output is gathered into bins that contain the number of
new infections in each city over consecutive spans of 7 days.
Furthermore, ILI data reflect other respiratory illnesses in addition to influenza. To
account for this, additional ILI cases are added into each week’s incidence according to a
Poisson distribution with mean equal to a fraction fn of the city’s population size.
4.4.6 Parameters and model validation
The model parameters used for the simulations are listed in Table 4.2. Epidemics are
simulated on eitherN = 16 or 25 cities. The gravity model population size exponent µ is
set at 0.32, its maximum-likelihood value from Chapter 3 (see Table 3.4). Only ρ = 1 is
considered, since adjusting this parameter is equivalent to placing the city coordinates in a
larger or smaller square. The weekly background noise fn is fixed at 1% of the population
size, which yields epidemic time series that resemble the observed time series across all
population sizes (see Fig 4.12), and surpasses the background ILI rate of 0.6% used to specify
the ‘low ILI threshold’ in Gog et al. (2014) [91]. The recovery rate γ is fixed at 1/168, with
units of 1/hour, which corresponds to an individual’s infection lasting for approximately
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one week (168 hours). The transmission parameter β is fixed at 1/112, also with units of
1/hour, which gives a within-city basic reproduction number R0 = β/γ = 1.5. The width
of the simulation window is 3ρ = 3 for the 16-city simulations and 4ρ = 4 for the 25-city
simulations. The fraction of commuters fc in each city is set at 10%. Ideally, fc would be
chosen such that the overall epidemic length roughly matches the amount of time it took the
true outbreak to spread through an area of about 3ρ−4ρ (about 200–266) square kilometres,
which is generally around 5 weeks. At fc = 10%, epidemics are somewhat longer than
in reality, on the order of 10-15 weeks between the earliest and latest onsets. Values of
fc = 5% and fc = 20% were also considered. Setting fc = 5% leads to long epidemics,
with many simulations yielding overall epidemic lengths of more than 20 weeks. Setting
fc = 20%, on the other hand, leads to rapid epidemics with no evidence of wave-like structure.
Setting fc = 10% appears to give the best compromise between epidemic length and realistic
epidemic structure, so results are reported for that value.
Table 4.2 Simulation model parameters
Parameter Meaning Value(s)
N Number of cities 16,25
µ Gravity model population effect 0.32
ρ Transmission kernel length scale 1
fc Fraction of commuters in each city 0.10
fn Background ILI noise parameter 0.01
β Disease transmission rate 1/112
γ Disease transmission rate 1/168
w Width of simulation window 3,4
In each simulation, the introduction site is set as the city with the largest population size.
After simulating the epidemic, outbreak onset times are calculated for each city using the
breakpoint method. The hubs are then identified according to the procedure described in
§4.2. The force of infection expression is taken to be
λi(t) = β0+βdN
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt e
−di, j/ρ
∑ j ̸=i e−di, j/ρ
(4.4)
where parameters ρ and µ are set as their simulation values (see Table 4.2). The seeding
parameter β0 is set at e−10 to match the order of magnitude of the true β0 (see Table 3.4). The
transmission parameter βd is trivially set at 1; since the hubs calculation relies exclusively on
ratios of the force of infection, the parameter essentially cancels out.
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In total, 20 epidemics were simulated on each of 25 random ensembles of 16 cities,
and 10 epidemics were simulated on each of 10 random ensembles with 25 cities. Also,
15 epidemics were simulated on the true geographic positions of the ZIPs in Arizona/New
Mexico with the true hub in Phoenix AZ, and 15 epidemics were also simulated on ZIPs in
Alabama/Georgia with the true hub in Atlanta GA. Fig 4.13 depicts four of the simulated
epidemics on 25 cities. The epidemic spreads from deepest to lightest red. Fig 4.14 depicts
two simulated epidemics in Arizona/New Mexico with seed in Phoenix AZ. Fig 4.15 depicts
two simulated epidemics in Alabama/Georgia with seed in Atlanta GA.
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Fig. 4.12 Simulated (top row) and true (bottom row) ILI time series for a range of population
sizes. The simulations in the top row are generated from the simulation model described in
§4.4 with parameter values given in Table 4.2. The time series in the bottom row are from
selected cities in the IMS-ILI dataset.
4.4.7 Simulation results
Table 4.3 gives the accuracy of the hub detection method for all simulated ensembles. In
general, the correct hub is identified around 75-80% of the time. Around 5-10% of the time,
one or more incorrect hubs are identified alongside the correct hub. The correct hub fails to
be identified about 20-25% of the time.
It is more common for cities with small population sizes to be incorrectly identified as
a hub. Fig 4.16 depicts the distribution of population sizes of the cities that are incorrectly
identified as hubs across all 500 simulations withN = 16 cities and 100 simulations with
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Weeks since earliest onset
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Fig. 4.13 Four simulated epidemics on 25 cities, using the simulation procedure described in
§4.4. Discs represent cities, and disc area is proportional to the city’s population size. Disc
colour represents the outbreak onset time in each city as estimated by the breakpoint method
(see §2.3.1). Cities with dashed outlines had indeterminable onset times. The city circled in
red is the introduction site, where ten infected individuals are introduced at the beginning of
the simulation. In each instance, the largest city is chosen as the introduction site.
Table 4.3 Hub identification accuracies for all simulated ensembles.
N
Number of Times correct hub Times correct hub identified Times correct hub
simulations identified with another hub not identified
16 500 385 (77%) 55 (11%) 115 (23%)
25 100 83 (83%) 7 (7%) 17 (17%)
AZ/NM 15 12 (80%) 1 (7%) 3 (20%)
AL/GA 15 11 (73%) 0 (0%) 4 (27%)
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Weeks since earliest onset
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Fig. 4.14 Two simulated outbreaks in Arizona and New Mexico. Discs represent ZIPs, and
disc area is proportional to population size. The epidemic is seeded in Phoenix (surrounded
by a thin red circle). The epidemic progresses from deeper to lighter red. The time scale on
the legend is in weeks. In the upper simulation, the hub identification scheme succeeds in
identifying Phoenix as the hub. In the lower simulation, a different hub, Tucson Main AZ
(boxed), is identified incorrectly.
4.4 Simulation-based validation of methods 127
Weeks since earliest onset
0 5 10 15
Fig. 4.15 Two simulated outbreaks in Alabama and Georgia. Discs represent ZIPs, and
disc area is proportional to population size. The epidemic is seeded in Atlanta (surrounded
by a thin red circle). The epidemic progresses from deeper to lighter red. In the upper
simulation, the hub identification scheme succeeds in identifying Atlanta as the hub. In the
lower simulation, a different hub, Valdosta GA (boxed), is identified incorrectly.
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N = 25 cities. This could be due in part to the smaller cities having noisier time series,
and thereby more frequently appearing to pre-empt the outbreak onset in the true hub. The
overall population distribution for all ZIPs (see Fig 2.1) roughly follows the same shape
as the population distribution for the mis-identified ZIPs in Fig 4.16, raising the question
of whether the incorrect hubs could simply represent a random sample of ZIPs. However,
a bootstrapping test suggests that this is not the case. To test whether the 204 incorrectly
identified hubs might represent a simple random sample of ZIPs, 10,000 unbiased random
samples of size 204 were drawn with replacement from the set of ZIP population sizes, and
the sample mean, sample standard deviation, and sample skewness were calculated. The
sample 95% confidence intervals for the bootstrapped mean, standard deviation, and skewness
values were (294229, 398331), (290205, 466937), and (1.64, 3.48), respectively. The sample
mean, standard deviation, and skewness of the population sizes of the mis-identified ZIPs
are 349282, 288363, and 1.41, respectively. So, while the sample mean of the mis-identified
ZIP population sizes lies within the bootstrapped confidence interval for the sample mean,
the standard deviation and skewness of the mis-identified ZIP population sizes lie outside of
the bootstrapped confidence intervals. The skewness of the mis-identified ZIP population
sizes is below the lower bound of the bootstrapped confidence interval, which is evidence
that smaller ZIPs are disproportionately mis-identified as hubs, since the presence of larger
ZIPs in such a distribution would tend to increase skewness. So, there does appear to be a
bias for smaller ZIPs to be mistakenly identified as hubs.
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
0
10
20
30
40
Population size (millions)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fig. 4.16 Histogram of the population sizes of cities that are incorrectly identified as hubs for
the combined 500 simulations onN = 16 cities and the 100 simulations onN = 25 cities.
Small cities are more often mistakenly identified as hubs than large ones.
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However, the results from the epidemic simulations suggest that it is unlikely that
stochastic effects can explain why all of the observed hubs are in small- to mid-sized ZIPs.
Even if we assume that the probability of mis-specifying a single transmission hub is 25%,
then the probability of mis-specifying three or more hubs is is about 1%, if the probabilities of
success are assumed to be independent for each hub. So, if the true hubs of the autumn wave
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US were in large cities, this simulation
study suggests that it is unlikely that the hub identification scheme would consistently mistake
them for small- to mid-sized cities.
4.4.8 Comments on model formulation
While the simulation model presented in this section provides some support for the accuracy
of the hub identification method, there are a number of reasons why this may not be the
best way of validating the method. First, it should be noted that a transmission hub and an
introduction site are not the same thing. A transmission hub is a site of outbreak establishment,
which may not coincide with the location to which infection was first introduced. In the
simulation model developed in this section, we attempt to force establishment by introducing
ten infected individuals at once into an index city. However, with a basic reproduction
number of 1.5, the outbreak still has a 1.7% chance (1/1.510) of not becoming established
in this index city. Even so, establishment may occur elsewhere, especially if some of the
initially-infected individuals are commuters. In this scenario, a different city would be
recognised as the transmission hub – and rightly so, because it would be the first city in
which the epidemic became established. However, under the evaluation criteria presented in
this section, this would be identified as a failure of the method. The probability of this sort of
error is low, but it still likely leads to some false deflation in the apparent accuracy of the hub
identification method.
Second, for the simulated epidemics, an exponential kernel is used to assign workers to
work places, and the same kernel is used to describe the decay in the the force of infection
with distance. However, there is no guarantee that the two should match. Indeed, Keeling et
al. (2010) [128] show that epidemic dynamics from models that assume continuous decay in
transmission strength (like the mechanistic transmission model developed in Chapter 3) can
differ significantly from the dynamics of models based on random individual movements
(like the individual-based model presented in this section), even when both are governed by
similar kernels. It is unclear how a kernel that describes individual-level commuting patterns
might translate into a kernel that describes metapopulation-level epidemic establishment.
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Understanding this link is key for properly evaluating the hub identification method using
individual-based simulations. Unfortunately, such an in-depth investigation lies outside the
scope of this thesis. It remains an important area for future work.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter presents a method for identifying the geographic transmission hubs of an
outbreak on a metapopulation, for which outbreak onset times for the sub-populations are
known, and for which the force of infection on each sub-population can be separated into
a additive contributions from all potential immediate sources of infection. The method
is used to identify the transmission hubs of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic in the United States. These were generally small- to mid-sized cities,
with two of the three most important hubs in the southeastern US, and the third in the central
valley of California. This Discussion begins with a few comments on the epidemiological
assumptions nested into the hub-finding scheme. Then, since the hubs that are identified for
the autumn 2009 pandemic wave are somewhat unexpected, there follows a discussion of
possible epidemiological justifications for the set of inferred hubs. The section concludes
with a brief discussion on how the methods presented in this chapter open new possibilities
for synthesising genetic and epidemiological data to improve the geographic reconstruction
of outbreaks.
4.5.1 Epidemiological interpretation of the hub-finding procedure
There are two possible interpretations of the transmission network depicted in Fig 4.2. Under
the first, the outbreak in each city i is sparked by one and only one introduction from a nearby
city or from external seeding. The quantities τi, j and σi respectively give the probabilities
that this index case came from location j or from external seeding. Under the second
interpretation, the outbreak in each city i is caused by the sum total of the infective force
exerted by multiple introductions from all possible ‘parent’ locations. Here, the quantities τi, j
and σi give the relative contribution of each predecessor. The second interpretation arguably
is the most realistic: the relatively low basic reproduction number of influenza suggests that
most within-city outbreaks are probably caused by multiple introductions from neighbouring
cities, and are partially sustained by a continued influx of infection. Under either scenario,
however, the hub identification method is equally valid, since it traces transmission through
all possible chains, weighted by their probability, to a most likely introduction site.
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4.5.2 Accounting for the set of observed transmission hubs
The nine identified hubs listed in Table 4.1 are all small- to mid-sized cities, not the major
population centres that conventional wisdom would predict as gateways of infection to the
United States. Three of them – Grenada MS, Albany West GA, and Stockton CA – were likely
responsible for sparking the majority of infections, triggering an estimated three-quarters
(617) of the 834 observed outbreaks through gravity-driven onward transmission.
These unexpected results demand further discussion. While it is likely that air travel
played an important role in disseminating the 2009 A/H1N1pdm virus both internationally
and within the US during the early spring wave [55, 59], these results indicate that other
critical ingredients are needed to explain the spatial introduction patterns of the autumn
wave of the pandemic in the continental US. The simulation study in §4.4 casts doubt on
the possibility that the observed distribution of hubs is due to a bias in data or methods,
which might estimate earlier epidemic onset times in smaller ZIPs than in larger ones by
chance. In addition, there is little evidence that small locations in the true data set have
systematically earlier or more uncertain epidemic onsets than large ones. Fig 2.12 depicts
epidemic onset uncertainty vs. ZIP population size, and finds no significant relationship. The
upper-left scatter in Fig 2.10 depicts epidemic onset week vs. population size, and reveals
that larger ZIPs tend to have earlier onsets than smaller ones, not the reverse. Furthermore,
when comparing the epidemic onset times of the 45 smallest ZIPs (those with population
size below 50,000) with the epidemic onset time of the nearest ZIP with more than 100,000
people, there are 12 pairs where the smaller ZIP onset precedes the larger, 27 where the larger
ZIP onset precedes the smaller, and 6 where the two onsets coincide. This again suggests
that onsets in smaller ZIPs do not systematically precede onsets in larger ZIPs. Finally, for
simulated outbreaks, the breakpoint method reliably estimates epidemic onset time, even
when the epidemic time series is noisy (see §2.3).
Before examining possible explanations for the geographic distribution of the hubs,
it is worth mentioning that epidemic establishment can be a highly stochastic process.
According to classic probability theory of epidemic spread [9, 26], a chain of transmission
can stochastically break early in an epidemic, even if the basic reproductive number (R0) is
above 1. If the chain is not broken during this early phase, a major epidemic is predicted
to unfold roughly deterministically, infecting a large fraction of all susceptible individuals.
For directly-transmitted immunizing infections, the probability of stochastic fadeout is
approximately (1/R0)x, where x is the number of initial infected individuals. With a reported
R0 of 1.6 for A/H1N1pdm [257], this would predict a 62% probability of early fade-out for
a single long-distance introduction, and a 39% probability of early fade-out even with two
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long-distance introductions into the same community. This highly random filter between
introduction and robust establishment may help explain the curious spatial invasion pattern
of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm outbreak in the US.
Also, identifying small ZIPs as hubs is not necessarily a cause for surprise, since even
large cities are sometimes partitioned into small ZIPs. For instance, there are 12 ZIPs in New
York City with fewer than 600,000 people; if one of these had been a hub, there would be no
need to question the conventional wisdom of epidemic establishment in highly-connected
locations. The real counter-intuitive result is that the hubs do not geographically coincide
with major cities. However, the highly-dispersed geographic distribution of the US population
makes the observed set of hubs more plausible. To calculate the probability of observing
hubs in minor cities, it is necessary to shift attention away from ZIPs, which do not generally
reflect an epidemiologically or socially relevant partition of the US population. The 2010 US
Census’ definition of an incorporated place [233] corresponds more directly to the common
notion of a city. There are 26 incorporated places in the US with population size greater
than 600,000 (just over the size of the largest hub). These cities account for only 15.5% of
the total US population. So, if a person is chosen at random to spark an outbreak in his/her
home town, there is a 84.5% chance that this person will not be from a major city. There
is a 22% chance that nine consecutively-chosen random people are not from major cities –
and thus a 22% chance of observing a distribution of hubs similar to the one observed here,
assuming all individuals had equal probability of seeding an outbreak. There is therefore no
evidence to reject the hypothesis that an unbiased stochastic process was responsible for the
long-range jumps of A/H1N1pdm in the US in the autumn of 2009.
Nevertheless, previous immunity, the start of the autumn school term, and meteorological
effects may have tipped the balance further toward outbreak establishment in these smaller
hubs. An early wave of A/H1N1pdm influenza struck some major US cities, including New
York and Chicago, between April and June of 2009, and may have conferred some immunity
on those cities’ populations. A brief calculation shows that this underlying immunity could
have doubled the number of importation events needed to trigger an outbreak. To begin,
note that the probability of outbreak establishment in a population after k introductions of a
disease with basic reproduction number R0 is approximately [129]
p = 1− 1
Rk0
(4.5)
which may be solved for k:
k =
− log(1− p)
log(R0)
. (4.6)
4.5 Discussion 133
Now, imagine that a previous wave of infection has dropped the reproduction number to
some value R. The number of infections needed to spark an outbreak in this partially immune
population with the same probability as before is
k∗ =
− log(1− p)
log(R)
. (4.7)
The proportional increase in the number of cases needed to spark an outbreak with probability
p in the partially immune population is obtained by dividing Eq 4.7 by Eq 4.6, giving
k∗
k
=
log(R0)
log(R)
. (4.8)
From Eq 4.8, if the spring infection wave in New York City and Chicago decreased
the reproduction number roughly from 1.6 to 1.2, then it would have required k∗/k =
log(1.6)/ log(1.2) = 2.6 times more introductions on average to spark an outbreak in these
cities than in a fully susceptible city. This may have prevented outbreak establishment during
the autumn of 2009 in cities that suffered an earlier spring wave of infection.
Elsewhere, the start of the autumn school term may have increased the likelihood of
pathogen establishment. Chao et al. (2010) [47] provide evidence of this at the state level.
If schools in smaller towns went into session before those in nearby large cities, it would
help explain why the smaller towns acted as hubs. Currently, this can only be investigated in
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the five states where school start
dates in 2009 are available at the district level. School start dates elsewhere are only available
as a state average, from [47]. There are two hubs in these five southern states, in Grenada
MS and Albany West GA. Both hubs are relatively close to Atlanta GA, a major urban centre
and international transit hub. The median school start date in Grenada MS precedes the
median school start date in Atlanta by about one half week, and the median school start
date in Albany West precedes the median school start date in Atlanta by about one week.
Perhaps more convincingly, a cluster of six ZIPs surrounding and including Albany West,
and excluding Atlanta, had the country’s earliest school start dates (see Fig 2.20). Though the
difference in school term timing between this cluster and Atlanta is slight, between one-half
and one week, this could help explain why Albany, rather than Atlanta, was an epicentre
of transmission for the eastern half of the US. More detailed data are needed to determine
whether similar differences in school term timing are associated with hubs in other states.
Finally, meteorological factors such as humidity may have influenced the geography
of the hubs. Ambient absolute humidity has been linked to the survival and subsequent
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transmissibility of the influenza virus [151, 209]. Indeed, Shaman et al. (2011) [209] correctly
predicted a third pandemic wave in the southeastern US based on a spatiotemporal model
of the effective reproductive number RE driven by absolute humidity. The results presented
in this chapter show that the southeast also played a crucial role in the spread of the second
(autumn) pandemic wave, since the two most influential hubs lie in that region. This warrants
further investigation of meteorological effects that may have predisposed the southeast to
outbreak establishment in 2009.
It is unfortunately impossible to identify or assess the importance of international hubs
using the IMS-ILI dataset. This may especially affect inferences for the southwestern United
States, since a major A/H1N1pdm outbreak was also occurring in the central and northern
states of Mexico during the autumn of 2009 [49]. For example, the influenza activity in
southern California, which is currently traced with high probability to the hub in Stockton
(see Fig 4.7), might be explained better by some unobserved hub just across the US-Mexico
border. This issue highlights the need for fine-scale influenza incidence data that can be
compared across national boundaries.
4.5.3 Linking with genetic data
Geographic incidence data make it possible to identify pathogen establishment sites, as in this
study and in [258]. A complementary approach for inferring establishment sites uses genetic
data instead, as in [160] and [158]. Linking epidemiological and virological observations
has proven difficult for human influenza [241], but the methods presented here may help
bridge the gap by providing a spatially-detailed, testable hypothesis of the mixing patterns
one might expect to see in spatially-referenced sequence data. Testing the observed patterns
could proceed in two steps. First, geolocated A/H1N1pdm viral sequences from the US in
2009 would need to be gathered from databases such as FluDB[175] and GenBank[174].
These would be subdivided into regions according to the basins depicted in Figure 4.7;
for example, a California group, an Idaho-Oregon-Washington group, an Arizona group, a
Colorado-Utah group, an Iowa-Minnesota-Nebraska group, and an Eastern States group. A
clustering analysis, similar to the one performed in [177], would reveal whether significant
differences exist in the viral sequences between these regions. Importantly, Nelson et al.
(2011)[177] conclude that similar viral strains caused the outbreaks in New York City NY,
Milwaukee WI, and Houston TX, the only three cities studied in that article, in the autumn of
2009. In Figure 4.7, these three cities have similar hues, so there is already some agreement
between this chapter’s results and existing phylogeographic analysis of the pandemic. Second,
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depending on the resolution of the available genetic data, the probabilities of pathogen jumps
between regions or between cities could be calculated according to phylogenetic similarity
and gathered into a Markov transition matrix. Hubs could then be identified using the step-
tracing method presented in this article. These hubs could be cross-checked with the nine
hubs identified in Table 4.1. Combining the data streams in this way would shed more light
on the true transmission network of the 2009 pandemic, improving in turn our ability to
develop effective and efficient interventions for future outbreaks.
4.6 Summary
A general method is introduced to identify the geographic transmission hubs of an epidemic
on a metapopulation for which outbreak onset times are modelled as a function of the
force of infection, expressed as the sum of independent contributions from various potential
contributors of infection. Using this method, the transmission hubs of the autumn wave of
the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States are identified. There are nine,
most of which are small- to mid-sized cities. A simulation study shows that error due to
noise is insufficient to explain the counter-intuitive set of transmission hubs. Instead, it is
likely that epidemic establishment was governed by a highly stochastic process, possibly
influenced by previous immunity, weather, and the start of the autumn school term.

Chapter 5
Age-specific transmission of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the
United States
The transmission dynamics of infectious diseases in humans can vary widely by the age of
the infected host. Identifying which age groups are most responsible for sustaining overall
transmission can improve strategies for outbreak control and prevention. Existing methods
to infer the relative roles of different age groups in epidemic transmission, however, can
normally only accommodate a few age classes, and require data that are highly-specific for
the disease being studied. In this chapter, symbolic transfer entropy (STE), a concept adapted
from the signal processing literature, is presented as a measure that can be used to identify
the most transmissive age groups in an epidemic when data are noisy and split into many age
groups. STE provides a relative ranking of which age groups dominate transmission, rather
than a reconstruction of the explicit between-age-group transmission matrix. Simulation
studies establish that STE can identify which age groups dominate transmission, even when
there are systematic differences in reporting rates between the age groups. Then, the pairwise
STE is calculated between time series of influenza-like illness for 12 age groups in 834
US cities during the autumn of 2009. Elevated STE from 5-19 year-olds to most other
age groups indicates that school-aged children were likely the most important transmitters
of infection within cities during the autumn wave of the 2009 pandemic in the US. The
pairwise STE is also calculated between age groups in cities between which infection likely
spread, as identified by the geographic transmission model presented in Chapter 3. These
estimates suggest that school-aged children may also have contributed disproportionately
to the short-distance geographic transmission of the outbreak. The results may be partially
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confounded by higher rates of physician-seeking behaviour in children compared to adults,
but it is unlikely that differences in reporting rates can fully explain the observed differences
in STE. Finally, as an alternative test of age-specific geographic transmission of the 2009
influenza pandemic in the US, the age-stratified ILI data are explicitly incorporated into
the transmission model developed in Chapter 3. A model selection procedure indicates that
between-city transmission is best predicted by the combined ILI intensity in young infants
(<2 years), young school-aged children (5-9 years), and young adults (20-29 years). This
suggests that transmission from school-aged children alone, though dominant overall, still
may not fully explain the between-city spread of the pandemic.
5.1 Background
Age is a predictor of both susceptibility to and transmissibility of many diseases, including
influenza [143, 168, 187, 217, 245]. This section provides an overview of how host age affects
the transmission of influenza, and describes the modelling approaches that have contributed to
this knowledge. The benefits and limitations of these approaches are discussed, particularly
with respect to inference on high-volume syndromic epidemiological data. Calculating
symbolic transfer entropy (STE) is introduced as a candidate method for identifying patterns
of transmission between age groups using this type of data.
5.1.1 Age as a key characteristic in disease transmission
A person’s age largely dictates her/his interpersonal contact patterns. The POLYMOD study
[170], one of the most complete sources of information on age-specific interpersonal contacts,
provides strong evidence that people tend to interact most frequently with others close to
their own age. This trend holds true within British primary schools as well, where mixing is
highly age-specific [57].
For diseases that spread via casual contact, age is therefore a key predictor of an individ-
ual’s risk of infection. However, care must be taken when using contact data to infer disease
transmission patterns. Survey-based contact data are normally based on some criterion, such
as time spent together, number of words spoken, or a physical touch [57, 71, 113, 170]. If a
different type of contact is a better predictor of infection, the relevance of the contact data
is diminished. Furthermore, age-related contact rates vary geographically, so parametrising
a model for one geographic location using a different location’s contact data may yield
unrealistic results [170]. Finally, the way in which contact information is incorporated into
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models of disease transmission must be chosen with care. Kucharski et al. (2014) for example
find that an individual’s risk of infection is influenced more by her/his age group’s average
mixing patterns than by the individual’s own number of contacts [137].
With these caveats in mind, however, it is possible to infer which age groups may suffer
the greatest burden of disease during an emerging outbreak. A mathematical model using the
POLYMOD contact data shows that 5-19 year-olds are expected to bear the highest burden
of infections during an outbreak of an emerging pathogen spread by casual contact [171].
For influenza, and particularly 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic influenza, a range of studies indicate
that school-aged children suffer a relatively higher risk of infection compared to other age
groups [81, 179, 245, 252, 259]. Findings by Brownstein et al. (2005) contrast somewhat
with these studies, using hospital data to suggest that preschool-aged children may in fact be
the first age group to become infected in seasonal influenza outbreaks, and may also be the
first to transmit the disease to other age groups [27].
School-aged children may also be the main drivers of transmission during influenza
epidemics. This notion is supported by a range of studies from different countries on different
outbreaks [91, 170, 218, 245]. In light of this, many have suggested that preferentially
vaccinating children may be the most effective way to disrupt the spread of an emerging
influenza outbreak [157, 173, 245], and there is some empirical evidence that suggests that
such a strategy would be effective [199].
The relationship between host age and influenza transmission may differ between pan-
demic and seasonal outbreaks [163]. Pandemic outbreaks are often marked by shifts in the
age groups that suffer the highest morbidity and mortality. The 1918 and 2009 influenza
pandemics both featured shifts in morbidity and mortality from the very young and very old
towards young adults [126, 183, 217]. This may be partially due to underlying immunity
in older individuals who have been exposed to a wider array of strains, some of which
may resemble the pandemic strain more closely than any strains to which the younger age
groups have been exposed [198]. The relationship between morbidity/mortality and onward
transmission remains unclear, however. Reichert et al. (2012) [198] find that immunity from
previous infection may protect against severe morbidity during a pandemic, but may not
prevent infection – and therefore may also not prevent transmission. It is therefore not valid
to assume that the age groups that suffer the worst health consequences are necessarily the
ones most responsible for transmission.
Differences in healthcare-seeking behaviour between age groups can confound ILI-
based estimates of which age groups dominate transmission. For example, if children
seek healthcare for ILI more frequently than adults, this could lead to artificially high
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estimates of ILI in children, and thus to artificially high estimates of children’s contribution
to overall transmission. Methods that aim to identify age-related differences in transmission
should account for known differences in healthcare-seeking behaviour between age groups.
Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22] estimate that 40% of adults (defined as individuals over 18
years) and 56% of children with ILI sought healthcare during the 2009 influenza pandemic in
the United States. These estimates remained fairly consistent during the following 2010-11
influenza season, when 45% of adults and 57% of children with ILI sought healthcare [21].
In a 2002-03 study of ILI in University of Minnesota students, 29.3% of students with ILI
sought healthcare, which is substantially lower than the healthcare-seeking rates reported
by Biggerstaff et al. for adults during the 2009 pandemic and 2010-2011 seasonal outbreak
[21, 22, 178]. This difference could be due in part to a lower level of perceived personal risk
from ILI before vs. after the 2009 pandemic, and also to the different age categories used in
the two studies; Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22] report healthcare-seeking rates for adults as a
whole, while Nichol et al. (2005) [178] focus just on university-aged students. Overall, the
evidence suggests that children with ILI seek healthcare more frequently than adults with ILI
do.
5.1.2 Incorporating age into epidemiological models
Failing to incorporate demographic structure into epidemiological models can yield in-
correct estimates of key epidemiological parameters. Nishiura et al. (2010), for example,
find that models without age structure overestimated the reproduction number of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in Japan [180]. Also, epidemiological processes and demo-
graphic processes can sometimes interact, making it important to include age structure into
epidemic models. Recurring outbreaks of the measles, for example, have been attributed to
replenishment of the susceptible population as children are born [58]. Klepac and Caswell
(2011) [134] provide a theoretical framework for these sorts of models. For the study of single
outbreaks of acute infections such as those caused by influenza, however, these long-term
interactions can normally be safely ignored; it is enough to account for the differences in risk
of infection due to differences in contact patterns [171, 245] and, in some cases, previous
exposure to the pathogen [78, 217].
The reproduction number, R, is perhaps the most commonly estimated quantity for char-
acterising the transmissibility of a disease. For structured populations, however, it is natural
to work with the next-generation matrix, which is a generalisation of the reproduction number
[65, 66]. The structure of the next-generation matrix can reveal which sub-populations are
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most responsible for sustaining the transmission of a disease. Just as the reproduction number
captures the expected number of secondary infections caused by a single infected individual,
the i, jth element of the next-generation matrix gives the expected number of secondary
infections in class i caused by a single infected individual in class j. The reproduction
number is the dominant eigenvalue of the next-generation matrix [66]. Diekmann et al.
(2010) [66] provide a recipe for calculating the next-generation matrix from compartmental
epidemiological models, but epidemiological reasoning alone is often enough to construct
the matrix, if the relative transmission rates between sub-populations are known.
Multiple studies use epidemiological models to infer which age groups drive the trans-
mission of influenza. Nishiura et al. (2009) [179] parametrise a next-generation matrix
for the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza outbreak in Japan, and find that children would have
been capable of sustaining the outbreak amongst themselves, while the outbreak would have
died out in a population of only adults. Glass et al. (2011) [90] extend a method introduced
by Wallinga and Teunis (2004) [244] to estimate a time-varying next-generation matrix
for the same Japanese outbreak [90]. Worby et al. (2015) use a simple ratio of pre- and
post-peak influenza cases in five age groups to demonstrate that 5-19 year-olds were primarily
responsible for transmission of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic in certain US states [252].
The methods presented in each of these studies are limited by the type of data they require
and the amount of detail they can accommodate. The strategies proposed by Nishiura et al.
(2009) [179] and Glass et al. (2011) [90] make strong assumptions about the structure of the
next-generation matrix, which become increasingly unrealistic as the number of age classes
grows. The method introduced by Worby et al. (2015) requires data that is highly specific for
influenza, so ILI data is unsuitable. For syndromic ILI data with as many as 12 age classes, a
different strategy is required.
5.1.3 Transfer entropy
To identify the epidemiological interactions between multiple age groups from noisy data
governed by complicated dynamics, we seek a measure of stochastic ‘driving’ that makes
as few assumptions as possible about the processes’ underlying dynamics. Transfer entropy
(TE) provides such a measure. Introduced by Schreiber (2000) [208], the TE gives the
amount of information the past states of one stochastic process provide about the transition
probabilities of another. It is sometimes referred to as the amount of information “transferred”
from one process to another [208]. If I and J are discrete-state and discrete-time random
processes such that it and jt are the states of processes I and J at time t, then the TE from
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process J to process I is defined as
TJ→I = ∑
ΩI ,ΩJ
p(it+1, i
(k)
t , j
(l)
t ) log
( p(it+1|i(k)t , j(l)t )
p(it+1|i(k)t )
)
(5.1)
where i(k)t is shorthand notation for (it , . . . , it−k+1), and similarly j
(l)
t = ( jt , . . . , jt−l+1). The
logarithm has base 2, so that the transfer entropy is measured in bits. The sum is over
all possible combinations of states (it+1, i
(k)
t , j
(l)
t ), where it+1, i
(k)
t ∈ ΩI and j(l)t ∈ ΩJ , and
ΩI and Ω j are the state spaces for processes I and J. Eq 5.1 is a Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence that measures how much process I deviates from the generalised Markov property
p(it+1|it , . . . , i1) = p(it+1|i(k)t ), given the last l states of process J. In practice, the histories
are often fixed at length 1 (k = l = 1) [208]. Note that the TE from a Markov process to
itself, TI→I , is zero.
The TE is related to mutual information. The mutual information for two random
variables I and J is defined as
MIJ =∑ p(i, j) log
( p(i, j)
p(i)p( j)
)
(5.2)
[208] where the sum is over all possible states i and j of the variables I and J. This is
another Kullback-Leibler divergence that measures the deviation of the joint process p(i, j)
from the assumption that the processes I and J are independent. Unlike the TE, mutual
information is symmetric; that is, it measures the probabilistic dependence between two
processes, but cannot determine the direction of information transfer between them, if there
is any [208]. Measuring the delayed mutual information between two processes is one way
to introduce asymmetry. This takes a step toward inferring whether one process influences
another, by measuring shared information between the present state of one process and
the past states of another [208]. While the lagged mutual information describes how one
process’ history predicts the static probabilities of another, the TE measures how one process’
history influences the transition probabilities of another. Because of this, the TE is less likely
to be confounded by a shared input signal, and is a better measure of stochastic ‘driving’
[208]. Section 2 of Kaiser and Schreiber (2002) [124] provides a detailed description of the
differences between TE and mutual information.
There are at least two other strategies for detecting causal-type interactions between time
series. Granger causality [97] measures how knowledge of one autoregressive stochastic
process improves predictions of another. Granger causality is a special case of TE, when
the stochastic processes are jointly Gaussian-distributed [12]. The TE is thus better suited
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than Granger causality for making inferences on more general, possibly nonlinear, processes,
though this comes at the expense of requiring more data and having no clear way to test
statistical significance [12]. Convergent cross mapping (CCM) [228], on the other hand, was
developed to detect causal relationships in stochastic systems with underlying deterministic
structure. CCM relies on Takens’ theorem [229] to reconstruct candidate manifolds of the
underlying dynamical system using lagged observations from two time series. Causality is
inferred if nearby points on one reconstructed manifold consistently map to nearby points on
the other reconstructed manifold. CCM has been used to provide evidence that temperature
and absolute humidity fluctuations drive the timing of global seasonal influenza outbreaks
[62], though some controversy surrounds these findings [13, 227]. Nevertheless, it would be
interesting to see whether CCM can reveal asymmetric epidemiological interactions between
age groups, and to compare its findings with those identified using TE. Lungarella et al.
(2007) [159] provide more detail on the relationships between various methods that infer
causal relationships from time series data.
As a brief aside, we prefer to avoid the term ‘causality’ and instead speak of processes
influencing, or sometimes ‘driving’, one another. Despite its frequent use in the literature,
causality is a philosophically fraught term, and the methods discussed above only detect
limited types of causality. Some argue that it is impossible for these methods to detect any
true notion of causality, since identifying causality requires perturbing the alleged causal
source, or otherwise intervening in the system [152]. Regardless of the vocabulary used, these
methods have successfully detected meaningful relationships between real-world stochastic
processes [24, 125, 185, 223, 224, 228].
The TE is limited by only applying to discrete-state random processes. In practice,
one often wishes to estimate the transfer of information between random processes with
continuous or near-continuous state spaces. A few strategies have been introduced to make
TE amenable to these sorts of processes, including coarse-graining the data into bins with
adaptive widths, and reconstructing the processes’ probability densities using non-parametric
kernel estimators [124]. Both methods demand many modelling choices that may be difficult
to defend, and can lead to widely divergent results [124].
Staniek and Lehnertz (2008) [223] introduce a more robust strategy for calculating
information transfer between time series processes that have continuous- or near-continuous
state spaces. Motivated by the insight that the relative amplitudes of subsequent observations
from these sorts of processes may provide enough information to identify interactions between
them, they propose symbolising the time series based on ordered m-tuples of observations.
This creates an ‘alphabet’ of symbols that describe the qualitative structure of the time series
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while greatly reducing the state space. First, the modeller chooses the number of consecutive
points m that make up each symbol. For m= 2, there are only two possible symbols: it−1 < it
and it−1 > it . For m = 3, there are six possible symbols, which we label A through F :
A : it−2 < it−1 < it (5.3)
B : it−2 < it < it−1 (5.4)
C : it−1 < it−2 < it (5.5)
D : it−1 < it < it−2 (5.6)
E : it < it−2 < it−1 (5.7)
F : it < it−1 < it−2 (5.8)
These symbols are depicted in Fig 5.1. In general, for a given m, there are m! possible symbols.
For a process I with n observations, a symbol is assigned to each state (im, im+1, . . . , in). Fig
5.2 depicts how a given time series would be symbolised for m = 2 and m = 3. Doing so
yields a new process Iˆ with observations (iˆm, iˆm+1, . . . , iˆn). The same may be done for process
J. The symbolic transfer entropy (STE) is then defined as
T SJ→I =∑ p(iˆt+1, iˆt , jˆt) log
( p(iˆt+1|iˆt , jˆt)
p(iˆt+1|iˆt)
)
(5.9)
where the sum is over all possible symbols for states iˆt+1, iˆt , and jˆt .
A B
A B C D E F
m = 3:
m = 2:
Fig. 5.1 List of the two possible symbols for m = 2 (top) and the six possible symbols for
m = 3 (bottom). The six m = 3 symbols are specified by Eqs 5.3-5.8. The ordering of the
symbols is arbitrary, but will remain consistent throughout this chapter.
In practice, the joint and conditional probabilities in Eq 5.9 are estimated using the
relative frequencies of the symbols in the observed dataset. For example, to calculate the
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Fig. 5.2 An example time series and its symbolisation with m = 2 and m = 3. For m = 2, A
represents an increase and B represents a decrease. The symbols corresponding to the letters
for m = 3 are defined in Eq 5.3-5.8 and depicted in Fig 5.1.
joint probability p(iˆt+1 = A, iˆt = B, jˆt =C) for symbols A, B, and C, one counts the number
of times a consecutive B and then A are observed in the I process, with a C in the J process
simultaneous with the B in the I process. Dividing this count by the total length of the
process, n−m+1, gives an estimate of the joint probability.
If multiple realisations of the process are available, the probabilities may be estimated
by the relative frequencies of the symbols across all realisations. The process need not have
reached a stationary distribution, as long as enough realisations are available [124]. Fig
5.3 depicts how this is done. Consider k realisations from two possibly related stochastic
processes I and J. Each realisation consists of a time series of length n. So, there are k pairs
of length-n time series available for estimating the STE between variables I and J. In Fig 5.3,
k = 3 and n = 17. To estimate the STE, each of the time series is symbolised using symbols
of length m. This yields k pairs of symbol strings, where each string within a pair has length
nS = n− (m−1). In Fig 5.3, m= 2, so each symbol string has length nS = 17− (2−1) = 16.
Next, the probabilities that make up the STE sum, Eq 5.9, are estimated using the relative
frequencies of the symbols in the symbol strings. For example, P(iˆt+1 = B, iˆt = A, jˆt = A) is
calculated as the number of times a consecutive A then B are observed in the I process, with
an A in the J process concurrent with the A in the I process. It is helpful to interpret this as
the number of times the pattern
A B
A
is observed when the symbol strings for a realisation of I and J are aligned one above the
other (see the symbol strings in Fig 5.3). The frequency with which this pattern appears is
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AAAAAAABBBABBBBB ABAAAAAAABBBBBBB ABAAAAABBBABBABB
BAABABAABAABBBBA ABAAAAABABBBABAB AAABABABBABBBBBB
P( it+1 = B, it = A, jt = A) = 2 + 2 + 2
15 + 15 + 15 = 645
P( it+1 = B | it = A, jt = A) =2 + 2 + 2
5 + 7 + 4 = 616
P( it+1 = B | it = A) =2 + 2 + 4
8 + 8 + 8 = 824
..
.
Fig. 5.3 Summary of how the STE is calculated from multiple realisations of an epidemic
process with two age groups. The three columns in the top pane portray k = 3 realisations
from an epidemic process, which in this case is the Poisson-type process described in §5.2.4.
The columns consist of two time series plots each, which depict the simulated case counts for
the two age groups (call them I and J) across 17 time steps. The time series are symbolised
with a symbol length of m = 2, yielding the character strings beneath the first set of arrows.
An A represents an increase and a B represents a decrease. The probabilities that make up the
STE sum, Eq 5.9, are estimated using the relative frequencies of the symbols in the character
strings. A few of these probabilities are calculated in the lower section of this figure. See the
main text (§5.1.3) for more details on how these probability estimates are computed.
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calculated for each of the k pairs of symbol strings, yielding a set of counts c1, . . . ,ck. Since
there are nS−1 possible positions for the pattern to appear within each pair of symbol strings,
the overall joint probability is estimated as
c1+ c2+ · · ·+ ck
k(nS−1) . (5.10)
Conditional probabilities are estimated in a similar way. For example, P(iˆt+1 = B|iˆt =
A, jˆt = A) is estimated as the number of times a B is observed in the I process, given that
the previous observations in the I and J processes were both A. The counts c1, . . . ,ck are the
same as before, but rather than dividing by the total length of the symbolised time series, we
instead divide by the number of times the pattern
A
A
is observed. Denote these counts cˆ1, . . . , cˆk. Then, the conditional probability is
c1+ c2+ · · ·+ ck
cˆ1+ cˆ2+ · · ·+ cˆk . (5.11)
The calculation is easier for the probabilities conditioned on just one term. The quantity
P(iˆt+1 = B|iˆt = A), for example, is simply the number of times an AB appears in the symbol-
ised time series for I, divided by the number of times an A appears in the symbolised time
series for I.
The above steps are demonstrated with a specific example in Fig 5.3. The joint and
conditional probabilities in Eq 5.9 may be estimated using the steps outlined above, adjusting
the specific symbols as necessary.
The STE has been used to study epileptogenic neural signals and the dissemination of
information through social networks [24, 223]. These studies rely on the STE’s robustness to
amplitude-adjusting effects, including point-wise random noise and process-wide vertical
shifts. This robustness also makes STE well-suited for studying age-stratified ILI data, which
features point-wise noise from non-influenza respiratory illness, and which is subject to
broad-scale amplitude shifts due to differences in physician-seeking behaviour between age
groups.
Estimating STE probabilities requires large volumes of data, as a trade-off for the
method’s minimal assumptions about the underlying process dynamics. When sufficient data
are available, STE offers a way of identifying interactions between processes governed by
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complicated dynamics from noisy data. The following sections consider how STE behaves
when confronted with data from both simulated and true epidemics.
5.2 Symbolic transfer entropy and epidemiological processes
To my knowledge, there has been no systematic evaluation of whether STE can detect true
differences in transmission strengths from age-structured epidemiological time series. This
section presents a range of tests to check whether STE can reliably infer which age groups
drive transmission in simulated outbreaks. First, the ‘contextual STE’ is introduced, which
is the STE measured forward from a point in an epidemiological time series with known
amplitude and known underlying dynamics. This is presented to ensure that symbolising
the time series does not ignore too much of the information encoded in the exact amplitude
values, and to verify that the most transmissive age groups can be consistently identified for
a range of epidemiologically feasible parameters.
Then, the full STE is calculated for a variety of age-structured epidemic simulations. For
the first set of simulations, the STE is calculated using an individual-based two-age-class
SIR model, where dependence between the age classes varies continuously from none, to
equivalent within- and between-group transmission, to strong asymmetric transmission from
one age group. Then, due to the computational difficulties of including more age groups in
such a detailed epidemic model, the same calculations are performed using a Poisson-type
epidemic model, giving virtually equivalent results. Next, the STE is calculated on two sets
of four-age-class Poisson-type epidemic models. The first set incorporates uniformly-varying
reporting rates across all age groups to measure the ability of STE to detect true asymmetry in
transmission rates despite incomplete reporting. The second set examines how STE responds
to age-variable reporting rates when within- and between-group transmission strengths are
equal, to see whether spurious differences in STE from unequal reporting rates are possible.
Finally, STE estimates are made on two twelve-age-class Poisson-type models, one with
strong asymmetric transmission from children and uniform reporting rates, and one with
symmetric transmission but age-varying reporting rates. These last simulations match the
resolution of the available IMS-ILI data, to be considered in §5.3. To summarise, STE
estimates are made under the following simulation scenarios:
• 2-age-class individual-based SIR simulations with varying coupling between age
groups (none to symmetric to asymmetric)
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• 2-age-class Poisson-type simulations with varying coupling between age groups (none
to symmetric to asymmetric), to ensure agreement with the SIR-based results
• 4-age-class Poisson-type simulations with asymmetric coupling between age groups
and uniform reporting across age groups
• 4-age-class Poisson-type simulations with symmetric coupling between age groups
and non-uniform reporting rates between age groups
• 12-age-class Poisson-type simulations with asymmetric coupling between age groups
and uniform reporting across age groups
• 12-age-class Poisson-type simulations with symmetric coupling between age groups
and non-uniform reporting rates between age groups.
5.2.1 The contextual STE
The STE assumes that that there are Markovian transitions between the symbols of the
symbolised time series – that is, the probability of observing a particular symbol, given
the symbol that precedes it (and possibly given the preceding value in some other time
series), is some constant value, regardless of the exact amplitude of the underlying process.
However, for disease outbreaks, the amplitude of the underlying process (i.e. the case count)
clearly does matter. For an outbreak with case counts binned into regular time windows,
the probability that an increase in cases occurs in a given age group from one time step to
the next is related to the number of cases in each age group in the previous time step, the
overall reproduction number, and the relative rates of infection between age groups. When
the reproduction number is greater than 1, an increase in cases is more likely if there are, for
example, 1000 cases in the current week than if there are 10. In the vocabulary of STE, when
using symbols of length m = 2 (thus encoding simple increases/decreases in the time series),
the probability of transitioning from the symbol it < it+1 to the (same) symbol it+1 < it+2 is
higher when it is 1000 than when it is 10, if the reproduction number is greater than 1. This
violates the Markovian assumption embedded into the STE calculation, which assumes that
the joint and conditional probabilities in Eq 5.9 are consistent throughout the entire process.
To test whether the STE can provide reliable information about age-structured transmis-
sion dynamics despite this deviation from the Markov property, we here calculate a version
of the STE for a range of epidemiologically reasonable reproduction numbers, between-
age-group infection rates, and true numbers of infected individuals. To lay the groundwork,
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consider an outbreak where the number of cases per unit time in two age groups are described
by the discrete random processes I = {i1, . . . , in} and J = { j1, . . . , jn}. Define the contextual
STE as
T SJ→I,t =∑ p(iˆt+1, iˆt , jˆt |it−m+1, jt−m+1) log
( p(iˆt+1|iˆt , jˆt , it−m+1, jt−m+1)
p(iˆt+1|iˆt , it−m+1, jt−m+1)
)
. (5.12)
where the sum is over all possible values (symbols) of iˆt+1, iˆt , and jˆt , and m is the symbol
length. Values with hats denote symbols, and values without hats denote actual case counts.
The contextual STE is equivalent to the full STE (Eq 5.9), conditional on the true amplitudes
of processes I and J at time t−m− 1, or the ‘context’ of the underlying process. If the
contextual STE gives accurate insight into the underlying epidemiological process regardless
of the context, then there is reason to believe that the full STE will give similarly accurate
insight.
Next, we define an epidemiological model that describes the distribution of cases in age
groups I and J at (discrete) time t, given the number of cases in each age group at time t−1:
P(it |it−1, jt−1) = f I(it ; it−1, jt−1,λ ) (5.13)
P( jt |it−1, jt−1) = f J( jt ; it−1, jt−1,λ ) (5.14)
(5.15)
where f I and f J are probability mass functions, and λ is a set of parameters specifying the
rates of infection between age groups I and J. The case counts it and jt are assumed to be
nonnegative integers. We first simplify notation by setting
f I(it ; it−1, jt−1,λ ) = f It−1(it) and (5.16)
f J( jt ; it−1, jt−1,λ ) = f Jt−1( jt) (5.17)
and similarly defining the corresponding CDFs
F It (x) =
x
∑
k=0
f It (k) (5.18)
FJt (x) =
x
∑
k=0
f Jt (k) (5.19)
where x is a nonnegative integer.
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A common choice is to model the disease case counts as Poisson random variables, each
with a rate that is a linear combination of the case counts in the previous time step in each
age group:
P(it |it−1, jt−1)∼ Poisson(λ11it−1+λ12 jt−1) (5.20)
P( jt |it−1, jt−1)∼ Poisson(λ21it−1+λ22 jt−1) (5.21)
giving
f It−1(it) = Exp[−(λ11it−1+λ12 jt−1)]
(λ11it−1+λ12 jt−1)it
it!
and (5.22)
f Jt−1( jt) = Exp[−(λ21it−1+λ22 jt−1)]
(λ21it−1+λ22 jt−1) jt
jt!
. (5.23)
If the length of the time steps matches the disease’s generation interval, the next-generation
matrix is simply
NGM =
[
λ11 λ12
λ21 λ22
]
, (5.24)
and the reproduction number is the dominant eigenvalue of this matrix.
We now seek to express the contextual STE, Eq 5.12, in terms of the epidemiological
process, defined by f I and f J . For now, consider a symbol length of m = 2, and hence
2! = 2 symbols. The contextual STE sum has 2× 2× 2 = 8 terms, one for each set of
possible symbols {iˆt+1, iˆt , jˆt}. The derivation will be done for a single term of that sum. The
derivations for the other terms follow nearly identical steps.
Consider the term of Eq 5.12 corresponding to two consecutive decreases in process I
with a concurrent decrease in process J:
P(it+1 < it , it < it−1, jt < jt−1|it−1, jt−1) log
(P(it+1 < it |it < it−1, jt < jt−1, it−1, jt−1)
P(it+1 < it |it < it−1, it−1, jt−1)
)
(5.25)
where the inequalities now take the place of the symbols (the terms with hats) from Eq 5.12.
We seek to express these probabilities in terms of f I and f J . To avoid cluttering notation,
assume that it−1 and jt−1 are given throughout. First, consider the joint probability (the first
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term, before the logarithm in Eq 5.25):
P(it+1 < it , it < it−1, jt < jt−1) = (5.26)
P(it < it−1, jt < jt−1)P(it+1 < it |it < it−1, jt < jt−1) = (5.27)
P(it < it−1)P( jt < jt−1)P(it+1 < it |it < it−1, jt < jt−1) = (5.28)
P(it < it−1)P( jt < jt−1)
jt−1
∑
jt=0
it−1
∑
it=0
P(it+1 < it | jt , it)P(it |it < it−1)P( jt | jt < jt−1) = (5.29)
= F It−1(it−1)F
J
t−1( jt−1)
jt−1
∑
jt=0
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it)
f It−1(it)
F It−1(it−1)
f Jt−1( jt)
FJt−1( jt−1)
= (5.30)
=
jt−1
∑
jt=0
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it) f
J
t−1( jt) (5.31)
where (5.27) follows from a definition of conditional probability, (5.28) follows from the
independence of it and jt given it−1 and jt−1, (5.29) follows from the law of total probability,
(5.30) follows from substituting terms, and (5.31) follows from cancellation of the two CDFs
in I and J.
The probabilities inside the logarithm in Eq 5.25 may be similarly expressed in terms of
the epidemiological process, giving
jt−1
∑
jt=0
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it) f
J
t−1( jt) log
( ∑ jt−1jt=0∑it−1it=0 F It (it) f It−1(it) f Jt−1( jt)
FJt−1( jt−1)∑
∞
jt=0∑
it−1
it=0 F
I
t (it) f It−1(it) f
J
t−1( jt)
)
(5.32)
as an alternative expression for the term (5.25). The remaining seven terms in the contextual
STE sum, Eq 5.12, may also be expressed in terms of the epidemiological process using
similar derivations. It is now possible to explore how different epidemiological scenarios
affect the contextual STE.
5.2.2 Contextual STE for under various epidemiological scenarios
This section considers how the contextual STE varies with reproduction number R and
underlying case counts it−1 and jt−1, given some relative within- and between-group rates of
transmission.
First, note that the contextual STE from group J to group I is zero when the number of
cases in group I does not depend on the previous number of cases in group J; that is, when
P(it |it−1, jt−1) = P(it |it−1). This property should be expected, since there is no transfer of
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infection, and thus should be no transfer of information, from group J to group I. To verify,
consider the numerator in the logarithm in Eq 5.32. Since F It and f
I
t−1 do not depend on jt ,
the sum over jt can be brought in front of the final term, yielding
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it)
jt−1
∑
jt=0
f Jt−1( jt) (5.33)
=
( it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it)
)
FJt−1( jt−1) (5.34)
Similarly, in the denominator, the sum over jt may be brought in front of the final term,
giving
FJt−1( jt−1)
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it)
∞
∑
jt=0
f Jt−1( jt) (5.35)
= FJt−1( jt−1)
it−1
∑
it=0
F It (it) f
I
t−1(it) (5.36)
sine the infinite sum is equal to 1. The numerator (5.34) and denominator (5.36) are equal,
giving the logarithm an argument of 1 and making the overall term’s value zero. This happens
for all eight terms in the contextual STE expression (Eq 5.12), yielding a contextual STE that
is exactly equal to zero. So, it is guaranteed that when one age group does not contribute
infection to another, the contextual STE in that direction will be zero, as required.
To explore further characteristics of the contextual STE, consider the Poisson-type
epidemiological model given in Eqs 5.20-5.21. For three different sets of within- and between-
group rates of transmission, we check how the contextual STE varies with reproduction
number R and contextual case counts it−1 and jt−1.
Before beginning, we seek an expression for the next-generation matrix λ in terms of the
reproduction number R and some relative rates of within- and between-group transmission.
Define the relative rate matrix
r =
[
r11 r12
r21 r22
]
(5.37)
where element ri j is the relative rate at which an infected individual in class j infects
individuals in class i. So, for example, if r12 = 2r21, then the infection rate from group 2
to group 1 is double the infection rate from group 1 to group 2. Let ρ be the dominant
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eigenvalue of r. The next-generation matrix is
λ =
R
ρ
r. (5.38)
This ensures that the dominant eigenvalue of λ is R, and that the relative magnitudes of the
elements of λ match the relative magnitudes of the elements of r. Note that using a constant
multiple of the relative rate matrix r∗ = cr will still yield the same next-generation matrix λ ,
since the dominant eigenvalue ρ∗ of r∗ will simply divide out the constant c again.
First, consider equal within- and between-group rates of transmission; that is,
r =
[
1 1
1 1
]
. (5.39)
This describes mean-field dynamics between the age groups. The group that dominates
transmission should therefore be the group with the most cases, at least during the phase
roughly prior to the epidemic peak (when Re f f > 1), since there are no intrinsic differences
in transmission rates. That is, if there are (somehow) 100 infected children and just one
infected adult, children will be responsible for the bulk of new cases, even though each child
individually has exactly the same transmission potential as the infected adult. We calculate
the contextual STE for reproduction number R between 0.6 and 1.5, which covers a range of
possible reproduction numbers for influenza (see, for example, Smieszek et al. (2011) [218]).
The number of cases in class I at time t−1, it−1, is held fixed at 25, and the number of cases
in class J at time t−1, jt−1, is allowed to vary from 5 to 50. Though these are small numbers
of cases, they coincide with the weekly numbers of recorded ILI cases in some of the smaller
age groups in the IMS-ILI dataset, especially in infants and the elderly (see Fig 5.23).
Fig 5.4 depicts T SI→J,t−1−T SJ→I,t−1 for R ∈ [0.6,1.5] and jt−1 ∈ {5, . . . ,50}. Fig 5.4 is
generated by considering pairs of jt−1 and R, with jt−1 between 5 and 50 in steps of 5, and
R between 0.6 and 1.5 in steps of 0.05. For each pair of jt−1 and R, the contextual STE
(Eq 5.12) is calculated in both directions (I → J and J → I), using the summation terms
expressed as in Eq 5.32. Contours depict the difference between these contextual STEs. Note
that it−1, jt−1, r, and R are sufficient to specify F I , FJ , f I , and f J , using Eq 5.22–5.23.
When R > 1, the age group with more cases transfers the most information. That
is, when jt−1 < it−1 = 25 (Fig 5.4, upper left quadrant), T SI→J,t−1 > T
S
J→I,t−1, and when
jt−1 > it−1 = 25 (upper right quadrant), T SI→J,t−1 < T
S
J→I,t−1. This matches with what one
might expect from the epidemiological dynamics: when R > 1, the age group with more
infected individuals causes the majority of new infections, and so has a higher contextual
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STE. When R< 1, interestingly, the reverse is true; the contextual STE is higher from the
group with fewer cases. This is a spurious result arising from the STE not taking into account
the underlying epidemic process. Clearly, epidemic decay is not ‘driven’ in the same way
transmission is; decay is governed by individual recovery rates, and not by interactions
between individuals. STE, however, searches simply for patterns in one process that predict
patterns in another. During an epidemic’s decay, one age group’s dropping case counts
may well anticipate drops in another group’s case counts simply because the depletion of
susceptibles in the first age group occurs earlier than in the second. The contextual STE
identifies this relationship, and identifies the process with fewer cases as the one that is
driving the decay. This suggests that caution is warranted when interpreting differences in
STE; it must always be done with reference to the underlying epidemiological dynamics.
In future work, it may be worthwhile to consider incorporating epidemiological intuition
explicitly into the STE formulation; the simplest way to do this may be to restrict attention to
only symbols that represent rises in amplitude. To summarise, when intrinsic within- and
between-group rates of transmission are equal (r given by Eq 5.39), the relative number of
cases at time t−1 dictates which group transfers the most information to the other. When
R> 1, the group with more cases at time t−1 transfers the most information; when R< 1,
the group with fewer cases at time t−1 transfers the most information.
Next, consider a case in which the within-group transmission rate for group I is twice
that of group J, but all other infection rates are equal. That is,
r =
[
2 1
1 1
]
. (5.40)
In this scenario, sub-population I does not directly contribute to infection in sub-population
J any more than J contributes to itself or to I. However, the growth rate in the number of
infections in group I is higher than for group J, and so group I will eventually account for
the bulk of transmission. As before, the contextual STE is calculated using the relative rate
matrix, Eq 5.40, for R ∈ [0.6,1.5] and jt−1 ∈ {5, . . . ,50}, with it−1 fixed at 25. The contour
plot in Fig 5.5 depicts T SI→J,t−1−T SJ→I,t−1 under this scenario. The epidemiological intuition
is supported; for nearly the full range of parameters, T SI→J,t−1 > T
S
J→I,t−1. For large jt−1 and
R > 1 (upper right), and also for small jt−1 and R < 1 (lower left), the dominant transfer
of information is reversed (T SI→J,t−1 < T
S
J→I,t−1), but only by a small amount. The I → J
contextual STE dominates most when jt−1 is small compared to it−1 and when R> 1 – that
is, when the transmission-dominant age group (I) has more cases and the outbreak is on the
upswing.
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Fig. 5.4 Difference in contextual STE, ∆STE = T SI→J,t−1−T SJ→I,t−1, for jt−1 between 5 and
50 and R between 0.6 and 1.5, with it−1 fixed at 25. Units for the vertical scale are in bits.
When T SI→J,t−1 > T
S
J→I,t−1 (redder colours), there is evidence that process I drives process J
more strongly than process J drives process I, and vice-versa. The relative rates of within-
and between-group transmission are equal, as specified by the rate matrix r (Eq 5.39). The
I → J contextual STE is higher when it−1 > jt−1 and R> 1 (upper left quadrant), and when
it−1 < jt−1 and R < 1 (lower right quadrant). The I → J and J → I contextual STEs are
approximately equal when it−1 = jt−1 and when R = 1.
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Fig. 5.5 Difference in contextual STE, ∆STE = T SI→J,t−1−T SJ→I,t−1, for jt−1 between 5 and
50 and R between 0.6 and 1.5, with it−1 fixed at 25. Units for the vertical scale are in bits.
The within-group rate of infection for group I is double the other infection rates (see Eq
5.40). The I → J contextual STE dominates in most of the parameter space, especially when
jt−1 < it−1 = 25 and R > 1. The J → I contextual STE is slightly higher than the I → J
contextual STE for large jt−1 and high R (upper right), and also for small jt−1 and low R
(lower left), with ∆STE reaching a minimum of −0.0032 bits at jt−1 = 10 and R = 0.65.
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Finally, consider the case in which the within-group transmission rate for group I is
quadruple the transmission rate from group J to group I, and the transmission rate from
group I to group J is double the transmission rate from group J to group I. The within-group
transmission rate for group J is equal to the transmission rate from group J to group I. That
is,
r =
[
4 1
2 1
]
. (5.41)
This corresponds to strong driving of transmission from group I. Again, the contextual STE
is calculated using the relative rate matrix Eq 5.41 for R ∈ [0.6,1.5] and jt−1 ∈ {5, . . . ,50},
with it−1 fixed at 25. The contour plot in Fig 5.6 depicts T SI→J,t−1− T SJ→I,t−1 under this
scenario. The I → J contextual STE is dominant throughout the parameter space, and is most
dominant when it−1 > jt−1 and R > 1. Here, the contextual STE correctly identifies that
group I dominates transmission for the full range of epidemiologically-feasible parameter
values.
5.2.3 Simulations on a two-age-class SIR model
We now shift attention from the contextual to the full STE. Since analytically evaluating the
full STE with respect to an underlying epidemiological model becomes exceedingly difficult
due to the complicated relationship between the symbolic transition probabilities and the
underlying epidemic time series, simulation studies are used instead. This section verifies
that the STE can identify meaningful epidemiological relationships between age groups using
a two-age-class individual-based stochastic SIR model.
Consider two age groups I and J. For each age group, let XI(t) and XJ(t) be the number
of susceptible individuals, YI(t) and YJ(t) be the number of infected individuals, and ZI(t)
and ZJ(t) be the number of recovered individuals at (continuous) time t. Let N be the
total population size, equal to the total number of individuals in all age classes and disease
states. N remains constant throughout the simulation; there are no births and no deaths.
The population sizes of each age group, NI and NJ , also remain constant throughout the
simulation; individuals may not transition between the two age groups on the scale of this
epidemic. Individuals transition from susceptible to infected to recovered according to the
rates given in Table 5.1. The parameter βmn specifies the transmission rate from age group n
to age group m. The recovery rate γ is assumed constant across age groups.
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Fig. 5.6 Difference in contextual STE, ∆STE = T SI→J,t−1−T SJ→I,t−1, for jt−1 between 5 and
50 and R between 0.6 and 1.5, with it−1 fixed at 25. Units for the vertical scale are in bits.
The within-group rate of infection for group I is quadruple the within-group rate of infection
for group J, and the infection rate from group I to group J is double that from group J to
group I (see Eq 5.41). The I → J contextual STE dominates throughout of the parameter
space (∆STE> 0 everywhere), especially when jt−1 < it−1 = 25 and R> 1.
Table 5.1 Infection rates for the two-age-class SIR model
Transition Rate
XI → YI β11XIYI/N+β12XIYJ/N
XJ → YJ β21XJYI/N+β22XJYJ/N
YI → ZI γYI
YJ → ZJ γYJ
160
Age-specific transmission of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the
United States
The next-generation matrix for this model is
NGM =
1
γ
[
β11 pI β12 pI
β21 pJ β22 pJ
]
(5.42)
where pI = NI/N and pJ = NJ/N. The within- and between-group transmission dynamics
therefore depend on the infection rates βmn and the relative population sizes NI and NJ .
Let r be a matrix in which the i, jth entry gives the relative rate of infection from age
class j to age class i. For a given basic reproduction number R0 and recovery rate γ , the
transmission rates can be calculated:
β =
[
β11 β12
β21 β22
]
=
R0γ
ρ
diag(1/pI,1/pJ) · r (5.43)
where ρ is the dominant eigenvalue of r. This yields a next-generation matrix with dominant
eigenvalue equal to R0, in which the proportional differences between the terms match those
of the rate matrix r.
Table 5.2 lists the parameter values used for the individual-based SIR simulations. The
basic reproduction number R0 is fixed at 1.5, which is consistent with estimated values of
R0 for 2009 pandemic influenza [122, 257]. The average time to recovery 1/γ is 3.5 days,
which is in line with estimates of the infectious period for 2009 pandemic influenza [257].
The population sizes NI and NJ are small enough to ensure clearly stochastic dynamics (the
dynamics become nearly deterministic as the population sizes increase), and are in line with
the population sizes of the smaller age groups in the IMS-ILI dataset.
Table 5.2 Parameter values for the two-age-class SIR model
Parameter Value Description Units
R0 1.5 Basic reproduction number people
γ 1/3.5 Recovery rate 1/day
NI 400 Number of individuals in age group I people
NJ 400 Number of individuals in age group J people
Simulations are implemented using the Gillespie algorithm, starting with one infected
individual in age group I. Since R0 is relatively low, there is a high chance of early epidemic
die-out, so only outbreaks that last for at least 12.5 weeks are recorded. Once an outbreak is
simulated, infections are binned into half-week intervals. Poisson noise is added to each bin
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at a rate of 0.5% of the population size to simulate background non-influenza ILI. This rate
is just below the 0.6% ILI ratio cutoff used in Gog et al. (2014) [91] to define out-of-season,
low ILI activity weeks. Fig 5.7 depicts five simulated epidemic time series from this model.
To study how STE detects the transition from completely decoupled age groups to mean-
field dynamics with equal within- and between-group transmission rates, consider a relative
rate matrix of form
r =
[
1 z
z 1
]
(5.44)
with z ∈ [0,1]. For each value of z between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.1, one hundred ensembles
of 800 outbreaks each are simulated. The epidemic time series are then symbolised using
symbols of length m = 3. We do not consider longer symbol lengths because estimating the
necessary joint and conditional probabilities becomes impractical. With m = 4, there are 24
possible symbols, which begins to defeat the purpose of symbolising to reduce the size of the
state space. To my knowledge, m = 4 is the largest symbol length that has been considered
in practice, and that was using a dataset of millions of Twitter tweets [24].
For each of the 100 ensembles, T SI→J and T
S
J→I are estimated using the relative symbol
frequencies in the 800 symbolised time series. This gives 100 STE estimates for each value
of z. The left-hand plot in Fig 5.8 depicts the mean STE and 95% confidence interval in
both directions (I → J and J → I) as a function of z. The I → J (blue) and J → I (black)
STEs overlap for all values of z, correctly identifying the balanced influence between the age
groups. The STE is near zero for z = 0 and increases steadily to approximately 0.06 bits as z
approaches 1, correctly identifying the increasing degree of coupling between the two age
groups as z increases.
Next, consider a rate matrix of form
r =
[
1+3k 1
1+ k 1
]
(5.45)
with k ∈ [0,1]. When k = 0, this is equivalent to the previous rate matrix, Eq 5.44, with z = 1.
When k = 1, the within-group transmission rate for age class I is four times the baseline
transmission rate, and the transmission rate from group I to group J is twice the baseline
transmission rate. This captures a continuum between the mean-field scenario and a scenario
with strong forcing from age class I. As before, 100 ensembles of 800 epidemics each are
simulated for values of k between 0 and 1 in steps of size 0.1. For each ensemble, the STE
from I to J and from J to I is calculated. The right-hand plot in Fig 5.8 depicts the mean STE
and 95% confidence interval in both directions for k between 0 and 1. For k = 0, the mean
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Fig. 5.7 Five simulations from the two-age-class individual-based SIR model, implemented
using the Gillespie algorithm. Each column depicts the output from a single epidemic
simulation, separated into case counts for group I (top) and group J (bottom). Vertical axes
have units of case counts, and horizontal axes have units of half weeks, which is also assumed
to be the length of the disease’s generation interval. Transition rates are given in Table 5.1,
with parameter values in Table 5.2. The transmission rates are specified by the relative rate
matrix 5.45 with k = 1, for which age group I (upper row) has quadruple the within-group
transmission rate as group J, and for which the I → J transmission rate is twice the J → I
transmission rate.
STE is approximately 0.06 bits, the same as it is for z = 1. As k increases, T SI→J increases
steadily and T SJ→I decreases steadily, correctly identifying the increasing forcing from group
I to group J.
5.2.4 Simulations on a two-age-class Poisson model
The simulations in §5.2.3 provide evidence that the STE can capture meaningful epidemiolog-
ical interactions between age groups. However, the epidemic sizes are still relatively small,
and the transmission model only accounts for two age groups. Modelling larger population
sizes and more age groups using an individual-based model demands large amounts of
computational time. So, we now consider a more efficient Poisson-type model like the one in
Eq 5.20-5.21 that specifies the number of cases in consecutive time steps as a function of the
number of cases in each age class in the previous time step.
In particular, let the number of infected individuals in age classes I and J at time t follow
it ∼ Poisson(λ11,t it−1+λ12,t jt−1) (5.46)
jt ∼ Poisson(λ21,t it−1+λ22,t jt−1) (5.47)
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Fig. 5.8 Mean T SI→J (solid blue line) and T
S
J→I (solid black line) values for a range of within-
and between-group transmission rates, as estimated from 100 ensembles of 800 epidemics
for each value of z and k, simulated using an individual-based SIR model. The shaded bands
provide the approximate 95% confidence intervals of the STE estimates. The left-hand plot
depicts the STE for the relative rate matrix given in Eq 5.44, which transitions smoothly from
completely decoupled age groups to mean-field dynamics where within- and between-group
transmission rates are equal. The right-hand plot depicts the STE for the relative rate matrix
given in Eq 5.45, which transitions smoothly from mean-field dynamics to strong forcing
from group I. In the left-hand plot, the STE increases steadily with z, and the I → J and J → I
STE estimates overlap, correctly capturing the symmetric coupling between age groups that
increases with z. In the right-hand plot, the STE correctly identifies statistically significant
forcing from group I to group J as k increases.
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where it and jt are case counts, and λmn,t is the infection rate from age class n to class m at
(discrete) time t. Unlike in the SIR model in 5.2.3, the infection rates λmn,t are allowed to
vary in time.
For the simulations, the length of the time steps is assumed to coincide with the generation
interval for the disease. This way, the next-generation matrix is simply
NGMt = λ t =
[
λ11,t λ12,t
λ21,t λ22,t
]
. (5.48)
For a given matrix r where element ri j denotes the relative rate of infection from group j
to group i, and a given reproduction number R, the next-generation matrix may be expressed
as
λ t =
R
ρ
r (5.49)
where ρ is the dominant eigenvalue of the matrix r. As before, this ensures that the dominant
eigenvalue of the next-generation matrix is equal to the reproduction number, and that
the relative magnitudes of the elements of the next-generation matrix match the relative
magnitudes of the elements of r.
Epidemics are simulated by placing a single initial infected individual in either group I
or group J with probability 0.5, and then simulating the numbers of infected individuals in
each group for subsequent weeks according to draws from the Poisson distributions given in
Eq 5.46-5.47. For the first eight time steps, R is fixed at 1.5. After the eighth time step, R
is decreased to 0.8 for the rest of the epidemic. This yields outbreaks of similar size as the
ones simulated using the individual-based SIR model presented in §5.2.3 (compare Figs 5.7
and 5.9). Only outbreaks in which at least 400 people become infected are recorded. Five
simulations from this two-age-class Poisson-type model are depicted in Fig 5.9.
To check consistency with the individual-based SIR model, 100 ensembles of 800
epidemics each were simulated for the rate matrices given in Eq 5.44 and Eq 5.45, with z
and k ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1. The mean STE estimates from these simulations
are depicted in Fig 5.10 (compare with Fig 5.8). The same trends hold: the I → J and J → I
STE estimates overlap and increase as z increases from 0 to 1, and the I → J STE quickly
dominates over the J → I STE as k increases from 0 to 1.
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Fig. 5.9 Five simulations from the two-age-class Poisson-type simulation algorithm, Eqs
5.46-5.47. Each column depicts the output for a single epidemic simulation, separated into
case counts from group I (top) and group J (bottom). The reproduction number R is 1.5 for
the first eight weeks of the outbreak, and then drops to 0.8 for the rest of the epidemic. The
transmission rates are specified by the relative rate matrix 5.45 with k = 1, for which age
group I (upper row) has quadruple the within-group transmission rate as group J, and for
which the I → J transmission rate is twice the J → I transmission rate.
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Fig. 5.10 Mean T SI→J (solid blue line) and T
S
J→I (solid black line) values for a range of within-
and between-group infection rates, as estimated from 100 ensembles of 800 epidemics
for each value of z and k between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.1, simulated using the two-age-
class Poisson-type model (Eq 5.46-5.47). The shaded bands provide the approximate 95%
confidence intervals for the STE estimates. The left-hand plot depicts the STE for the relative
rate matrix given in Eq 5.44, which transitions smoothly from completely decoupled age
groups to mean-field dynamics where within- and between-group transmission rates are
equal. The right-hand plot depicts the STE for the relative rate matrix given in Eq 5.45, which
transitions smoothly from mean-field dynamics to strong forcing from group I. The trends in
these plots match those in Fig 5.8, showing agreement between STE estimates when using
either the individual-based SIR model or the more computationally efficient Poisson-type
model.
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5.2.5 Simulations on a four-age-class Poisson model with variable re-
porting rates
Having demonstrated agreement between STE estimates based on an individual-based SIR
model and a more efficient Poisson-type model, we now consider larger epidemics with more
age classes. We also consider the relationship between reporting rates and STE.
First, define the n-age-class Poisson-type epidemic model as
yi,t ∼ Poisson(λi1,ty1,t−1+λi2,ty2,t−1+ · · ·+λin,tyn,t−1) (5.50)
where yi,t is the number of infected cases in age group i at (discrete) time t, and λi j,t specifies
the infection rate from group j to group i at time t. As before, the time steps are assumed to
be equal to the generation interval of the disease, so that the next-generation matrix is
NGMt = λ t =

λ11,t λ12,t . . . λ1n,t
λ21,t λ22,t . . . λ2n,t
...
... . . .
...
λn1,t λn2,t . . . λnn,t
 . (5.51)
For a given matrix r whose i, jth entry specifies the relative rate of infection from age group
j to group i, and a given reproduction number R, the relationship in Eq 5.49 still holds.
For the scenario with four age classes (n = 4), epidemics are initiated by placing a single
infected individual into any of the four age groups with equal probability. The case counts in
subsequent weeks are drawn from the Poisson distributions specified by Eq 5.50. To allow
for larger epidemics than considered in the two-age-class scenario, the reproduction number
R is fixed at 1.5 for fourteen, rather than eight, time steps. After the fourteenth time step, R
reduces to 0.8 as before. Fig 5.11 (grey lines) depicts five simulations from this model.
In a real outbreak, only a fraction of cases are reported and recorded. To simulate this, a
vector of reporting rates c = (c1, . . . ,cn) is introduced, where ci is the reporting rate for age
class i. The number of reported case counts for age group i in time step t follows
yobsi,t ∼ Binomial(yi,t ,ci). (5.52)
Fig 5.11 depicts the original (grey) and observed (black) time series for five outbreaks on
four age classes using this model, with ci = 0.5 for all age classes.
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Fig. 5.11 Five simulations from the 4-age-class Poisson-type model (Eq 5.46-5.47) with
relative rate matrix r given in Eq 5.53. Columns correspond to a single epidemic simulation,
separated into case counts for the four age groups. Grey lines depict the full case counts
simulated from the Poisson model, and black lines depict the case counts obtained by using a
Binomial observation model (Eq 5.52) with a reporting rate of ci = 0.5 for all age groups.
Note the different vertical scales.
To explore how reporting rates influence the STE, two scenarios are considered. First, we
consider how varying the reporting rate equally across all age groups affects the identifiability
of true differences in transmission rate. Second, we consider how different reporting rates
between age groups affects the STE, when the true transmission rates are all equal.
For the first scenario, consider a relative rate matrix of form
r =

1 2 1 1
1 4 1 1
1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1
 (5.53)
so that the within-group transmission rate for group 2 is four times the baseline transmission
rate, and the group 2 to group 1 and group 2 to group 3 transmission rates are double the
baseline transmission rate. If the four age groups correspond to infants, children, adults,
and elderly, then this would match a scenario with high transmission among children and
intermediate transmission between children and infants and between children and adults.
To study how varying reporting rates uniformly across all age classes affects the ability
of the STE to identify children as the dominant transmitters of disease, 100 ensembles of
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800 epidemics each were simulated for reporting rates ci between 0.1 and 1 in steps of 0.1,
with equal reporting rates across all age groups. Fig 5.12 depicts the STE from each age
group to every other age group as a function of ci. Even for reporting rates as low as 0.1,
the STE values from group 2 are higher than those from any other group. As the reporting
rates increase, the differences become more pronounced. The left-hand plot in Fig 5.13
depicts the mean pairwise STE values with ci = 0.5 in all age groups, which is essentially
a vertical slice from the plots in Fig 5.12 at ci = 0.5. Matrix 5.56 provides the mean STE
values used to make the left-hand plot in Fig 5.13, with their 95% confidence intervals. There
is significantly elevated transmission from group 2 to all other groups.
For the second scenario, with mean-field transmission dynamics and reporting rates that
differ by age, the relative rate matrix is
r =

1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
 (5.54)
so that all within- and between-group rates of transmission are equal. Roughly following the
age-structured reporting rates reported by Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22], the reporting rate
vector is fixed at
c = (0.4,0.6,0.4,0.4) (5.55)
corresponding to elevated reporting rates in group 2 (children). To be more consistent with
the reporting rates in Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22], the reporting rate for group 1 (infants)
should also be approximately 0.6, but for illustrative purposes we for now consider elevated
reporting in just one age group. A more realistic scenario, with elevated reporting rates for
both infants and children, is considered later in the 12-age-class simulations.
To estimate how age-variable reporting rates affect the STE, 100 ensembles of 800
epidemics each were simulated using the rate matrix Eq 5.54 and the reporting rates Eq 5.55.
The pairwise STE between each age group was calculated for each ensemble. The right-hand
plot in Fig 5.13 depicts the pairwise mean STE values, and matrix 5.57 provides the mean
values and 95% confidence intervals. A 60% reporting rate in group 2 and a 40% reporting
rate in all other age groups yields significantly higher STE estimates from group 2 than from
any other age group. However, the first scenario, with elevated transmission from group 2
but constant 50% reporting across all age groups, yields even higher STE estimates from
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Fig. 5.12 Mean pairwise STE values (solid lines) with 95% confidence intervals (shaded
bands) for 100 ensembles of 800 simulated epidemics, for reporting rates c (horizontal axis)
between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.1. The vertical axis corresponds to the estimated STE, in
units of bits. Reporting rates for the simulations are uniform across all age groups. The
relative rate matrix that specifies within- and between-group transmission rates is given by
Eq 5.53. The plot in row i and column j depicts the STE from group j to group i. Even with
reporting rates near 0.1, group 2 is correctly identified as the primary driver of transmission.
As reporting rates increase, the dominant transmission from group 2 becomes clearer. The
estimated STE increases with reporting rate for all age groups, but more quickly for group 2
than for the other age groups. According to Biggerstaff et al. (2012), true reporting rates for
ILI in the US during the 2009 pandemic were between 0.4 and 0.6.
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group 2. For comparison, the mean pairwise STE values for the two scenarios are depicted
side-by-side in Fig 5.13.
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Fig. 5.13 Mean pairwise STE values in bits, multiplied by a factor of 102, for 100 ensembles
of 800 epidemics using relative rate matrix Eq 5.53 and 50% reporting rate for all age groups
(left), and using relative rate matrix Eq 5.54 with 60% reporting rate in group 2 and 40%
reporting rate in all other age groups (right). A box in row i and column j corresponds to
the mean STE from group j to group i, with darker shades corresponding to higher STE. In
both scenarios, the STE from group 2 to all other age groups is elevated. The elevation is
higher for the scenario with explicitly higher transmission rates from group 2 (left) than for
the scenario with equal transmission rates and elevated reporting in group 2 (right). Mean
values and confidence intervals are given in matrices 5.56 and 5.57.
5.2.6 Simulations on a twelve-age-class Poisson model
For the final set of simulations, we consider ensembles of 834 outbreaks on twelve age
classes (<2, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, 80+). This
matches the resolution of the IMS-ILI data. First, 10 ensembles of 834 outbreaks each are
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simulated using the Poisson-type epidemic model, Eq 5.50, with relative rate matrix
r =

1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(5.58)
which corresponds to strong transmission between children (5-19 years), moderate trans-
mission from children to infants (0-4 years) and from children to adults (20-59 years), and
baseline transmission within and between all other age groups. Reporting rates are held
constant at 50% for all age groups, and reported cases are simulated using the Binomial
reporting rate model (Eq 5.52). The mean pairwise STEs between all age groups are depicted
in the left-hand plot in Fig 5.14.
Also, 10 ensembles of 834 epidemics each were simulated using a 12×12 mean-field
relative rate matrix r with all entries equal to 1, and with 60% reporting rate for age groups
from 0 to 19 years old, and 40% reporting rates for age groups 20 years old and older. This
aligns with the ILI reporting rates reported by Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22]. The mean
pairwise STEs between all age groups under this scenario are depicted in the right-hand
plot in Fig 5.14. As before, differences in reporting rates are enough to yield detectable
differences in STE, but the explicitly forced model with uniform reporting rates yields more
dramatic differences in STE than the mean-field model with age-varying reporting rates. In
Fig 5.14, there is little row-wise variation in STE. This is due in part to the effects discussed
in §5.2.2, in which it was found that age groups with more infected members tend to transfer
more information. So, even though the child-to-elderly transmission rate used to produce
the left-hand plot is no different than the elderly-to-elderly transmission rate, the elevated
numbers of children who become infected due to the high within-child transmission rate
yields a high STE from children to the elderly. In the right-hand plot, elevated reporting rates
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for infants and children makes the case counts in those age groups appear artificially high,
which manifests in higher apparent STE from those age groups to all other age groups.
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Fig. 5.14 Pairwise mean STE between 12 age groups from 10 ensembles of 834 simulated
epidemics using a Poisson-type outbreak model (Eq 5.50). A box in row i and column j
corresponds to the STE from group j to group i, where darker shades corresponds to higher
STE. For the left-hand plot, epidemics are simulated with high transmission among children
and moderate transmission between children and infants and between children and adults
(see Eq 5.58). Reporting rates are fixed at 50% across all age groups. For the right-hand plot,
epidemics are simulated with uniform transmission rates within and between all age groups,
but with 60% reporting rates for infants and children and 40% reporting rates for adults and
elderly. Higher STE is associated with each of elevated transmission and elevated reporting
rates. In the left-hand plot, the maximum pairwise STE is 0.052 bits, from 5-9 year-olds
to 15-19 year-olds. In the right-hand plot, the maximum pairwise STE is 0.036 bits, also
from 5-9 year-olds to 15-19 year-olds. The cells corresponding to these maximum values are
marked with a dot.
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5.3 STE to identify dominant age groups in transmission
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United
States
Having established a relationship between relative transmission rates, reporting rates, and
STE on simulated outbreaks, we now calculate the STE between age groups during the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States using the IMS-ILI data. First, the STE
is computed between age groups within the same ZIP. Then, the STE is estimated between
age groups in ZIPs between which infection likely spread, as identified by the geographic
transmission model in Chapter 3. In both cases, there is elevated STE from 5-19 year-olds
to most other age groups, suggesting that school-aged children contributed most to both
within-city transmission and between-city transmission of the outbreak.
5.3.1 Age-group differences in within-city transmission
Weekly ILI data are available for 834 3-digit ZIP codes across the United States (see Chapter
2). For each of these ZIP codes, the ILI data are further separated into 12 age groups.
The ILI ratios (ILI counts divided by number of physician visits in each age group) are
symbolised for the 12 age groups in the 25 weeks between 12 July 2009 and 27 December
2009, using a symbol length of m = 3. The age-aggregated ILI ratios for each ZIP are
also symbolised in the same way. It is assumed that each outbreak represents an instance
of an underlying epidemic process that is consistent for all ZIPs; that is, we assume that
age-related transmission and reporting rates remain constant across ZIPs. To the best of my
knowledge, this should be a reasonable assumption, since the overall demographics of the
US are fairly consistent throughout the country. This way, the STE transition probabilities
may be estimated as simple relative frequencies of symbol combinations in a particular age
group across all locations, as they were in the outbreak simulations.
Fig 5.15 depicts the within-ZIP STE from each age group to the ZIP’s age-aggregated
time series. There is a clear peak in STE for 5-19 year-olds, with the highest STE from 10-14
year-olds. There is also a smaller peak in STE from 70-79 year-olds. It is unclear whether
this represents a true signal or is just a spurious effect, since the time series for the elderly
age groups are noisy (see Fig 5.23).
Fig 5.16 depicts the pairwise within-ZIP STE between all age groups. The elevated STE
from 5-19 year-olds to all ages from infants through adults, depicted as the dark shades in
columns 3-5, provides evidence that there was systematically elevated transmission from
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school-aged children to these other age groups within cities. The adult-adult STE is also
moderately elevated, suggesting that adults may have played some role in transmitting the
outbreak amongst themselves, though this could also be explained by elevated transmission
from children alone. Compare, for example, to the left-hand plot in Fig 5.14. In that
simulation, only transmission from children is elevated, but it causes a moderate elevation in
the STE from adults and infants.
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Fig. 5.15 Within-ZIP STE from each age group to the age-aggregated symbolised ILI time
series. School-aged children (ages 5-19 years) have the highest transfer of information to the
age-total time series.
5.3.2 Age-group differences in geographic transmission
In addition to examining within-city relationships between the age groups, it is possible to
measure the extent to which the age groups in one city may have contributed to transmission
in a different city. Here, the STE is calculated between age groups in pairs of cities between
which infection likely spread. The i, jth entry of matrix τ , where τ is defined in §4.2.2, gives
the probability that the outbreak in ZIP i was triggered by transmission from ZIP j, according
to the transmission model developed in Chapter 3. For each row i of matrix τ , the index of
the largest entry coincides with the ZIP that most likely infected ZIP i. The ZIPs for which
max(τi1,τi2, . . . ,τin) < σi (that is, for which external seeding is the most likely source of
infection) are excluded.
First, the STE is calculated from each age band in ZIP i’s most likely infector to the
age-aggregated symbolised ILI time series for ZIP i. These STE values are depicted in Fig
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Fig. 5.16 Within-ZIP STE from the age classes along the top to the age classes along the left,
estimated from the IMS-ILI data. Darker boxes indicate higher STE. The highest STE value
is from 10-14 year-olds to 2-4 year-olds, at 0.084 bits.
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5.17. Again, the STE from school-aged children is elevated, with 5-9 year-olds providing the
most information about the age-aggregated ILI in the nearby infected ZIP. The STE plateaus
for 20-49 year-olds, before decreasing again for 50+ year-olds. This may reflect moderate
between-city transmission from working adults who commute between ZIPs.
Next, the pairwise STE is computed from each age group in each ZIP i’s maximum-
likelihood infector to each age group in ZIP i. These pairwise STEs are depicted in Fig 5.18.
The overall picture is similar to the one in Fig 5.16, with elevated STE from children to
infants through adults, and moderate STE from adults to other adults.
Note that the transmission model developed in Chapter 3 and the between-ZIP pairwise
STE considered here each characterise a different type of transmission. The transmission
model from Chapter 3 describes epidemic ‘sparks’ that travel between ZIPs, while the
pairwise STE is better interpreted as a measurement of which age groups sustain transmission
over the course of the outbreak. The maximum-likelihood infector ZIP, as identified by
the mechanistic transmission model, may not be the ZIP most responsible for sustaining
transmission in the recipient ZIP, and conversely, the age groups that drive transmission
according to STE are not necessarily the ones that most likely sparked transmission in a
nearby ZIP. However, the maximum-likelihood infector pairs considered in this section
provide a proxy for locations that are likely epidemiologically coupled in some way. A
discussion of the differing conclusions that may be drawn from the mechanistic transmission
model versus from the STE may be found in this chapter’s Discussion.
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Fig. 5.17 STE from each age group to the age-aggregated time series in maximum-likelihood
donor/recipient-of-infection ZIP pairs. As for within-ZIP transmission, school-aged children
(ages 5-19) have the highest STE to the age-total time series.
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Fig. 5.18 STE from the age classes listed along the top to the age classes listed along the left,
for maximum-likelihood donor/recipient-of-infection ZIP pairs. Darker boxes indicate higher
transfer of information. The STE is especially elevated in the column beneath school-aged
children, which may indicate a high degree of transmission between school-aged children
and infants, other school-aged children, and adults in nearby cities. The highest transfer of
information is from 5-9 year-olds to 2-4 year-olds, at 0.060 bits.
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A quick way to validate these methods is to calculate the STE between ZIPs that are very
far apart. These STE values should be lower, since there should be very little epidemiological
coupling, and thus very little transfer of information, between the ZIPs. To check this, for
each ZIP, a partnering ZIP is randomly drawn from the set of ZIPs at least 1000 km away.
The transfer entropies between the age-specific time series in the original ZIPs and the
age-aggregated time series in the distant ZIPs are calculated. These are depicted in Fig 5.19.
There is still some evidence of elevated STE from school-aged children, possibly due to
synchrony between outbreaks in distant locations [239] or elevated reporting rates in these
age groups. The STE values are lower than in Fig 5.17, however, as expected.
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Fig. 5.19 STE from each age group to the age-aggregated time series in a randomly-selected
ZIP at least 1000 km away. School-aged children (ages 5-19) still transfer the most informa-
tion to the age-total time series, but the magnitude of the STE is much smaller than within
ZIPs (Fig 5.15) or between maximum-likelihood donor/recipient-of-infection pairs (Fig 5.17).
This provides further evidence that the STE captures epidemiologically relevant coupling,
which is expected to be low at long distances.
Taken together, these findings suggest that school-aged children may have been the
primary drivers of within-city transmission, and may also have contributed disproportionately
to between-city transmission, of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United
States.
5.3.3 Robustness to variation in reporting rates
It remains to be seen whether the observed differences in STE in the ILI data could be fully
explained by differences in reporting rates between age groups. To check this, pre-reporting
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Fig. 5.20 STE from the age classes listed along the top to the age classes listed along the
left, between randomly-selected pairs of ZIPs at least 1000 km apart. Darker boxes indicate
higher transfer of information. The STE from children to other age groups is elevated, but
not as markedly as it is in the within-ZIP and the maximum-likelihood infector pair scenarios
(Figs 5.16 and 5.18). The maximum pairwise STE in this case is also lower than for either of
the two previous scenarios, at 0.015 bits, from 5-9 year-olds to 20-29 year-olds.
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counts of influenza-like illness can be roughly inferred from the observed ILI counts, and the
STE may be re-calculated. If the STE trends persist, then they are likely robust to reporting
uncertainty. To accomplish this, it is necessary to first demonstrate that the STE differences
observed in the ILI data still hold when estimated using ILI counts rather than the ILI ratios.
Figs 5.21 and 5.22 depict the STE from each age group to the age-aggregated time series,
and the pairwise STE between each age group, calculated using the within-ZIP ILI counts
rather than the ILI ratios. The same patterns hold, with school-aged children emerging as the
primary contributors of information to most other age groups’ time series.
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Fig. 5.21 Within-ZIP STE from each age band to the age-aggregated time series, using ILI
counts rather than ILI ratios. The values are almost identical to the ones obtained using the
ILI ratios (see Fig 5.15).
Next, it is possible to reconstruct a distribution of possible true case counts from the
observed case counts, given a particular reporting rate. First, for a given location, as in §5.2.5,
we assume that the observed ILI count yobsi,t in age band i in week t represents a binomial
sample from yi,t total ILI cases in that week. That is,
yi,t ∼ Binomial(yi,t ,ci) (5.59)
where ci is the reporting rate for age band i. Given the number of observed cases yobsi,t and
reporting rate ci, the normalised likelihood for the true number of cases in week t is
L(yi,t ;yobsi,t ,ci) =
(
yi,t
yobsi,t
)
c
yobsi,t +1
i (1− ci)yi,t−y
obs
i,t (5.60)
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Fig. 5.22 Within-ZIP pairwise STEs between age bands, using ILI counts rather than ILI
ratios. Darker boxes correspond to higher values. The values are almost identical to the ones
obtained using ILI ratios (see Fig 5.16).
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which satisfies ∞
∑
yi,t=0
L(yi,t ;yobsi,t ,ci) = 1. (5.61)
The normalised likelihood for yi,t , Eq 5.60, may be interpreted as a probability distribution,
from which possible true numbers of cases in week t can be drawn.
To test the robustness of the STE results to reporting uncertainty, possible true case
counts are drawn using Eq 5.60 for each week and each age group in each location, and the
pairwise STE is re-calculated. This is repeated 100 times. The reporting rate c is assumed to
be 60% for age groups between 0 and 19, and 40% for age groups 20 and above, following
the ILI reporting rate estimates from the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic in the US reported
by Biggerstaff et al. (2012) [22]. Fig 5.23 depicts four reconstructed full case counts (grey)
from four age-group time series (rows) in four different locations (columns). Fig 5.24 depicts
the mean pairwise within-ZIP STE between age groups using the reconstructed case counts.
The pattern of elevated STE from children to infants through adults persists.
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Fig. 5.23 True counts (black) with four binomial reconstructions (grey) of the true numbers
of counts. It is assumed that children (under 20 years) have 60% reporting rates and adults
(20+) have 40% reporting rates, following [22].
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Fig. 5.24 Mean pairwise within-ZIP STE values estimated from 100 reconstructed ILI case-
count time series, assuming a 60% reporting rate in infants and children and a 40% reporting
rate in adults and elderly. Darker boxes correspond to higher values. School-aged children
still transfer the most information to the other age groups, consistent with all of the previous
results.
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5.3.4 Maximum-information symbols
As a brief aside, it is possible to identify which symbols carry the most information in a given
stochastic process. For example, if one time series has the symbol A at time t, it is possible
to identify whether this provides more information about which symbol another time series
will display at time t+1 than if the first time series had a different symbol at time t. This is
done by separating the STE sum in Eq 5.9 into parts. The amount of information that an A in
process J at time t−1 provides about whether the symbol in process I is a B at time t is
T S,ABJ→I = ∑ˆ
it
p(iˆt+1 = B, iˆt , jˆt = A) log
( p(iˆt+1 = B|iˆt , jˆt = A)
p(iˆt+1 = B|iˆt)
)
. (5.62)
The amount of information that each symbol contributes to every other symbol can thus be
calculated. Using the IMS-ILI data, the symbol-specific STE is calculated from the three
school-aged-children age groups (5-19, 10-14, and 15-19 years) to the age-aggregated time
series in their same ZIP. The values are depicted in Fig 5.25. A symbol A (steadily increasing)
in the child time series provides a lot of information that there will be an A in the overall time
series at the next time step, and similarly for the symbol F (steadily decreasing). Symbols
that end on an increase/decrease tend to predict symbols that also end on an increase/decrease,
though there are exceptions. Overall, this suggests that the most informative symbols are
strong increases and strong decreases (symbols A and F), which matches with the intuition
that repeated increases and decreases in ILI tend to correspond to takeoffs of infection or
declines in infection – epidemiologically relevant events that should affect the dynamics in
other time series and thus transmit information to them. Other symbols are more likely to
arise through stochastic noise, and so there is lower transfer of information between them.
5.4 Fitting a mechanistic geographic transmission model
with age class data
As an alternative to the methods developed above, the mechanistic geographic transmission
model developed in Chapter 3 can be adjusted to include information from the age-specific
time series. Re-fitting the model using these more refined ILI data can shed light on which
age groups best predict the geographic transmission of influenza.
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Fig. 5.25 Information that each symbol jˆt in the child time series carries about the next
symbol iˆt+1 the age-aggregated time series, for each group of school-aged children (ages
5-9, 10-14, and 15-19, from left to right). The more information the symbol in the child
time series carries about the symbol in the overall time series, the darker the corresponding
square. The steadily-increasing and steadily-decreasing symbols (A and F) carry the most
information, and tend to predict the same symbol in the age-total time series.
5.4.1 Adjusting the data and the model
The geographic transmission model for the force of infection on a ZIP i, developed in §3.2.2,
takes as one of its inputs the ILI ratio from neighbouring infected ZIPs. It is possible to
infer which age groups predict the geographic transmission of the outbreak by replacing this
overall ILI ratio with the ILI ratio from a particular age group, and testing for an improvement
in model fit. The ILI ratios from multiple age groups can also be combined to identify which
combination of age groups best predict onward geographic spread.
Before the age-specific ILI time series can be aggregated, however, some missing entries
in the data must be filled in. The number of physician visits is missing in each age group
for all weeks when there were no recorded ILI cases in that age group. This affects the
denominator of the ILI ratio when data from multiple age groups are aggregated; in some
weeks, there will appear to be an unrealistically small number of physician visits, artificially
amplifying the ILI ratio. To address this, any missing records of physician visits are replaced
with the median number of weekly physician visits in that age band between July and
December 2009. The weeks containing Labour Day and Thanksgiving, however, must be
treated differently, since there are generally fewer physician visits in those weeks across
all locations. To fill in these values, the median percentage drop in cases for each holiday
is calculated for each age group. This is done by dividing the number of physician visits
on the holiday by the median number of physician visits in July-December of 2009, for all
locations/age groups where there were recorded physician visits on the holiday, and then
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taking the median of these fractions for each age group. Then, for all locations in each age
group for which the number of physician visits on the holiday is missing, the missing value
is replaced by the median number of visits in that location and age group multiplied by the
median fractional decrease in visits for that age group, rounded to the nearest whole number.
Table 5.3 provides the fraction of missing entries in each age band from July-December
2009, as well as the median fractional decrease in physician visits for Labour Day and
Thanksgiving.
Table 5.3 Fraction of missing physician visits entries, with the median fractional decrease in
the number of visits in the weeks containing Labour Day and Thanksgiving, for each age
group
Age Group
Fraction of Labour Day Thanksgiving
entries missing frac. decrease in cases frac. decrease in cases
<2 0.08 0.85 0.83
2-4 0.09 0.83 0.73
5-9 0.11 0.84 0.70
10-14 0.15 0.86 0.64
15-19 0.16 0.85 0.74
20-29 0.15 0.85 0.73
30-39 0.17 0.85 0.70
40-49 0.17 0.84 0.69
50-59 0.18 0.83 0.70
60-69 0.26 0.84 0.69
70-79 0.39 0.86 0.68
80+ 0.49 0.88 0.72
After filling in the missing entries, the data are ready for input into the geographic
transmission model. First, for a given set of age groups, the numbers of ILI cases are summed
across all the age groups in each week for each location. The same is done for the number of
physician visits. The aggregated ILI cases are divided by the aggregated physician visits in
each week, giving an age-aggregated weekly ILI ratio time series for each location. Following
the methods presented in §3.2.2, the aggregated ILI ratio for each location is normalised
by the mean ILI ratio in that location between July and December 2009. These aggregated,
normalised time series are then used as the n j,t in the transmission model, Eq 3.37. Note
that the outbreak onset times to which the model is fit are not changed; these are still the
outbreak onset times from the fully age-aggregated time series considered in Chapters 2 and
3. Through this model formulation, we are essentially asking which age groups provide the
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best prediction of the overall (age-aggregated) outbreak onset time in neighbouring ZIPs.
Model parameters are fit by maximum likelihood, as described in §3.2.2. This is done for all
possible combinations of age groups, excluding those over 60 years old, since the time series
for those age groups become extremely noisy and hinder the model fits, and because so many
data entries in those age groups are missing (see Table 5.3). This yields a total of 511 new
model fits.
5.4.2 Geographic transmission model fits using age-specific ILI data
The maximum-likelihood model uses normalised ILI ratios n j,t obtained by aggregating the
ILI data from <2 year-olds, 5-9 year-olds, and 20-29 year-olds. The AIC for this model is
4259.8, which is a 15.8-point improvement over the model that uses the fully aggregated time
series (see Table 3.3). The parameter values for this best-fit model are given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Estimated parameter values for the maximum likelihood transmission model, Eq
3.37, using aggregated ILI data from <2 year-olds, 5-9 year-olds, and 20-29 year-olds to
generate n j,t , with parameter values estimated using the age-aggregated time series (see
Chapter 3, Table 3.4)
Parameter Estimated value (95% CI) Previous value (95% CI) Units
β0
0.00041 0.00043 (∆t)−1
(0.00014, 0.00085) (0.00015, 0.00087)
βd 0.60 (0.50, 0.72) 0.61 (0.53, 0.70) (∆t)−1(km)1−ε
µ 0.31 (0.23, 0.40) 0.32 (0.24, 0.40) none
ρ 58 (41, 84) 66 (48, 96) km
γ 7.0 (4.8, 18) 8.9 (5.5, 74) none
ε 0.97 (0.89, 1.0) 1.0 (fixed) none
θ 0.70 (0.48, 0.93) 0.56 (0.35, 0.77) none
There are five other models within two log-likelihood units of the maximum-likelihood
model. Table 5.5 lists their log likelihoods and specifies which age groups are included in
each. All six models include the <2 year-old and 5-9 year-old ILI. The 2-4 year-old ILI
is sometimes included, as are the 20-29 year-old and 40-49 year-old ILI, but only one set
of adult ILI is ever included at a time. There are no model fits that fall between 1 and 2
log-likelihood units below the optimal model; the next-best model, after the ones included in
Table 5.5, is 2.2 log-likelihood units below the maximum-likelihood model.
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Table 5.5 Age groups included in ni,t for the geographic transmission model fits within two
log likelihood units of the best model
∆ log likelihood <2 2-4 5-9 20-29 40-49
0 • • •
−0.10 • •
−0.13 • • • •
−0.58 • • •
−0.73 • • •
−0.91 • • • •
5.5 Discussion
This chapter adopts STE as a means of identifying which age groups contribute most to the
transmission of infectious disease outbreaks. STE is chosen for its robustness to point-wise
noise and broad-scale amplitude shifts in time series, which particularly affect the ILI data
stream due to non-influenza respiratory illness and incomplete reporting. Simulation studies
indicate that STE can correctly identify asymmetric transmission patterns between age groups.
However, STE is also positively associated with reporting rates, which can partially confound
estimates of asymmetric transmission. STE estimates on ILI time series data from July-
December 2009 in the United States indicate that 5-19 year-olds were primarily responsible
for driving the autumn wave of the A/H1N1pdm pandemic outbreak. These estimates were
made possible by the fine geographic and age detail in the IMS-ILI dataset, since STE
calculations are “data hungry”, requiring many replicates of the observed process (in this
case, ZIP-level age-stratified ILI outbreaks) to obtain reliable estimates of the probabilities
in Eq 5.9. It is unlikely that reporting rates alone can account for the elevated STE from
these ages. Fitting a geographic transmission model using age-stratified ILI data reveals that
ILI incidence in young infants (<2 years), young children (5-9 years), and young adults
(20-29 years) best predicts the geographic transmission of the autumn wave of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the United States.
The identification of school-aged children as the primary drivers of transmission of the
2009 influenza pandemic in the United States is in line with most other studies on age-
specific transmission of both seasonal and pandemic influenza [91, 170, 218, 245]. Elevated
transmission from school-aged children can likely be explained by the elevated number of
contacts in these age groups. Mossong et al. (2008) [170] estimate that 10-19 year-olds have
more contacts per day than any other age group, and the contact patterns of 5-9 year-olds
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are tightly coupled with these older children. The highest number of daily contacts is made
by 10-14 year-olds, who also display the highest within-ZIP STE (see Fig 5.15). Smieszek
et al.’s (2011) [218] estimates of infection rate by age during the 2003 influenza outbreak
in Switzerland are qualitatively similar to the within-ZIP STE estimates presented in Fig
5.15, with a peak infection rate in 10-14 year-olds and elevated infection rates in 5-9 and
15-19 year-olds. Unfortunately, little data exists on the movement patterns of children, so
it is difficult to say why the maximal STE shifts to 5-9 year-olds when comparing the ILI
time series from ZIPs between which infection likely spread, according to the geographic
transmission model developed in Chapter 3.
It is unlikely that differences in reporting rate alone can explain the observed differences
in STE between the age groups. Besides the checks presented in this chapter, Biggerstaff
et al. (2012) [22] report that 0-4 year-olds had the highest reporting rates for ILI in 2009,
yet the STE from 0-4 year-olds is consistently low. If reporting rates alone could explain the
observed differences in STE, the STE from infants should be at least as high as the STE from
school-aged children.
The geographic transmission model fits reveal a slightly different picture than the STE.
The inclusion of ILI data from <2 year-olds and, in slightly less optimal models, from
2-4 year-olds is in agreement with Brownstein et al. (2005) [27], who find that respiratory
illness in children under 3 is the best predictor of overall influenza-related mortality, and
that children under 5 generally act as sentinels of respiratory illness, even if school-aged
children predominately drive infection once an outbreak has taken hold. The inclusion of
ILI from 5-9 year-olds suggests that transmission from school-aged children is nevertheless
a key determinant of geographic spread. The 5-9 year-old age group is also associated
with the highest short-distance between-city STE (see Fig 5.17). The other two school-
aged-children age groups (10-14 and 15-19 year-olds) may not be included in the best
geographic transmission models because they provide redundant information and dampen the
5-9 year-old signal. The 5-9 year-old ILI ratio signal is consistently the strongest of the three
school-aged children age groups; the peak ILI ratio for 5-9 year-olds is the highest of the
three in 680 of the 834 ZIP in the span between July and December of 2009. Furthermore,
the youngest three age groups (<2, 2-4, and 5-9 years) have the fewest number of missing
physician visit data entries (see Table 5.3), so their time series are the most accurate overall,
further justifying their inclusion in the geographic transmission model. Finally, including
adult ILI may help account for between-city transmission from individuals who commute for
work. The ILI signal for 20-29 year-olds is also consistently the strongest of the adult age
groups, with a peak ILI ratio that is higher than the peak in 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 year-olds
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in 739 of the 834 ZIPs. These findings are all overshadowed by the fact that many missing
counts of physician visits needed to be filled in. More complete data would be extremely
helpful for verifying these results.
The geographic transmission model fits are not necessarily in contradiction with the
STE estimates. The STE ranks age groups according to their contributions to transmission
throughout an outbreak, while the geographic transmission model reveals which age groups
best predict epidemic onset times in neighbouring ZIPs. So, elevated ILI in young infants,
young children, and young adults may best herald the onset of an outbreak in a city, while
school-aged children sustain transmission once it has begun.
Despite the apparent well-suitedness of STE for making inferences on ILI data, its
epidemiological relevance currently remains limited. Indeed, the essential lack of epidemi-
ological insight in the formulation of STE makes it surprising that STE is as capable of
identifying true epidemiological interactions between age groups as the simulation studies
presented in this chapter suggest. The next-generation matrix is the key object for char-
acterising age-structured, or more generally population-structured, transmission dynamics,
and yet there is no obvious direct link between STE estimates and the NGM. It is possible
that further simulation studies could help identify such a link; even though the explicit
STE values seem to bear little meaning apart from the relative ordering that they yield, it
is possible that regressing the inferred STE values on the underlying transmission matrix
could connect the pairwise STE matrix with the NGM under certain conditions. However,
it appears unlikely that a simple link exists, especially since STE can say nothing about
transmission within a single age group, which is necessary for filling in the diagonal entries
of the next-generation matrix. STE and related methods such as convergent cross-mapping
that do not explicitly incorporate mechanistic descriptions of the underlying physical system
are unlikely to be able to reveal more than an approximate hierarchy of driving processes.
Nevertheless, such a hierarchy can contain valuable information, especially if developing
and fitting a mechanistic model is too demanding to be practicable. Extensions to STE
could also enhance its relevance for epidemiological inference. Local transfer entropy [153]
and state-dependent transfer entropy [249], like the contextual STE, are intended to make
the traditional transfer entropy more flexible and general, by considering how information
transfer may change under varying conditions. These may yield better insight into epidemic
processes, which are inherently nonlinear and context-dependent, than the more established
measurements of transfer entropy can provide.
Perhaps the most important challenge confronting both transfer entropy- and convergent
cross mapping-based approaches is deciding how to measure power and significance. STE
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calculations rely on a middle level of stochasticity; for a deterministic system, the STE will
always be exactly zero, while for a stochastic system with too much within-sequence noise,
the small-scale variation in amplitudes will likely mask important patterns from which the
transfer of information might be inferred. This acceptable range of stochasticity has not
been clearly defined. In other words, it is unclear how to measure how much statistical
power is present in a given experiment for distinguishing true differences in STE. Similarly,
it is unclear how best to measure when a difference in STE should be called statistically
significant. Though this is recognised as an open and difficult problem [12, 13], it may be
possible to make some progress by assuming that the underlying process follows certain
epidemiological, or otherwise well-specified, dynamics.
A different way forward would be to extend existing methods for next-generation matrix
inference to accommodate data with lower specificity and more age classes. There are
two strategies that appear especially promising. The first is to follow the groundwork laid
by Wallinga and Teunis (2004) [244] and Glass et al. (2011) [90]. Their approaches use
branching process theory to infer the likely number of cases triggered by each observed case
in an epidemic. The methods rely on age-specific estimates of the generation interval of the
disease, which are currently under-studied for influenza (see [149] for one of the few examples
of age-stratified generation intervals for influenza). It also assumes that accurate case
counts are available; to my knowledge, the methods cannot currently accommodate ILI data.
Furthermore, the method proposed by Glass et al. (2011) [90] makes strict assumptions on
the form of the next-generation matrix, which become increasingly unrealistic as the number
of age classes increases. Leveraging data from multiple nearby outbreaks and assuming some
geographic dependence between them may be one way to relax these assumptions and obtain
more refined estimates of the next-generation matrix.
The second strategy follows in the line of Ionides et al. (2006) [121], Shaman and
Karspeck (2012) [210], and Yang et al. (2015) [258]. This approach uses sequential Monte
Carlo methods to fit explicit mechanistic transmission models to time series data. Yang et al.
(2015) [258] use this strategy to infer key transmission parameters for influenza outbreaks
over the course of nine years. That study incorporates age-specific transmission rates into
the underlying model, but estimates these rates a priori from the POLYLMOD contact
matrices, rather than inferring them from epidemiological data (it appears that age-stratified
ILI data were not available). Though implementing such a model for age-structured inference
would be extremely computationally intensive, it may hold the most promise for linking
age-structured ILI data directly with a next-generation matrix.
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An interesting and important way to extend all of the aforementioned methods would be
to incorporate other sources of heterogeneity in transmission rate, such as viral strain. An
age- and strain-structured model would likely have to accommodate non-trivial interactions
between host age and viral strain, since different influenza strains preferentially infect
different age groups, often due to differences in previous exposure [18]. Though this is likely
unimportant for the 2009 pandemic, when a single viral strain caused the vast majority of
infections, such an approach could provide valuable insight into the transmission of seasonal
outbreaks when multiple strains may co-circulate.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, symbolic transfer entropy (STE) is used to infer which age groups may have
contributed most to the transmission of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza
pandemic in the United States. The STE overcomes limitations associated with existing
strategies to infer from time series data how disease transmission varies by age group. The
contextual STE is introduced to verify that symbolisation does not omit too much relevant
information from epidemiological time series. It is shown that the contextual STE gives valid
insight into the underlying disease transmission process for a range of epidemiologically
feasible parameters. Using a two-age-class individual-based stochastic SIR model, it is
shown that the STE can detect both increasing symmetric coupling and asymmetric coupling
between age groups. Equivalent results are obtained using a more computationally efficient
Poisson-type epidemic model. Simulations on a set of four-age-class Poisson-type epidemic
models demonstrate that STE is positively associated with both transmission strength and
reporting rate, and also that STE can identify true differences in transmission rates even
when reporting rates are low. Simulations on 12-age-class Poisson-type epidemic models
reinforce the results from the four-age-class simulations, and provide a point of comparison
with available ILI data from July-December 2009 in the United States. STE calculations on
this ILI data provide evidence that 5-19 year-olds were primarily responsible for within-city
and short-distance between-city transmission of the autumn wave of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic in the US, in agreement with previous studies. A sensitivity analysis
based on reconstructing true case counts from observed data indicates that the results are
robust to reporting uncertainty. As an alternative check of the role of different age groups in
the transmission of the pandemic outbreak, age-specific time series are incorporated into a
mechanistic geographic transmission model. The optimal model predicts city-level epidemic
onset times as a function of ILI intensity in young infants (<2 years), young children (5-
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9 years), and young adults (20-29 years) from nearby cities, suggesting that school-aged
children alone may not fully account for the geographic transmission of the outbreak, despite
likely sustaining the majority of local transmission.
Chapter 6
Seasonal variation in the geographic
transmission of influenza in the United
States
In this chapter, a geographic disease transmission model is fit to epidemic onset times inferred
from city-level ILI data from the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks in the
United States. These were the two outbreaks with the highest overall peak ILI incidence in
the decade preceding the 2009 pandemic, according to the IMS-ILI dataset. Following the
methods developed in Chapters 3 and 4, transmissibility surfaces and transmission hubs are
identified for both outbreaks. Differences in transmission strength by age group are inferred
using the methods developed in Chapter 5. For the 2007-08 outbreak, in which three distinct
viral strains circulated, geo-tagged antigenic data is used to infer which strains may have
seeded the outbreaks in each of the hubs.
6.1 Background
Though pandemic influenza has arguably received more attention than seasonal influenza
in the epidemiological modelling literature, there are a number of studies that consider the
transmission characteristics of seasonal influenza at the international, continent, and country
scales. Internationally, genetic analyses by Russell et al. (2008) [204] and Bedford et al.
(2015) [18] reveal that seasonal outbreaks of A/H3N2 influenza tend to be seeded from
southeast Asia, while outbreaks of other strains may follow more complicated resurgence
dynamics. The continent-scale transmission of seasonal influenza in Europe is considered for
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example by Paget et al. (2007) [184], who find evidence of frequent north-easterly geographic
waves of transmission across Europe. Within the US, Viboud et al. (2006) [239] use 30
years’ worth of mortality data in the United States to demonstrate a high degree of synchrony
in the timing of influenza outbreaks between US states. Yang et al. (2015) [258] use ILI
data to calculate key epidemiological parameters for influenza outbreaks in the US between
2003 and 2013. Charu et al. (2017) [48] fit gravity-type mechanistic transmission models,
like the one presented in Chapter 3, to outbreak onset times from eight influenza seasons in
the US using a spatially-aggregated version of the IMS-ILI data considered in this thesis.
Though this chapter focuses on just two seasonal outbreaks, it extends the work by Charu
et al. (2017) [48] in that it considers the IMS-ILI data in its full spatial detail, presents a
detailed comparison of the transmission kernels for each outbreak, identifies the outbreaks’
transmission hubs using the methods developed in Chapter 4, and uses symbolic transfer
entropy to infer which age groups contributed most to transmission. Attention is restricted
to the 2003-04 and 2007-08 outbreaks because these seasons, along with the autumn 2009
pandemic outbreak, featured the sharpest rises in ILI out of all influenza outbreaks between
2001 and 2010, permitting outbreak onset times to be successfully estimated for most ZIPs.
The analyses that follow in this chapter are in theory applicable to all seasons included in the
IMS-ILI dataset, but care must be taken to address the reduction in data clarity for seasons
beyond the three considered here. Consideration of those additional seasons is left for future
work.
6.1.1 The 2003-04 influenza outbreak in the United States
In 2003, a novel strain of influenza subtype A/H3N2 emerged, possibly from southeast Asia
[88, 204]. The strain quickly became the most prevalent of the 2003-04 seasonal influenza
outbreak in the United States and across much of the world [34, 88]. The influenza vaccine
for that season was a poor match to the novel strain, and provided little reduction in the
overall burden of ILI [35]. In the United States, the 2003-04 seasonal influenza outbreak
began in October and peaked in late November, earlier than most flu seasons [34, 36]. Texas
was the first state to report widespread influenza activity, and was the state from which
the first viral strains of the season were isolated [37]. Yang et al. (2015) estimate that this
outbreak had the highest basic reproduction number R0 (2.04) of any influenza outbreak in
the United States between 2003 and 2013, including the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic [257].
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6.1.2 The 2007-08 influenza outbreak in the United States
In 2007, elevated regional influenza activity in the United States was first reported in Decem-
ber from Texas [38]. The outbreak peaked in mid-February [39]. Three distinct influenza
strains co-circulated, with a shift in dominant strain from type A/H1N1 to type A/H3N2
to type B over the course of the season [38]. Overall, type A/H3N2 was most prevalent
during the season [38]. The season’s vaccine was a good match for the A/H1N1 strain, but
not for the A/H3N2 or B strains [38]. Yang et al. (2015) estimate that this outbreak had the
second-highest basic reproduction number R0 (2.03) of any influenza outbreak in the United
States between 2003 and 2013, including the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic [257].
6.2 Outbreak onset times for the 2003-04 and 2007-08 sea-
sonal influenza outbreaks
Using the methods developed in Chapter 2, ZIP-level outbreak onset times may be estimated
for the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal outbreaks in the United States using the breakpoint
method applied to the IMS-ILI dataset. Fig 6.1 depicts the ZIP-level outbreak onset times for
the 2003-04 seasonal influenza outbreak in the United States. To generate the onset times
for 2003-04, the maximum ILI incidence is sought in each ZIP between 28 September 2003
and 25 January 2004, and the breakpoint method is used to calculate the ZIP’s outbreak
onset time using the ILI ratios from n = 17 weeks prior to and including this epidemic peak.
Like the 2009 pandemic outbreak, there is evidence of radial spread from an epicentre in the
southern US. The spread is faster than in 2009, with 14.5 weeks between the earliest and
latest onsets, over a month shorter than the autumn 2009 outbreak. Over 98% (723) of the
734 outbreaks with detectable onset times have onset in the 10 weeks following 5 October
2003.
Fig 6.2 depicts the ZIP-level outbreak onset times for the 2007-08 seasonal influenza
outbreak in the United States. To generate these onset times, the maximum ILI incidence is
sought in each ZIP between 9 December 2007 and 20 April 2008, and the breakpoint method
is used to calculate the ZIP’s outbreak onset time using the ILI ratios from n = 17 weeks
prior to and including the epidemic peak. A radial spread pattern is less apparent for this
outbreak than for 2003-04 or 2009. Rather than spreading from a clear epicentre, it appears
that infection was introduced in various locations and spread outward locally. The onset
times span a total of 15 weeks, similar to the length of the 2003-04 outbreak, but shorter than
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Oct Nov Dec
Fig. 6.1 ZIP-level outbreak onset times for 2003-04. Discs represent ZIPs, and disc area
is proportional to the ZIP’s population size. Each disc is coloured according to the corre-
sponding ZIP’s outbreak onset time, with green/yellow representing outbreaks early in the
epidemic and purple/blue representing outbreaks late in the epidemic. The epidemic appears
to spread radially from southern Louisiana and Texas.
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the 2009 pandemic. Over 98% (708) of the 716 outbreaks with detectable onset times have
onset in the 12 weeks following 25 November 2007.
Dec Jan Feb
Fig. 6.2 ZIP-level outbreak onset times for 2007-08. Discs represent ZIPs, and disc area
is proportional to the ZIP’s population size. Each disc is coloured according to the corre-
sponding ZIP’s outbreak onset time, with green/yellow representing outbreaks early in the
epidemic and purple/blue representing outbreaks late in the epidemic. There appear to be
multiple clusters of ZIPs with early onsets near Houston TX, Detroit MI, and Los Angeles
CA. There is still some evidence of radial spread from these epicentres, though the signature
is less apparent than for 2003-04 and 2009. The epidemic also took place much later in the
year than the 2003-04 and 2009 outbreaks.
6.3 The seasonal influenza transmission model
To model the geographic transmission of influenza in the United States in 2003-04 and 2007-
08, the transmission model developed in Chapter 3 for pandemic influenza (Eq 3.27) is fit to
outbreak onset times from these two seasonal outbreaks. The most parsimonious model for
both seasons matches the form of the best model for the 2009 pandemic, indicating that the
key drivers of all three outbreaks were similar. However, some of the model parameter values
differ significantly between the seasons, reflecting possible differences in strain severity and
human behaviour.
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6.3.1 Model selection and parameter estimation
The transmission model developed in Chapter 3, Eq 3.27, is fit to outbreak onset times from
the 2003-04 and 2007-08 influenza seasons, using the methods presented in §3.2.2. Both
outbreaks began after schools were in session across the country, so βd is fixed at 0 and Ia to
1 for both seasons.
For both seasons, the best model in terms of AIC omits the donor population size
parameter ν , and leaves all other parameters free. That is, the force of infection λ on location
i in half-week t is given by
λi(t) = β0+βdsN
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt n
θ
j,tκ(di, j)
[∑ j ̸=iκ(di, j)]ε
(6.1)
where Λt is the set of locations with outbreak onset prior to half-week t; n j,t is the ILI ratio
in location j in half-week t, normalised by the mean ILI ratio in location j throughout the
epidemic season, and fixed at 0 for all t prior to location j’s outbreak onset time; and Ni is
the mean-normalised population size of the recipient location i. As before, the parameter
β0 is the background force of infection due to long-distance seeding; βds is the transmissive
strength of the disease; µ is the recipient-population gravity model exponent; θ modulates
the importance of the ILI time series in neighbouring ZIPs; ε modulates population density
dependence; and κ(di, j) =
(
1+ di, jργ
)−γ
captures the decay in epidemiological connectivity
between locations as a function of distance di, j with length scale ρ and power law parameter
γ . The model selection procedures for 2003-04 and 2007-08 yield optimal models of the
same overall form as the best model for the autumn wave of the 2009 pandemic; compare Eq
6.1 and Eq 3.37.
While the model forms match for all three seasons, the parameter values differ. Table 6.1
provides the maximum likelihood parameter values for the outbreaks in 2003-04, 2007-08,
and 2009. The baseline force from external seeding, β0, is similarly small across all three
seasons. Comparing the exact values of β0 across seasons is not especially illuminating,
since the estimated value depends strongly on the date that is arbitrarily chosen as the
start of the flu season. The other parameters are not as strongly affected by this choice,
and so can be compared across seasons. The 2003-04 and 2009 outbreaks, both of which
were caused by antigenically novel strains of influenza, have similar transmissibility (βds).
The transmissibility term for the 2007-08 outbreak is significantly smaller. The boost in
susceptibility from the recipient location’s population size (µ) is fairly consistent across all
seasons, though it is slightly higher for the 2009 pandemic than for the 2003-04 and 2007-08
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outbreaks. The characteristic distance of transmission, ρ , is smallest in 2003-04 and largest
in 2009, but the uncertainties on the parameter are large, and the parameter’s confidence
intervals for all three seasons overlap substantially. The power kernel parameter γ is similar
for 2003-04 and 2007-08, but is significantly larger in 2009. The distance kernels for the two
seasonal outbreaks therefore have thicker tails than the kernel for the pandemic outbreak, or
in other words, long-range jumps were relatively more likely during the seasonal outbreaks
than during the 2009 pandemic. The population density dependence parameter ε is high
(close to 1) in 2003-04, as it is in 2009. It is somewhat lower in 2007-08. The ILI intensity
factor θ is consistent across all three seasons, with a value close to 0.5.
Table 6.1 Estimated parameter values for the most parsimonious transmission model, Eq 6.1,
fit to outbreak onset times from the 2003-04, 2007-08, and autumn 2009 influenza outbreaks.
Parameter
2003-04 value 2007-08 value 2009 value
Interpretation Units
(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI)
β0
8.6E-5 6.0E-4 4.3E-4 External
(∆t)−1(5.0E-6, 3.7E-4) (1.6E-4, 1.4E-3) (1.5E-4, 8.7E-4) seeding risk
βds
0.72 0.31 0.61 Transmissibility (km)1−ε
(∆t)(0.57, 0.88) (0.17, 0.49) (0.53, 0.70) factor
µ 0.24 0.23 0.32 Gravity model none
(0.15, 0.34) (0.14, 0.33) (0.24, 0.40) exponent
ρ 32 54 66 Characteristic km
(20, 49) (23, 111) (48, 96) distance
γ 3.1 2.5 8.9 Power law none
(2.6, 4.1) (1.8, 4.3) (5.5, 74) decay factor
ε 0.89 0.66 1.0 Density none
(0.78, 1.0) (0.51, 0.81) (fixed) correction
θ 0.46 0.59 0.56 ILI intensity none
(0.21, 0.72) (0.30, 0.87) (0.35, 0.77) exponent
Rather than comparing the parameters side-by-side, however, it is helpful to consider
how they jointly affect range of geographic transmission for each outbreak. It is possible
to define a distance kernel for a hypothetical city with median population size and median
surrounding population density. This kernel has form
K(x) = βdsN¯µ
κ(x)
∆¯ε
(6.2)
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where N¯ is the median normalised ZIP population size, and ∆¯ is the median population
density divisor; that is,
∆¯= Mediani(∑
j ̸=i
κ(di, j)). (6.3)
This distance kernel is depicted in Fig 6.3 for the 2003-04, 2007-08, and 2009 outbreaks,
obtained by substituting the maximum likelihood parameter estimates from Table 6.1 into
Eq 6.2. The shaded areas in Fig 6.3 depict parameter uncertainty. The boundaries of these
regions are calculated by choosing a subset of distances x and, for each of these distances,
maximising/minimising Eq 6.2 while constraining the log-likelihood of the parameters to be
within 1.92 units of the maximum log-likelihood. This provides an effective 95% confidence
interval for the transmission kernel at each distance. If the distances are sampled densely
enough, they produce the curved boundaries of the regions.
From Fig 6.3, it may be seen that the estimated gravity-driven transmission strength of the
2003 outbreak is higher than for the autumn 2009 pandemic at short distances, under about
75km. After 75km, the confidence bands for the two kernels intersect, and by a distance
of about 200km the maximum-likelihood kernel values are nearly the same. This agrees
with the observed behaviour of the two outbreaks: the higher transmission strength of the
2003-04 outbreak at short distances is indicative of its faster spread, while the similar thinness
of both kernels’ tails agrees with the observation that both outbreaks spread primarily in
coherent geographic waves, rather than through a series of long-distance jumps. On the other
hand, the estimated transmission strength of the 2007-08 outbreak is higher than for both
the 2003-04 outbreak and the 2009 pandemic at all distances. In particular, the 2007-08
outbreak’s kernel retains a thick tail at long distances, in agreement with the outbreak’s rapid
and geographically patchy spread.
6.3.2 Transmissibility surfaces
Following the methods developed in §3.2.3, the spatial and temporal variation in transmissi-
bility are estimated for the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks. Given the
model
λi(t) = β0+βds Exp[ξ Tt +ξ
S
i ]N
µ
i
∑ j∈Λt n
θ
j,tκ(di, j)
∑ j ̸=iκ(di, j)
, (6.4)
posterior values of ξ T and ξ S are estimated by drawing candidate values from Gaussian
process priors with squared-exponential covariance function, and accepting with probability
proportional to the ratio of the proposed to the previous model’s likelihood (see Eq 3.36).
For consistency, the length scales of the SE covariance functions are set at the same values as
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Fig. 6.3 Maximum-likelihood gravity transmission kernels for the 2003-04 (red), 2007-08
(blue), and autumn 2009 (black) influenza outbreaks in the United States. The kernels
quantify the amount of infective force that an infected ZIP would contribute to a hypothetical
ZIP with median population size and median surrounding population density when situated
some distance x away. The shaded regions depict uncertainty in the kernel, obtained by
maximising/minimising the kernel function (Eq 6.2) at a set of distance values x, while
constraining the log-likelihood of the parameters to be within 1.92 units of the maximum
log-likelihood. The maximum-likelihood kernels for both 2003-04 and 2007-08 sit above the
maximum-likelihood kernel for 2009, which agrees with the observation that both of these
outbreaks spread more quickly than the 2009 pandemic. The 2007-08 kernel’s thick tail is
indicative of that outbreak’s patchy geographic spread with multiple long-distance jumps
of infection. The 2003-04 and 2007-08 kernels are cut off at K(x) = 0.001 to better depict
the relationships between the three curves. The 2003-04 kernel intersects the vertical axis at
a value of K(0) = 0.0018, and the 2007-08 kernel intersects the vertical axis at a value of
K(0) = 0.016.
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they were for the analysis of the 2009 pandemic, l = 8 half-weeks for ξ T and l = 200km
for ξ S. The MCMC algorithm is run four times for each season, for 10,000 iterations each.
Following Gelman et al. (2013) [86], the first 5,000 iterations of each run are discarded to
avoid effects from the burn-in period. For 2003-04, the Gelman-Rubin statistic for all chains
is below 1.2, and for 2007-08 the Gelman-Rubin statistic for all chains is below 1.6, which
suggest that the chains have converged acceptably. The Gelman-Rubin statistic is likely
higher for 2007-08 than for 2003-04 because the higher number of introduction sites and
patchier spread of the 2007-08 outbreak makes it more difficult for the Gausssian process
to settle into a good fit. The final 5,000 iterations for each of the four runs are combined,
yielding 20,000 draws of ξ T and ξ S for each season.
Fig 6.4 depicts the estimated temporal variation in transmissibility, ξ T , for the 2003-04
and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks. In 2003-04, there is little evidence of temporal
variation in transmissibility. In 2007-08, on the other hand, the transmissibility reaches a
minimum in late December and rises again by mid-January. The shape of this curve is similar
to the one identified for the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic (see Fig 3.10), though smaller
in absolute magnitude. The dip in transmissibility could reflect changes in contact rates
associated with the winter holiday season.
Fig 6.5 depicts the mean values of ξ S by geographic location for 2003-04 and 2007-08.
In 2003-04, the geographic transmissibility surface has a banded structure, with a region of
higher-than-average transmissibility in Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, and Virginia, and lower-
than-average transmissibility in the southeast and the northeast. The model also identifies
higher-than-average transmissibility in California, especially in Los Angeles. In 2007-08,
the transmissibility surface is somewhat patchier, with a small area of lower-than-average
transmissibility near the borders of Kentucky, West Virginia, and Virginia, as well as in the
northeast. Transmissibility in the southeast is higher than average, while transmissibility
in Florida and much of California is near average. The overall geographic variation in
transmissibility is smaller for 2003-04 than it is for 2007-08, and is smaller for both of those
seasons than it is for the 2009 pandemic (compare with Fig 3.11).
The variability in the spatial and temporal transmissibility adjustments for both seasons
is greater than the variation observed from simulated outbreaks with constant βd across
all locations (see §3.16), but only just. This suggests that, while there may have been
some spatiotemporal variation in the transmissibility of the 2003-04 and 2007-08 influenza
outbreaks, it was not especially pronounced, and likely did not have as large of an influence
on the geographic transmission of those outbreaks as it did on the spread of the 2009
A/H1N1pdm pandemic.
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Fig. 6.4 Temporal variation in transmissibility, Exp[ξ T ], for the 2003-04 (top) and 2007-08
(bottom) seasonal influenza outbreaks in the United States. The exponentiated transmissibility
adjustment depicted here is a multiplicative factor for the transmissibility term, βds, in Eq
6.1; values greater than 1 indicate higher-than-average transmissibility and values less than 1
indicate lower-than-average transmissibility. In 2003-04, there is no evidence of temporal
variation in transmissibility. In 2007-08, the transmissibility dips to a minimum in late
December, and then rises again in mid-January, possibly reflecting variation in contact rates
due to the winter holiday season.
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Fig. 6.5 Geographic variation in transmissibility, Exp[ξ S], for the 2003-04 (top) and 2007-08
(bottom) seasonal influenza outbreaks in the United States. The exponentiated transmissibility
adjustment depicted here is a multiplicative factor for the transmissibility term, βd , in Eq
6.1; values greater than 1 indicate higher-than-average transmissibility and values less than
1 indicate lower-than-average transmissibility. In 2003-04, there is a band of increased
transmissibility between the southeast and the northeast, and in Los Angeles. In 2007-08,
there are patches of high transmissibility near Detroit and Washington, DC, as well as in the
southern states of Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and Kentucky.
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6.4 Transmission hubs of the 2003-04 and 2007-08 influenza
outbreaks
Following the methods developed in §4.2, transmission hubs are identified for the 2003-
04 and 2007-08 seasonal influenza outbreaks in the United States. Following §4.2, the
proportion of the force of infection due to external seeding on each ZIP at its time of
onset (σ ) is calculated. These values are depicted in Figs 6.6-6.7 for both seasons. Then,
transmission is probabilistically traced back to a set of most likely points of introduction, or
hubs. The extent to which external seeding in each ZIP contributed to all other outbreaks
through gravity-driven onward transmission (C) is depicted in Figs 6.8-6.9 for both seasons.
Transmission hubs are taken to be the locations with σ of at least 0.5 and C at least 5.
In 2003-04, nearly all transmission (C = 679.1 of 734 locations) is traced back to
seeding in a single transmission hub, in Mandeville, LA (pop. 423,850). From the map of
outbreak onset times in 2003-04 (Fig 6.1), it appears that the overall epidemic was seeded
in Mandeville, jumped quickly to Houston, and then spread outward from that part of the
southeastern US. Fig 6.10 depicts the estimated probability that each ZIP’s outbreak can
be attributed to gravity-driven transmission from Mandeville. As one might expect, the
outbreaks in ZIPs close to Mandeville can be traced back to seeding in Mandeville with
higher probability than those that are far away, but even the outbreaks in ZIPs in the far
northeast and northwest of the country can be traced back to Mandeville with a probability
of over 80%.
In 2007-08, five transmission hubs are identified. These are listed in Table 6.2. Unlike
both the 2003-04 and 2009 outbreaks, all of the transmission hubs in 2007-08 lie in or near
major cities. The Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA hub is identified by the probabilistic back-
tracing procedure as two separate hubs, but the two ZIPs have onset in the same week and lie
just 11 km apart, suggesting that they represent a single seeding event near Los Angeles. In
Table 6.2, the overall contributions from seeding in the two ZIPs (C) are combined, but the
probabilities of seeding (σ ) are reported separately. Taken independently, the transmission
model estimates that seeding in Inglewood Vicinity CA triggered C = 61.0 outbreaks through
gravity-driven onward transmission, and that seeding in Torrance CA triggered C = 63.8
outbreaks. Recall that C measures the effective number of outbreaks triggered by a hub,
so in reality, a single seeding event near Inglewood Vicinity or Torrance likely triggered
approximately 125 (≈ 61+63.8) downstream outbreaks.
Fig 6.11 depicts the basins of infection for each of the transmission hubs in 2007-08. The
transmission hubs in Cleveland OH, Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA, and Boise (ID) West
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Fig. 6.6 Probability σ that each ZIP’s outbreak was caused by external seeding, in ascending
order, for 2003-04 (top) and 2007-08 (bottom). In both seasons, there is a large gap between
ZIPs with σ -values above and below 0.5 (solid horizontal bar). In 2003-04, only Mandeville
LA surpasses this cutoff. Five ZIPs – Johnstown North PA, Reno (NV) West CA, Yakima
WA, Brighton East CO, and New Rochelle NY – surpass a lower natural cutoff, at σ = 0.05
(dashed). These ZIPs are depicted geographically in the upper map of Fig 6.7, and labelled
with names parentheses. In 2007-08, six ZIPs surpass the cutoff at σ = 0.5. These happen to
be the transmission hubs identified by the back-tracing procedure, and so are listed in Table
6.2. Their geographic locations are depicted with solid black discs in Fig 6.7. Five ZIPs –
Denver West CO, North Houston Southeast TX, Glenwood Springs CO, Sioux Falls Main
SD, and Orlando East FL – surpass a lower natural cutoff, at σ = 0.1 (dashed). These are also
depicted geographically in the lower map of Fig 6.7, and labelled with names parentheses.
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Mandeville LA
(New Rochelle NY)(Johnstown North PA)(Brighton East CO)(Reno (NV) West CA)
(Yakima WA)
Worcester Main MA
Cleveland Vicinity OH
El Paso Main (1) TX
Inglewood Vicinity CA
Torrance CA
Boise (ID) West OR
(Orlando East FL)
(Sioux Falls Main SD)
(North Houston Southeast TX)
(Denver West CO)(Glenwood Springs CO)
Fig. 6.7 Probability σ that external seeding triggered each ZIP’s outbreak, by geographic
location, for 2003-04 (upper map) and 2007-08 (lower map). Disc area is proportional to σ .
In 2003-04, only Mandeville LA has a seeding probability σ of over 0.5. Five other ZIPs,
labelled with names in parentheses, have σ over 0.05. The rest have σ < 0.05. In 2007-08,
six ZIPs have σ greater than 0.5. These are represented by the larger black discs, and labelled
without parentheses. Five additional ZIPs have σ greater than 0.1. These are labelled with
names in parentheses.
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Fig. 6.8 Total contribution C of external seeding in each ZIP to all other ZIP-level outbreaks
via downstream gravity-driven transmission, in ascending order, for 2003-04 (top) and 2007-
08 (bottom). The value C may be interpreted as the effective number of outbreaks triggered
by seeding in a ZIP. For reference, there were 734 ZIPs in the analysis of the 2003-04
outbreak, and 716 ZIPs in the analysis of the 2007-08 outbreak. In 2003-04, Mandeville
LA accounts for the vast majority of geographic transmission; it is represented by the single
dot at the upper right corner of the upper plot. Only four ZIPs – Mandeville LA, Johnstown
North PA, North Houston North TX, and Houston Main (1) TX – surpass the cutoff at C = 5.
The geographic locations of these ZIPs are depicted in Fig 6.9. In 2007-08, ten ZIPs surpass
the cutoff at C = 5. These are labelled with their geographic locations in Fig 6.9.
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Mandeville LA
Johnstown North PA
Houston Main (1) TXNorth Houston North TX
Worcester Main MAToledo Main OH Cleveland Vicinity OH
North Houston Southeast TX
El Paso Main (1) TX
Denver West COGlenwood Springs CO
Inglewood Vicinity CA
Torrance CA
Boise (ID) West OR
Fig. 6.9 Contributions C of seeding in each ZIP to all other outbreaks via downstream gravity-
driven transmission, by geographic location, for 2003-04 (top) and 2007-08 (bottom). The
value C may be interpreted as the effective number of outbreaks triggered by seeding in a ZIP.
Disc area is proportional to C. In 2003-04, nearly all geographic transmission can be traced
back to Mandeville LA. Seeding in three other ZIPs (also labelled) contributed to just over
five ZIP-level outbreaks each through downstream gravity-driven geographic transmission.
In 2007-08, seeding in ten ZIPs (labelled) contributed to at least five downstream outbreaks.
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OR, are the most important, together effectively accounting for 513.3 of the 716 observed
outbreaks through gravity-driven onward spread.
Table 6.2 Transmission hubs of the 2007-08 influenza outbreak in the United States
Name ZIP Pop. size C σ Onset date
Cleveland Vicinity OH 440 854036 282.8 0.97 25 Nov
Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA 902/905 1453468 124.8 0.75/0.82 25 Nov
Boise (ID) West OR 979 32039 105.7 1.0 18 Nov
Worcester Main MA 016 180202 40.4 0.69 29 Nov
El Paso Main TX 799 706832 50.4 0.69 25 Nov
6.5 Age-structured transmission of the 2003-04 and 2007-
08 seasonal influenza outbreaks
Using the methods developed in Chapter 5, we calculate the symbolic transfer entropy (STE)
between age groups during the 2003-04 and 2007-08 seasonal outbreaks. To do so, a span
of 25 weeks that contains the outbreak of interest in each season is isolated. In 2003-04,
this span is from 17 Aug 2003 to 1 Feb 2004, and in 2007-08 the span is from 21 Oct 2007
to 6 Apr 2008. The twelve age-stratified time series and the age-aggregated time series for
each ZIP within this timespan are symbolised with a symbol length of m = 3. Using these
symbolised time series, the within-ZIP STE is calculated between each age group’s time
series and the age-aggregated time series. These are depicted for 2003-04 and 2007-08 in
Fig 6.12. For both epidemics, the pairwise STE is less pronounced than for 2009 (compare
with Fig 5.15). For 2003-04, the 15-19 year-old age group appears to contribute most to
overall transmission, while for 2007-08, the 10-14 year-old age group contributes most
to overall transmission, as was the case for the 2009 pandemic. The within-ZIP pairwise
STE is also calculated between each age group. These values are depicted for 2003-04
and 2007-08 in Fig 6.13. Again, the differences are less pronounced than they are for the
2009 pandemic (compare with Fig 5.16), though there is still some evidence that children
contributed disproportionately to infection in most other age groups during both seasonal
outbreaks.
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Fig. 6.10 Probability with which each ZIP’s outbreak can be traced back to seeding in
Mandeville LA in 2003-04. According to the geographic transmission model, Eq 6.1,
downstream gravity-driven transmission from Mandeville can account for every other ZIP’s
outbreak with at least 80% probability. Dark blue indicates a high (close to 1) probability
that downstream transmission from Mandeville sparked the ZIP’s outbreak, and light blue
indicates a lower (close to 0.8) probability that downstream transmission from Mandeville
sparked the ZIP’s outbreak.
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Worcester MACleveland OH
El Paso TX
Inglewood CA
Torrance CA
Boise ID
Fig. 6.11 Transmission hubs (boxed) and basins of infection for the 2007-08 seasonal
influenza outbreak. Seeding events in each hub are assigned colours, indicated by the colour
of the surrounding box. Discs are then coloured according to the probability with which
their outbreak can be traced back to the seeding event in the hub of the corresponding colour.
Colours are allowed to mix to depict mixed influence from multiple hubs. The prevailing red
in the northeast indicates a predominant influence from Cleveland OH. The blue in California
indicates a predominant influence from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA.The green in the
northwest indicates mixed influence from Boise ID and Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA,
and the green in east Texas indicates mixing from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA, El Paso
TX, and Cleveland OH.
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Fig. 6.12 Within-ZIP STE from each age group to the age-aggregated time series, for the
2003-04 (top) and 2007-08 (bottom) seasonal outbreaks. For both seasons, the peak STE is
smaller than for the 2009 pandemic (compare with Fig 5.15). In 2003-04, the STE is highest
from the 15-19 year-old age group, while for 2007-08, the STE is highest from the 10-14
year-old age group.
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Fig. 6.13 Within-ZIP pairwise STE between age groups, for the 2003-04 (top) and 2007-08
(bottom) seasonal outbreaks. Darker colours correspond to higher STE. For both seasons, the
differences in STE between the age groups are less pronounced than for the 2009 pandemic
(compare with Fig 5.16). However, both still show some evidence of elevated STE from
children to the other age groups. The maximum pairwise STE for 2003-04 is 0.060 bits, and
the maximum pairwise STE for 2007-08 is 0.052 bits.
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6.6 Correlations between antigenic prevalence and seeding
from a hub
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) make available data on the weekly
number of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases, together with the sampled viruses’ antigenic
types, for 10 regions in the United States. In 2007-08, three distinct antigenic subtypes
co-circulated, making it possible to identify geographic differences in the prevalences of
each strain. In this section, estimates of regional antigenic prevalences from the CDC
data are correlated with the transmissive influence from each of the five hubs in 2007-08,
providing a first hypothesis of which strains may have infected which hubs. Since the 2003-
04 outbreak was caused predominately by a single strain and had a single transmission hub,
the corresponding analysis for that outbreak is trivial and will not be considered further here.
6.6.1 Curating the antigenic data
The antigenic data available from the CDC (see §2.7) contain weekly counts of laboratory-
confirmed influenza cases with their antigenic subtype (A/H1, A/H3, A/Unsubtyped, or B)
collected from the 10 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regions in the
United States. Fig 6.14 depicts these samples for 2007-08 as a time series for each region.
The incidence of each antigenic subtype varies by geographic region and over time. Region
4 (southeast), for example, is dominated throughout by antigenic subtype A/H3, while the
outbreaks in Regions 9 and 10 (west) are dominated early by subtype A/H1 and later by
subtype A/H3 and type B. Also depicted in Fig 6.14 is the date before which the earliest 10%
of each region’s ZIP-level outbreak onset times lie, to give a rough estimate of the epidemic
onset time in the region as a whole. Visually, these onset times match well with the initial
rises in incidence in the virologic data.
Since the geographic transmission model only captures the dynamics of the initial invasion
wave of infection, we restrict our attention to the relative antigenic prevalences in each region
prior to the epidemic peak. This helps to avoid effects from potential later waves of infection
that may have featured different subtypes. In particular, we identify the cumulative incidence
of each strain in each region prior to the week in which the maximum number of laboratory-
confirmed cases of all subtypes was observed. For a region h, denote the number of observed
pre-peak laboratory-confirmed cases of each antigenic subtype as
nh = (nhAH1,nhAH3,nhAU,nhB). (6.5)
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These observation vectors will be used to determine the antigenic subtypes that may have
been responsible for triggering the outbreaks in the transmission hubs in 2007-08. The
final results are essentially unaffected if the statistical analysis is performed instead using
the cumulative incidences of each subtype during the first two months after 10th-percentile
ZIP-level outbreak onset in each region (vertical bars in Fig 6.14) or across the entire season;
the directions all trends remain the same, but some significances diminish.
6.6.2 Regression analysis
If each hub’s outbreak is assumed to have been triggered by a single influenza virus subtype,
one might expect that subtype to be highly represented in downstream outbreaks triggered by
that hub. If this is true, one might then also expect that the relative number of laboratory-
confirmed cases of that subtype in each HHS region would correlate with the expected
number of outbreaks the hub triggered in each region. Here, the relative cumulative incidence
of each antigenic subtype in each HHS region is regressed against the relative expected
transmissive contribution from each hub, as estimated by the mechanistic transmission model,
Eq 6.1. For a given hub and antigenic subtype, a positive correlation between expected
transmissive influence from the hub and prevalence of the subtype gives evidence that that
subtype may have been responsible for infecting the hub.
The first step requires calculating the expected fraction of ILI cases in region h caused by
gravity-driven transmission from seeding in hub j. This is
fh, j =
∑i∈H Pi, jNi
∑i∈H Ni
, (6.6)
where H is the set of all ZIPs in region h, matrix element Pi, j gives the proportion of ZIP i’s
outbreak attributable to seeding in ZIP j (see derivation in §4.2), and Ni is the population
size of ZIP i.
Next, the fraction of pre-peak laboratory-confirmed cases caused by each strain are
identified. For this preliminary analysis, it is assumed that the ratio of A/H1 cases to A/H3
cases in each region’s A/Unsubtyped group is the same as the ratio of A/H1 cases to A/H3
cases in the subtyped cases. That is, the effective number of pre-peak laboratory-confirmed
A/H1 cases in region h is
n˜hAH1 = nhAH1+
( nhAH1
nhAH1+nhAH3
)
nhAU, (6.7)
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Fig. 6.14 Weekly counts of laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza subtypes A/H1 (blue),
A/H3 (red), and B (green) in 2007-08 in the 10 HHS regions, as reported by the CDC [45].
Some type A strains processed by clinical laboratories do not undergo further subtyping (see
§2.7); these are depicted in yellow. Dashed grey lines depict the cumulative strain counts.
Subtype A/H3 was dominant in Regions 4-7, while Regions 9 and 10 suffered early outbreaks
of subtype A/H1. The vertical black bars depict the 10th percentile ZIP-level breakpoint
outbreak onset times for each region, giving a rough estimate of the epidemic onset time in
the region as a whole.
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and the effective number of pre-peak A/H3 cases is
n˜hAH3 = nhAH3+
( nhAH3
nhAH1+nhAH3
)
nhAU. (6.8)
After assigning the A/Unsubtyped cases in this way, the relative prevalences of each strain
type in each region are calculated as
n˜hAH1
n˜hAH1+ n˜hAH3+nhB
,
n˜hAH3
n˜hAH1+ n˜hAH3+nhB
, and
nhB
n˜hAH1+ n˜hAH3+nhB
(6.9)
for types A/H1, A/H3, and B, respectively.
Finally, these relative prevalences are plotted and regressed against the expected fraction
of cases fh, j in region h triggered by hub j, for each of the five hubs in 2007-08. These
scatters are depicted in Fig 6.15. The plotted lines indicate associations with a p-value below
0.1.
There is a strong positive correlation between transmission from Worcester MA and a high
prevalence of antigenic type B, between transmission from Cleveland OH and a high preva-
lence of antigenic type A/H3, and between transmission from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance
CA and Boise ID and a high prevalence of antigenic type A/H1. There is a strong negative
correlation between transmission from Cleveland OH and a high prevalence of antigenic
type A/H1, and a strong negative correlation between transmission from El Paso TX and
a high prevalence of antigenic type B. There are moderate negative correlations between
transmission from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA and Boise ID and a high prevalence of
antigenic type A/H3, and a weak negative correlation between transmission from Boise ID
and a high prevalence of antigenic type B. The p-values for all of these regressions are given
in Table 6.3. This suggests that subtype A/H1 may have been responsible for seeding the
transmission hubs in Boise ID and Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA, that subtype A/H3 may
have been responsible for seeding the transmission hub in Cleveland OH, and that subtype
B may have been responsible for seeding the transmission hub in Worcester MA. Subtype
A/H1 was probably not responsible for seeding the outbreak in Cleveland OH, subtype A/H3
was probably not responsible for seeding the outbreaks in Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA
or Boise ID, and subtype B was probably not responsible for seeding the outbreaks in El
Paso TX or Boise ID.
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Fig. 6.15 Scatter plots of the relative prevalence of antigenic types A/H1 (blue circles), A/H3
(red squares), and B (green diamonds) in each HHS region vs. the relative transmissive
contribution from a given transmissive hub to that region, for all five transmission hubs of
the 2007-08 influenza outbreak. The plotted lines depict the linear least squares fits for all
regressions with p-value below 0.1. Line colour corresponds to the antigenic type, with blue
for A/H1, red for A/H3, and green for B. There is a positive relationship between prevalence
of antigenic type B and transmissive influence from Worcester MA, between prevalence of
antigenic type A/H3 and transmissive influence from Cleveland OH, and between prevalence
of antigenic type A/H1 and transmissive influence from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA
and Boise ID. There is a negative relationship between prevalence of antigenic type A/H1
and transmissive influence from Cleveland OH.
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Table 6.3 Regression p-values and direction of relationship (positive or negative) between
antigenic prevalence and transmissive influence from each hub, across the 10 HHS regions in
the United States. Significant (p< 0.1) values are in bold.
Transmission hub A/H1 A/H3 B
Worcester MA 0.35 (–) 0.82 (–) 0.010 (+)
Cleveland OH 0.0026 (–) 0.089 (+) 0.40 (+)
El Paso TX 0.94 (–) 0.40 (+) 0.081 (–)
Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA 0.024 (+) 0.17 (–) 0.48 (–)
Boise ID 0.0049 (+) 0.16 (–) 0.22 (–)
6.7 Discussion
In this chapter, the geographic transmission model developed in Chapter 3 is fit to epidemic
onset times from the 2003-04 and 2007-08 influenza outbreaks in the United States. In
spite of the many differences between these two seasonal outbreaks and the 2009 pandemic,
including epidemic timing, duration, and responsible strain(s), the best transmission model
for all three epidemics takes the same general form. In all three seasons, transmission
is described by gravity-driven transmission modulated by recipient, but not donor, ZIP
population size, as well as by surrounding population density. However, the values for the
model parameters differ between seasons, capturing differences in transmission strength and
the characteristic distance of gravity-driven geographic spread. The transmissibility (βd)
is highest in 2003-04 and lowest in 2007-08. The high transmissibility in 2003-04 may be
explained by the fact that the outbreak was caused by a novel type of an especially virulent
influenza strain, A/H3, to which underlying population immunity was low. Furthermore, the
outbreak, though strong, was not classified as a pandemic, so the general public’s vigilance
may not have been as high as it was in 2009, leading to higher contract rates and increased
transmission. On the other hand, in 2007-08, all three circulating strains were related to
strains that had circulated in previous years, so underlying immunity was likely higher than
in 2003-04 or in 2009, reducing transmissibility. The distance kernels in 2003-04 and in
2007-08 feature shorter characteristic distances (ρ) than the 2009 pandemic and thicker tails
(smaller γ). This could be explained by differences in social behaviour during the pandemic
vs. the seasonal outbreaks. Individuals may have been more likely to make long-distance
trips during the seasonal outbreaks, leading to a lower γ . Also, the average age of infection is
generally higher for outbreaks dominated by strain type A/H3 (the dominant strain in 2003-04
and 2007-08) than by types A/H1 (the dominant strain in 2009) and B [18]. This may have
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further increased the impact of long-distance travel, which is likely more frequent for older
individuals, during the two seasonal outbreaks. The population density normalisation term (ε)
is smaller in 2007-08 than it is in 2003-04 or in 2009. Smaller ε is associated with a higher
force of infection for ZIPs in densely-populated areas relative to equivalent ZIPs in sparsely-
populated areas. This difference in ε may be attributed to underlying immunity, which was
present in 2007-08 but largely absent in 2003-04 and 2009. For a strain to spark an outbreak
in a population that already has some underlying immunity to it, an especially high frequency
of interpersonal contacts (which are likely more frequent in densely-populated areas) may be
required, compared with a strain to which essentially everyone is vulnerable. The estimated
values for the gravity population size factor µ and the ILI time series normalisation factor
θ are fairly consistent across all three seasons; transmission is roughly related to the fourth
root of the recipient population size and the square root of the normalised ILI intensity.
It appears that the 2003-04 and autumn 2009 outbreaks have much in common, including
the abnormally early time of year when they began circulating in the US, their transmission
hubs in small- to mid-sized cities, and their marked wave-like geographic transmission
patterns emanating from the southeastern US. The 2007-08 outbreak differed from these
other two outbreaks on all three counts. It remains unclear why this might be the case. One
possibility is that the 2003-04 and 2009 strains were able to invade earlier in the year, due to
low levels of underlying immunity. This means that the 2003-04 and 2009 outbreaks may
have spread during a time when influenza transmission was ‘sub-optimal’; that is, indoor
crowding, humidity, and temperature, among other factors, may not have been as conducive to
influenza transmission as they tend to be in the later winter months. Studying the geographic
transmission patterns of other influenza seasons may help unpick which of these factors may
matter most to the geographic spread of influenza, and whether there is indeed a split regime
between 2003-04- and 2009-like outbreaks and other ‘regular’ seasonal outbreaks.
It would be interesting to see whether the same model form persists across all seasons
for which the IMS-ILI data are available, and how the model parameters compare across the
seasons. In seasons for which the initial rise in ILI intensity is less severe, the breakpoint
onset time estimates are less certain and, in general, fewer ZIPs can be retained in the analysis.
However, one way to avoid omitting data entirely would be to account for neighbouring ILI
intensity in the model’s n j,t term, even if ZIP j’s onset was undetectable. Also, fitting the
model parameters using an MCMC scheme, rather than the maximum likelihood strategy
employed here, may be especially useful, since it would more explicitly account for uncer-
tainty in outbreak onset time. In the weaker seasons, this onset uncertainty is likely to have a
greater impact on the model inferences.
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The transmissibility surfaces fit to 2003-04 and 2007-08 reveal further temporal and
geographic variation in transmission in both of those seasons. In 2003-04, there is a band
of increased transmissibility between the southeastern US and the northeast. The map of
outbreak onset times (Fig 6.1) for that season reveals relatively early jumps to that band of
the US, suggesting that the transmissibility surface is capturing a true effect. In 2007-08,
there is a small patch of decreased susceptibility near the borders of Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Virginia, as well as near Chicago and in the northeast, around New York City. These
might correspond to underlying immunity in these areas due to previous outbreaks.
There is essentially no significant temporal variation in the transmissibility of the 2003-
04 outbreak (see Fig 6.4). For the 2007-08 outbreak, however, there is a clear dip in
transmissibility in late December, followed by a slight increase in early January. This might
follow the school term; as schools closed for the winter vacation, transmissibility dipped, and
then increased again when schools opened for the new term at the beginning of the calendar
year. The 2003-04 outbreak, which struck significantly earlier, would not have been impacted
by this effect.
Remarkably, only one transmission hub is identified for the 2003-04 outbreak. Since
the outbreak spread quickly, especially compared with the 2009 pandemic, there may have
simply been less time for multiple introductions of infection. Also, the parameter fits for the
transmission model indicate that the transmission kernel has a thicker tail than the kernel for
the 2009 pandemic, so any mid-distance jumps that occurred are more likely to be attributed
to gravity-driven spread, rather than seeding. Following the pattern observed in the 2009
pandemic, the transmission hub for 2003-04 is a mid-sized town in the southeast. However,
Houston TX was infected quickly thereafter, potentially facilitating onward spread. This
agrees with data from the CDC that indicates that Texas was the first state to report influenza
activity in 2003 [37].
Five transmission hubs are identified for the 2007-08 outbreak. In contrast to the 2003-04
outbreak and the 2009 pandemic, each of these cities is a major regional population centre.
Worcester MA is close to Boston, and after Boston is the second most populous city in New
England. Inglewood and Torrance CA both lie within greater Los Angeles. Cleveland and
Boise are the largest and second-largest cities in their respective states. El Paso TX is a
major southwestern city, and lies adjacent to Ciudad Juárez, the largest city in the Mexican
state of Chihuahua. This matches more closely with the conventional notion that influenza
spreads hierarchically from major cities into surrounding areas. It is unclear why a traditional
seasonal outbreak might follow this pattern, while outbreaks of novel strains, as in 2003-04
and 2009, do not. This is an important area for further research.
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Measuring the symbolic transfer entropy between the age-stratified time series for the
2003-04 and 2007-08 outbreaks suggests that the role of children was qualitatively similar
for the two seasonal outbreaks as it was for the 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic. In all three
outbreaks, there is evidence of elevated transmission from school-aged children to most other
age groups. The dominant age group for the 2003-04 outbreak may have been just older
than the dominant age group for the 2007-08 and 2009 epidemics, at 15-19 years vs. 10-14
years. This may reflect an authentic difference in the average age of infection between those
outbreaks; indeed, influenza subtype A/H3N2, which dominated the 2003-04 outbreak, is
associated with a higher average age of infection than are subtypes A/H1N1 and B [18]. The
overall ranges of the STE values for 2003-04 and 2007-08 are smaller than for the 2009
pandemic, but this does not necessarily imply that transmission during the two seasonal
outbreaks was less affected by age structure. Instead, it is possible that elevated reporting
rates and relatively more acute outbreaks during the pandemic lead to more pronounced
observed differences in STE. In the simulation studies presented in Chapter 5, previous
immunity was not taken into account, and so it is unclear how STE might respond to the
underlying immunity that may have affected the transmission of the 2003-04 and 2007-08
influenza outbreaks. It is possible that this underlying immunity could explain why the
between-age-group differences in STE were less pronounced in 2003-04 and 2007-08 than in
2009. This would be an interesting area for further theoretical work.
Like the 2009 pandemic, the 2003-04 outbreak was dominated by a single antigenic
subtype. During the 2007-08 outbreak, however, three strains co-circulated. An exploratory
statistical analysis shows that a high relative prevalence of antigenic type A/H1 is associated
with regions whose outbreaks can be traced predominately to hubs in the western half of
the US (Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA and Boise ID); that the relative prevalence of
antigenic type A/H3 is associated with regions seeded predominately by Cleveland OH; and
that high relative prevalence of type B is associated with regions whose outbreaks can be
traced predominately back to Worcester MA.
An obvious next step is to develop a full statistical model to infer which viral subtype
triggered each hub’s outbreak. This would involve specifying the probability of observing
some collection of laboratory-confirmed subtypes in each region, given the subtypes that
infected each hub, and then working backwards to identify the strain-hub assignments that
maximise the likelihood of observing the true laboratory-confirmed data. It is tempting to
use the matrix P to estimate the expected subtype prevalences in each region, since P gives
the expected onward transmissive influence from each hub. However, the matrix P does not
adequately account for the dependence structure between city-level outbreaks. Consider, for
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example, the transmission network depicted in Fig 6.16. Circles represent cities, and arrow
widths are proportional to the forces of infection between them. Consider a scenario in which
locations 1 and 2 have simultaneous outbreak onsets, followed by location 3, then location
4, and so on. Calculating P for this scenario would reveal that locations 1 and 2 contribute
roughly equally to all of the downstream outbreaks; that is, C for locations 1 and 2 would be
about 3.5 each for this system of 7 cities. However, if we imagine that locations 1 and 2 are
infected by different viral subtypes, and that each downstream city-level outbreak is caused
by the subtype of the city that directly infected it, then the strain that manages to infect city 3
will likely be highly represented in all downstream outbreaks. So, while the expected relative
prevalence of each strain in this system, captured by P, will be around 50%, in reality it is
likely that six of the seven city-level outbreaks will have been caused by single strain. This
must be taken into account when calculating the strain-hub likelihoods.
1
2
3 4 5 76
Fig. 6.16 Example transmission network to illustrate an extreme case of dependence between
outbreaks. Circles represent cities, and arrows represent possible routes of transmission.
Arrow widths represent the force of infection along that transmission route, as would be
specified by the geographic transmission model, Eq 6.1. The epidemic depicted here begins
simultaneously in cities 1 and 2, then spreads to city 3, then to city 4, and so on. In this
scenario, each city’s outbreak can be traced back to either city 1 or city 2 with about 50%
probability each. However, this does not imply that the strains responsible for infecting cities
1 and 2 will be found in roughly equal quantities in the downstream outbreaks; instead, it is
far more likely that whichever strain infects location 3 will dominate the epidemic overall.
This has important implications when developing a statistical strategy to infer which strain
infected which hub.
One possible strategy for incorporating this dependence structure is to simulate many
possible “who infected whom” transmission trees. This may be done by randomly assigning
a ‘parent’ to each ZIP outbreak, according to the transition probabilities in the reverse
transmission network (see Fig 4.2). Then, for a given transmission tree, each ZIP’s outbreak
may be traced back to the hub from which its outbreak originated. Doing this for all ZIPs
within an HHS region provides an estimate of the relative influence of each hub in the region,
given the particular who-infected-whom transmission tree. Each hub may then be assigned
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the subtype that best accounts for the observed laboratory-confirmed prevalences of each
subtype across all regions. This may be repeated for many who-infected-whom networks,
until a pattern emerges, with particular subtypes being repeatedly assigned to particular
hubs. There are two key complications with this strategy, however. First, the number of
possible epidemic trajectories is massive, on the order of 102034, making it nearly impossible
to sample the space of possible transmission trees completely enough to guarantee robust
subtype-hub assignments. Second, some of the transmission trees assign all outbreaks in a
region to just one or two hubs, and yet all three antigenic types (A/H1, A/H3, and B) are
observed in the region. So, random effects need to be built into the model to account for
outbreak “impurity”, that is, that each ZIP-level outbreak does not consist of solely one
antigenic type. It is difficult to say how exactly these random effects ought to be incorporated.
Attempts to develop and make inferences from such a model have so far been unsuccessful,
but this remains an important and interesting area for future work.
6.8 Summary
A geographic transmission model is fit to outbreak onset times inferred from ILI data in the
United States from 2003-04 and 2007-08. The most parsimonious transmission model for
both epidemics matches the overall form of the best model for the geographic transmission
of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic. Transmissibility of the 2003-04 outbreak
was similar in magnitude to that of the 2009 outbreak, while the transmissibility of the
2007-08 outbreak was smaller, possibly reflecting an effect from underlying immunity. The
gravity distance kernels for the seasonal outbreaks have thicker tails than the kernel for the
pandemic outbreak, indicating a higher likelihood of long-distance jumps. Transmissibility
varied geographically for both seasonal outbreaks, though the magnitude of this variation
was smaller than for the 2009 pandemic. Transmissibility also varied over time in 2007-08,
with a dip in late December and a peak in mid-January, possibly reflecting differences in
contact rates associated with the winter holidays. Nearly all of the geographic transmission
in 2003-04 can be attributed to a single transmission hub in Mandeville, LA. In 2007-08,
five transmission hubs are identified, all of which are in or near large cities. Calculating
the symbolic transfer entropy between age-stratified ILI time series from both the 2003-
04 and 2007-08 influenza epidemics suggests that school-aged children likely contributed
disproportionately to transmission during both seasons. For the 2007-08 outbreak, when
three antigenically distinct strains circulated, the strains that may have infected each hub
are identified using regressions. According to this analysis, cumulative incidence of strain
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types A/H1 is correlated with seeding from Inglewood Vicinity/Torrance CA and Boise
ID, cumulative incidence of type A/H3 is correlated with seeding from Cleveland OH, and
cumulative incidence of type B is correlated with seeding from Worcester MA.
Chapter 7
Discussion and conclusions
By making use of a dataset that captures weekly city-level influenza-like illness incidence in
the United States, I have characterised the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm pandemic influenza
outbreak in the US in terms of its geographic transmission patterns, its establishment sites,
and the age groups most responsible for sparking and sustaining its transmission. While the
age-structured results align with established theory regarding the transmission of influenza
– that the bulk of transmission is likely driven by children – the geographic results are
somewhat more surprising. Despite the well-documented rapid international spread of the
2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic, the invasion wave of the autumn 2009 pandemic in
the United States was relatively slow and cohesive, compared to the 2003-04 and 2007-08
seasonal outbreaks. Also, the geographic sites where the autumn 2009 pandemic first became
established in the United States were generally mid-sized cities, not the major urban areas
that conventional wisdom might expect to be epicentres of disease transmission. These
findings highlight the difficulties involved with planning for pandemic influenza outbreaks,
and indicate key areas for further research to prepare for the next emergence of a novel
influenza virus.
7.1 Accounting for the establishment sites and transmis-
sion patterns of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm epidemic
in the US
In Chapters 3 and 4, the southeastern United States is identified as a key region for both
the initial establishment and subsequent transmission of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm
epidemic in the US. This is not the first time the region has been identified as an important
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site of influenza transmission: Charu et al. (2017) [48] find that seven of the eight influenza
outbreaks in the US between 2003 and 2010 were likely seeded in the southeast, and Shaman
et al. (2011) [209] note that the southeastern US suffered a third wave of pandemic influenza
in 2010 from which the rest of the country was spared. Unfortunately, the IMS-ILI dataset
concludes just before the onset of this third pandemic wave, so it cannot be studied in the
same way as the earlier autumn 2009 wave is in this thesis. Shaman et al. (2011) [209]
attribute the third pandemic wave to a local rise in absolute humidity in the southeastern
US. Absolute humidity is not considered as a contributor to the geographic transmission
of influenza in this thesis, largely because it was rejected as an important predictor of city-
level influenza outbreak onset times in the geographic transmission models developed by
Gog et al. (2014) [91] and Charu et al. (2017) [48]. However, the potential influence of
absolute humidity on the geographic transmission of influenza is worth revisiting. It may
be worthwhile to develop a ‘risk of establishment’ map based on potential predictors of
local outbreak establishment, including absolute humidity, age-structured contact rates, and
age-structured movement patterns. This could follow in the spirit of Pigott et al. (2014)
[192], who estimate the risk of emergence of Ebola virus disease in West Africa according to
a set of geographically-varying predictors. The Gaussian process transmissibility surfaces
presented in Chapter 3 provide a first prediction of what this risk surface might look like.
Regressing possible covariates against the posterior mean Gaussian process values may
provide a way of identifying plausible predictors for the risk map. Unfortunately, little is
known about age-structured contact and movement patterns in the US as a whole, let alone
for particular subregions. An important area for future research, then, is the collection of
geo-tagged and age-structured movement and contact data in the United States, possibly
using POLYMOD-like surveys [170] and mobile phone geo-tracking. These data could help
explain regional and inter-seasonal differences in the transmission dynamics of influenza,
and possibly of other diseases as well.
7.2 Incorporating epidemiological and genetic data
In Chapter 4, a method is developed to identify an outbreak’s geographic transmission
hubs and their associated basins of infection. The method lays the groundwork for a new
way of combining epidemiological and genetic data. The most straightforward avenue for
further investigation would be to perform an independent genetic clustering analysis on
2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza virus sequences from the United States, to see if the basins of
infection identified in Chapter 4 can be reproduced. Then, it may be possible to develop
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a more unified statistical inferential framework, possibly using the basins of infection as a
Bayesian prior estimate of the geographic variation in 2009 A/H1N1pdm strain prevalences,
and using viral genome sequences to refine the estimate. This sort of analysis could help
distinguish true transmission hubs from false ones, since the basins of infection associated
with false transmission hubs should not be visible in the genetic data.
A second way of incorporating genetic data into the methods from Chapter 4 would
be to use phylogenetic approaches to infer transmission links between the autumn 2009
transmission hubs and possible reservoirs of infection outside the US. This would follow in
the vein of Lycett et al. (2012) [160], who infer the migration routes of 2009 A/H1N1pdm
influenza between various countries and continents. Specifically, phylogenetic relationships
between viral strains circulating in distinct basins of infection and in other parts of the world
would be used to infer long-distance transmission routes of the autumn 2009 A/H1N1pdm
outbreak. Knowing the basins of infection may enhance the inferential capability of Lycett et
al.’s approach, since the basins are likely to be more epidemiologically relevant partitions
of geographic space than geopolitical boundaries. This would flesh out the transmission
history of the 2009 A/H1N1pdm influenza pandemic in the US: the genetic analysis would
reveal how long-distance transmission to/between the hubs may have occurred, while the
geographic transmission model from Chapter 3 would describe the onward short-distance
transmission of infection from the hubs.
7.3 Linking individual-based and metapopulation disease
dynamics
This thesis relies heavily on a metapopulation approach to disease modelling, though an
individual-based simulation features briefly in the validation of the hub identification method
in Chapter 4. Individual-based and metapopulation approaches are perhaps the two most
common perspectives for modelling the geographic spread of infectious diseases [128, 200].
Both are likely to remain relevant; indeed, epidemiological data is nearly always collected at
some scale of spatial aggregation, motivating the use of metapopulation models, yet individu-
als are ultimately responsible for spreading disease, so individual-based models provide a
more faithful description of the underlying disease dynamics. Despite the widespread use of
these two modelling paradigms, it remains unclear how epidemiological dynamics translate
between them.
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The transmission kernel is a concept present in both the individual-based and metapopu-
lation perspectives, and so it offers a sensible starting place for exploring the relationship
between epidemiological dynamics at the two scales. For individual-based models, the
transmission kernel is usually interpreted as an individual’s propensity to move over cer-
tain distances, while in the metapopulation framework, the transmission kernel describes
a more abstract decay in infective force with increasing spatial separation [128]. There
is no clear way of inferring the shape of a metapopulation transmission kernel from an
individual-based movement kernel. The shape of a metapopulation transmission kernel is
likely to depend intricately on the disease’s infectiousness, the frequency and duration of
individual-based movements, and the precise way in which the metapopulation patches are
partitioned. Extensive simulation studies may shed light on the relationship between kernels
at the two scales. In this thesis, and indeed in many epidemiological modelling analyses,
the metapopulation paradigm is largely taken for granted. This thesis’ findings, and spatial
epidemiology as a whole, would be greatly enhanced by a better understanding of the links
between individual-based and metapopulation epidemic models.
7.4 Inferring age-structured transmission from incidence
time series
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, symbolic transfer entropy (STE) provides a way of determining
which age groups drive the transmission of a disease from age-stratified incidence time series.
While STE is only applied to ILI time series in this thesis, it would be interesting to see
whether it can give plausible estimates of age-structured transmission for other diseases.
However, STE and related methods are inherently limited; since they do not explicitly take
into account underlying epidemiological dynamics, they can only provide a rough ordering
of which age groups contribute most to transmission. Obtaining more precise estimates of
age-structured differences in transmission strength will almost certainly require developing
model-based methods to reliably estimate the next-generation matrix from incidence data that
is separated into many age classes, possibly following the basic framework established by
Glass et al. (2011) [90], or extending the inferential methods developed by Yang et al. (2015)
[257] to accommodate multiple age groups. As classifications of population heterogeneity
increase in resolution – for example, as disease incidence data become increasingly tagged
by the sufferer’s exact age and geographic location – it may be necessary to consider
further generalisations of the next-generation matrix, which may include developing a
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continuous-state next-generation operator or function. Inaba (2017) [120] provides an up-
to-date discussion of work in this budding field. Ultimately, it will be necessary to unify
age-structured and spatially-structured notions of the generalised reproduction number; for
now, the best way of doing this remains an open question [200].
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